• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • University Colleges
    • SUNY Brockport
    • Theses
    • Brockport Senior Honors Theses
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • University Colleges
    • SUNY Brockport
    • Theses
    • Brockport Senior Honors Theses
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of SUNY Open Access RepositoryCommunitiesPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsDepartmentThis CollectionPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsDepartmentAuthor ProfilesView

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Campus Communities in SOAR

    Alfred State CollegeBrockportBroomeCantonDownstateDutchessEmpireFarmingdaleFinger LakesFredoniaHerkimerMaritimeNew PaltzNiagaraOld WestburyOneontaOnondagaOptometryOswegoPlattsburghPurchase CollegePolytechnic InstituteSUNY Office of Workforce Development and Upward MobilitySUNY PressUpstate Medical

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    In Defense of the Four-Case Manipulation Argument for Hard Incompatibilism

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    honors/66/fulltext (1).pdf
    Size:
    176.3Kb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Average rating
     
       votes
    Cast your vote
    You can rate an item by clicking the amount of stars they wish to award to this item. When enough users have cast their vote on this item, the average rating will also be shown.
    Star rating
     
    Your vote was cast
    Thank you for your feedback
    Author
    Filcheva, Krasimira
    Keyword
    Brockport Honors College
    Derk Pereboom
    Free Will
    McKenna
    Date Published
    2011-05-01
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/6818
    Abstract
    Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument has proved to be a major point of contention between compatibilism and hard incompatibilism in the debate over causal determinism's alleged threat to free will and moral responsibility. Notably, the four-case argument has met Michael Mckenna's so called hard-line reply, a six-case argument modeled after Pereboom’s four-case one and intended to establish a dialectical stalemate between the compatibilist and incompatibilist positions on largely intuitive grounds. Mckenna contends that his six-case argument elicits compatibilistically friendly intuitions about Pereboom’s case 1 in which the agent is said to be morally responsible. I argue that Mckenna's hard-line reply does not succeed in demonstrating this alleged stalemate between the two debating sides. The current state of the dispute can be so characterized only if the opposing sides' reported intuitions enjoy evidential equivalence. But, I argue, the evidential credentials of these intuitions are not equivalent. The newly elicited intuition from Mckenna’s six-case argument cannot be assumed to do any evidential work without a good explanation of why it cannot be a commanding intuition. I argue that Mckenna's proposed explanation is not adequate as it stands. Finally, I offer a diagnosis of the origins of the apparent dialectical impasse, and, on this basis, seek to advance the debate on novel grounds. I defend the four-case argument by locating the disagreement between the two sides in the particular application of the generalization method.
    Collections
    Brockport Senior Honors Theses

    entitlement

     

    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2025)  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.