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dc.contributor.authorWilliams, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-07T19:31:35Z
dc.date.available2021-09-07T19:31:35Z
dc.date.issued2007-09-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/3233
dc.description.abstractThis paper contrasts two varieties of naturalism: realistic naturalism and pragmatic naturalism. These two views both reject a priori knowledge, but then they differ in many ways. For realistic naturalists, meaning and knowledge are to be understood in terms of causal relations. By contrast, pragmatists think that meaning and knowledge can be understood only in relation to normatively constructed practices.
dc.subjectEpistemology
dc.subjectNaturalism
dc.subjectRealism
dc.subjectPragmatism
dc.titleNaturalism, Realism and Pragmatism
dc.typearticle
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-07T19:31:35Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.source.peerreviewedTRUE
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitlePhilosophic Exchange
dc.contributor.organizationJohns Hopkins University
dc.languate.isoen_US


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  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

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