Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorBarnes, Gordon
dc.contributor.authorFilcheva, Krasimira
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-08T14:16:56Z
dc.date.available2021-09-08T14:16:56Z
dc.date.issued5/1/2011
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/6818
dc.description.abstractDerk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument has proved to be a major point of contention between compatibilism and hard incompatibilism in the debate over causal determinism's alleged threat to free will and moral responsibility. Notably, the four-case argument has met Michael Mckenna's so called hard-line reply, a six-case argument modeled after Pereboom’s four-case one and intended to establish a dialectical stalemate between the compatibilist and incompatibilist positions on largely intuitive grounds. Mckenna contends that his six-case argument elicits compatibilistically friendly intuitions about Pereboom’s case 1 in which the agent is said to be morally responsible. I argue that Mckenna's hard-line reply does not succeed in demonstrating this alleged stalemate between the two debating sides. The current state of the dispute can be so characterized only if the opposing sides' reported intuitions enjoy evidential equivalence. But, I argue, the evidential credentials of these intuitions are not equivalent. The newly elicited intuition from Mckenna’s six-case argument cannot be assumed to do any evidential work without a good explanation of why it cannot be a commanding intuition. I argue that Mckenna's proposed explanation is not adequate as it stands. Finally, I offer a diagnosis of the origins of the apparent dialectical impasse, and, on this basis, seek to advance the debate on novel grounds. I defend the four-case argument by locating the disagreement between the two sides in the particular application of the generalization method.
dc.subjectBrockport Honors College
dc.subjectDerk Pereboom
dc.subjectFree Will
dc.subjectMcKenna
dc.titleIn Defense of the Four-Case Manipulation Argument for Hard Incompatibilism
dc.typethesis
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-08T14:16:56Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitleSenior Honors Theses
dc.contributor.organizationThe College at Brockport
dc.languate.isoen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
honors/66/fulltext (1).pdf
Size:
176.3Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record