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dc.contributor.authorFirth, Roderick
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-07T19:32:04Z
dc.date.available2021-09-07T19:32:04Z
dc.date.issued1971-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/3400
dc.description.abstractThere is exactly one good reason to prefer dualism to the identity theory, and it is is this: whereas brain events occur in a particular spatial location inside the head, it is nonsensical to say that mental events occur in any particular location. Professor Shaffer’s other objections to the identity theory are either parasitic on this one, or else unsuccessful.
dc.subjectPhilosophy Of Mind
dc.subjectMaterialism
dc.subjectIdentity Theory
dc.subjectBehaviorism
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectJerome Shaffer
dc.titleOn Being in the Mind
dc.typearticle
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-07T19:32:04Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.source.peerreviewedTRUE
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitlePhilosophic Exchange
dc.contributor.organizationHarvard University
dc.languate.isoen_US


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  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

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