Incentives for monitors; director stock-based compensation and firm performance
| dc.contributor.author | Cordeiro, James J. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Veliyath, Rajaram | |
| dc.contributor.author | Neubaum, Donald O. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-07T17:29:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-09-07T17:29:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-04-01 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/2087 | |
| dc.description | First appeared in The Journal of Applied Business Research Volume 21, Number 2 Posted with permission of The Clute Institute | |
| dc.description.abstract | Since the mid-1990s, US corporations have increasingly emphasized stock-based compensation for outside directors in order to align their interests with stockholders and thus boost firm performance. We demonstrate that stock options and stock grants (each as a ratio relative to total compensation) for directors were positively related to future firm performance (measured as stock returns, and, separately, as Jensen's Alpha) for a panel of 450 Standard and Poor 500 films over 1995-97. Stock option ratios appeared to have a stronger impact on film performance than stock grants did. | |
| dc.title | Incentives for monitors; director stock-based compensation and firm performance | |
| dc.type | article | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | The Journal of Applied Business Research | |
| dc.source.volume | 21 | |
| dc.source.issue | 2 | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-09-07T17:29:28Z | |
| dc.description.institution | SUNY Brockport | |
| dc.source.peerreviewed | TRUE | |
| dc.source.status | published | |
| dc.description.publicationtitle | Business-Economics Faculty Publications | |
| dc.contributor.organization | Kennesaw State University | |
| dc.contributor.organization | The College at Brockport | |
| dc.contributor.organization | University of Central Florida | |
| dc.languate.iso | en_US |
