On the Banality of Literary Truths
|dc.description.abstract||The propositional theory of literary truth says that the purpose of literary works is to express propositions. One objection to this theory is that the propositions that can be extracted from literary works are too banal to constitute the purpose of those works. This paper defends the propositional theory against this objection.|
|dc.subject||Philosophy Of Literature|
|dc.title||On the Banality of Literary Truths|
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Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.