Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorWeitz, Morris
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-07T19:31:27Z
dc.date.available2021-09-07T19:31:27Z
dc.date.issued1/1/1972
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/3187
dc.description.abstractPhilosophical theories of human action aim to state necessary conditions of human action. The thesis of this paper is that there are no such conditions. The concept of a human action is essentially an open concept. It is not governed by any set of necessary conditions. The paper considers and rejects several recent attempts to state necessary conditions of human action, including those of Donald Davidson and Roderick Chisholm
dc.subjectPhilosophy Of Action
dc.subjectAction Theory
dc.subjectDonald Davidson
dc.subjectRoderick Chisholm
dc.titleThe Concept of Human Action
dc.typearticle
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-07T19:31:27Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.source.peerreviewedTRUE
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitlePhilosophic Exchange
dc.contributor.organizationBrandeis University
dc.languate.isoen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
phil_ex/vol3/iss1/21/fulltext ...
Size:
4.871Mb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

Show simple item record