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dc.contributor.authorPereboom, Derk
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-07T19:31:40Z
dc.date.available2021-09-07T19:31:40Z
dc.date.issued12/1/2010
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/3260
dc.description.abstractStructuralist theories describe the entities in their domains solely in terms of relations, while also claiming to be complete theories of the entities in question. Leibniz and Kant insist that no structuralist theory can be a complete theory. Kant believes that the knowledge afforded by structuralist theories is sufficient. However, Jacques Derrida is skeptical of the sufficiency of structuralist theories for stable knowledge of any kind.
dc.subjectMetaphysics
dc.subjectStructuralism
dc.subjectIntrinsic Properties
dc.subjectLeibniz
dc.subjectKant
dc.subjectDerrida
dc.titleStructuralism, Anti-Structuralism and Objectivity
dc.typearticle
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-07T19:31:40Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.source.peerreviewedTRUE
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitlePhilosophic Exchange
dc.contributor.organizationCornell University
dc.languate.isoen_US


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  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

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