The Concept of Human Action

Philosophical theories of human action aim to state necessary conditions of human action. The thesis of this paper is that there are no such conditions. The concept of a human action is essentially an open concept. It is not governed by any set of necessary conditions. The paper considers and rejects several recent attempts to state necessary conditions of human action, including those of Donald Davidson and Roderick Chisholm

Collections

Philosophic Exchange

The Concept of Human Action

Average rating

Cast your vote You can rate an item by clicking the amount of stars they wish to award to this item. When enough users have cast their vote on this item, the average rating will also be shown. Star rating

Author

Keyword

Date Published

Metadata

URI

Abstract

Collections

Cast your vote
You can rate an item by clicking the amount of stars they wish to award to this item. When enough users have cast their vote on this item, the average rating will also be shown.

Star rating