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dc.contributor.authorFoot, Philippa
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-07T19:32:03Z
dc.date.available2021-09-07T19:32:03Z
dc.date.issued1971-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/3393
dc.description.abstractKant insisted that moral precepts must be categorical imperatives, telling the agent what he should do, no matter what his desires or interests. Kant contrasted these categorical imperatives with hypothetical imperatives, which operate only on the condition of certain desires or interests. I believe it is a mistake to think that Kant has disposed of the hypothetical imperative in morals. In this paper, I will consider the arguments that he has brought against it, and respond to them.
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectMoral Philosophy
dc.subjectImmanuel Kant
dc.subjectHypothetical Imperative
dc.titleIn Defense of the Hypothetical Imperative
dc.typearticle
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-07T19:32:03Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.source.peerreviewedTRUE
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitlePhilosophic Exchange
dc.contributor.organizationOxford University
dc.languate.isoen_US


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  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

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