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dc.contributor.authorMargolis, Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-07T19:31:19Z
dc.date.available2021-09-07T19:31:19Z
dc.date.issued1/1/1994
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/3149
dc.description.abstractWestern philosophy has tended to distinguish between the use of our cognitive powers in theoretical and practical matters. Moreover, Western philosophy has persuaded itself that whatever is valid in human judgment depends upon and implicates necessary invariances. These assumptions are manifested and developed, most prominently, in Aristotle and Kant. This paper argues against both of these assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition.
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectMetaphysics
dc.subjectHistory Of Philosophy
dc.subjectPhilosophy Of Science
dc.titleA Reckoning of Sorts on the Prospects of Moral Philosophy
dc.typearticle
refterms.dateFOA2021-09-07T19:31:19Z
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockport
dc.source.peerreviewedTRUE
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.description.publicationtitlePhilosophic Exchange
dc.languate.isoen_US


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  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

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