In Defense of Introspection
|The author defends the conviction that we have direct knowledge or awareness of our own states of mind, that we do not have to observe our own speech and behavior in order to find out whether we are angry or elated or what we believe or hope or fear, and that, furthermore, we do often come to know, or at least reasonably to believe, such things about ourselves.
|In Defense of Introspection
|New School of Social Research
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Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.