• Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy

      Cohen, Marshall; The Rockefeller University (1970-01-01)
      Civil disobedience is an action that is intended to appeal to the public, to show that they have violated principles that they otherwise generally accept. This is why acts of civil disobedience must be public acts. Acts of civil disobedience cannot involve violence to persons, for that might provoke fear, which undermines the public’s ability to listen to the appeal. The civil disobedient accepts his punishment in order to demonstrate his commitment to the rule of law, and also to demonstrate the seriousness of his commitment to the principles that have been violated by the public.
    • Comment on "Some Essays at Objectivity"

      Kateb, George; Amherst College (1973-01-01)
    • Comment on Dewart's Language and Religion

      Catan, John; The College at Brockport (1972-01-01)
      Professor Dewart’s thesis is every bit as much a metaphysical view as the one that he opposes. It is also unfalsifiable.
    • Comment on Monroe Beardsley’s ‘Inevitability in History’

      Krieger, Leonard; Columbia University (1971-01-01)
      There seem to be inevitabilities both within and without history. Thus, Monroe Beardsley’s analysis of historical inevitability raises this question: what is the relationship between the extra-historical and the historical inevitability? There seems to be an assumption that the concept of inevitability is the same within and without history. I wish to question that assumption. There are distinctively historical forms of inevitability that cannot be assimilated to other kinds of inevitability.
    • Comments on "Patient Morality"

      White, David E.; St. John Fisher College (1983-01-01)
    • Computers, Ethics and Business

      De George, Richard T.; The University of Kansas (1998-01-01)
      When it comes to computers and computer-related activities, moral responsibility is in short supply. Our language often manifests the myth that computers are responsible and hence no one is to blame. This paper explores the idea that computer programmers are morally responsible for the consequences of their programming.
    • Conceptual Analysis and its Limits

      Bennett, Karen; Cornell University (2017-10-18)
      My topic is conceptual analysis and its limits. I will start by sketching what I mean by ‘conceptual analysis’, and saying a bit about how it is used in contemporary philosophy. Then I will point out two limitations of the method, and illustrate these limits with examples: some from the philosophical literature, and some from biology.
    • Contra - The Moral Point of View

      Aiken, Henry D.; Brandeis University (1980-01-01)
    • Coping with Cognitive Limitations: Problems of Rationality in a Complex World

      Rescher, Nicholas (1997-01-01)
      In cognitive and practical contexts alike, even the most rational of problem-solutions can misfire in situations of incomplete information. The prevailing state of our information will -- and should -- decisively affect the determination of what is the best thing to do or think. Accordingly, reason faces the predicament of acknowledging that it must call on us to do that which, for aught we know, may in the end prove totally inappropriate.
    • Cosmopolitanism, Universalism and Particularism in an Age of Nationalism and Multiculturalism

      Nielsen, Kai; University of Calgary and Concordia University (1999-01-01)
      The objectivity of morality is achieved by the coherentist method of appealing to considered convictions in wide reflective equilibrium. This method yields a conception of morality that is at once universalistic and particularistic. It follows that morality must be cosmopolitan, but also accept a liberal nationalism, at least under certain circumstances. This paper concludes by applying these ideas to the issues of Quebec nationalism and the status of African-Americans in the United States.
    • "Crafting Natures": Aristotle on Animal Design

      Leunissen, Mariska; University of North Carolina (2011-03-01)
      It is a commonplace in Aristotelian scholarship that the forms of living beings and the animal species to which they give rise are “fixed.” However, Aristotle’s biological works often stress the flexibility of nature during the development of animals. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to delineate the range of flexibility that Aristotle takes natures to have in the design of animals; and second, to draw out the implications of this for Aristotle’s embryology and theory of natural teleology.
    • Culture or Commerce: On the Liberation of Expression

      Held, Virginia; City University of New York (1988-01-01)
    • Dance Writing and the Fear of Generalization

      Copeland, Roger; Oberlin College (1988-01-01)
    • Dangerous Beauties

      Muelder Eaton, Marcia; University of Minnesota (2000-01-01)
      In this paper I argue that many sound ecological practices have a chance of success only if we follow sound aesthetic practices. If we want to produce and maintain sustainable landscapes, we must work to connect aesthetic preferences to what is ecologically sound. We must work against what I shall call “dangerous beauties.”
    • Determinism and Inevitability

      Danto, Arthur C.; Columbia University (1971-01-01)
      Monroe Beardsley’s analysis of historical inevitability is simply an analysis of determinism. Thus, he has not specified what, in excess of determinism, is implied by assertions of historical inevitability.
    • Diabolical Mysticism, Death, and Skepticism

      Hirsch, Eli; Brandeis University (2009-01-01)
      According to one view, death is bad for the one who dies. The challenge for this view is to explain exactly why and when death is bad for the one who dies. According to an alternative view, death is not actually bad for the one who dies. There is a third alternative, according to which the thought of one’s own death elicits an experience that reveals the horror of one’s own death in a way that is ineffable. This paper explores this third alternative.
    • Do Social Events Defy Scientific Prediction?

      Morrison, Paula G.; The College at Brockport (1972-01-01)
      If Professor Macintyre is correct, then there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as a scientific explanation or prediction of anything social, and hence there can never be any social science. This paper responds to Professor Macintyre’s argument, and rejects his position.
    • Don’t Think Twice, It’s Alright

      Kornblith, Hilary; University of Massachusetts, Amherst (2019-01-01)
      We arrive at most of our beliefs unreflectively. As we navigate the world, beliefs about our surroundings are, inevitably, simply produced in us. Similarly, the vast majority of our actions are unreflective. We don’t have to think about every little thing we do; we simply act. But we also, at times, stop to reflect: Is this what I should believe? Is this what I should do? What does such reflective activity achieve? Some philosophers have suggested that reflecting about what we should believe is necessary if our beliefs are to be justified. In the case of action, some philosophers have suggested that reflecting about what one should do is necessary for freedom of the will. One might think that there are more humble benefits as well. Beliefs which are the product of reflective activity are more likely to be true than beliefs unreflectively arrived at; actions reflectively produced are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals than unreflective actions. This is just, it seems, good common sense. This paper challenges both common sense views about the benefits of reflection as well as a good deal of recent philosophical thinking. It would be silly to think that reflection is never valuable, but I will argue that both common sense, and much philosophical thought about the nature and importance of reflection, have vastly overestimated its value.
    • Dreams and Skeptics

      Sosa, Ernest; Brown University and Rutgers University (2005-11-01)
      This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.