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    Insider Ownership and Financial Analysts' Information Environment: Evidence from Dual-Class Firms

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    Author
    Forst, Arno
    Hettler, Barry
    Barniv, Ran Ron
    Keyword
    Insider Ownership
    Corporate Governance
    Financial Analysts
    Forecast Accuracy
    Dual-Class Firms
    Journal title
    Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
    Date Published
    2016-10-18
    
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    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/2073
    Abstract
    We examine the association of insider ownership with financial analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion in a sample of U.S. dual class firms. Insider ownership exerts two effects: a positive incentive and a negative entrenchment effect. The lack of significant findings in prior research regarding the association between insider ownership and forecast accuracy may be attributable to the offsetting forces of these two effects. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. firms that maintain more than one class of common stock, we are able to disentangle incentive and entrenchment effects which are confounded in single-class firms. We find that disproportionate insider control is negatively associated with forecast accuracy and positively associated with forecast dispersion. Moreover, insider cash flow rights (insider voting rights) are positively (negatively) associated with forecast accuracy and negatively (positively) associated with forecast dispersion, consistent with incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects of ownership affecting financial analysts’ forecasting environment in opposite directions.
    Citation
    Forst, A., Hettler, B., & Barniv, R. R. (2016). Insider Ownership and Financial Analysts’ Information Environment: Evidence From Dual-Class Firms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance , 0148558X16670048.
    DOI
    https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X16670048
    Description
    Article first published online: October 18, 2016 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X16670048
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X16670048
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    Business-Economics Faculty Publications

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