The Concept of Human Action
|dc.description.abstract||Philosophical theories of human action aim to state necessary conditions of human action. The thesis of this paper is that there are no such conditions. The concept of a human action is essentially an open concept. It is not governed by any set of necessary conditions. The paper considers and rejects several recent attempts to state necessary conditions of human action, including those of Donald Davidson and Roderick Chisholm|
|dc.subject||Philosophy Of Action|
|dc.title||The Concept of Human Action|
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Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.