• Toward a Philosophy of Chess

      Benardete, Jose; Syracuse University (1979-01-01)
    • Toward a Reasonable Ethics of Belief

      Ferre, Frederick; Dickenson College (1971-01-01)
      Reason has an important role to play in every area of life, including religion. However, Dr. Blanshard’s definition of what is “reasonable” is too narrow. There are many kinds and degrees of evidence. Even if one should not believe contrary to the evidence, or without any evidence, one might be permitted to believe in the absence of perfect evidence. Moreover, what constitutes relevant evidence is not the same in all areas of life. The kind of evidence that is relevant to a belief in physics is not the same as the kind of evidence that is relevant to a belief about the values of music, for example.
    • Toward an Experiential Sport Aesthetic

      Thomas, Carolyn E.; SUNY Buffalo (1974-01-01)
    • Towards a Critique of Contemporary Aesthetics

      Sircello, Guy (1990-01-01)
      This paper distinguishes two sub-fields of aesthetics: the study of a certain kind of experience, which is “aesthetics” proper, and the philosophy of art. The last fifty years have seen a turn away from aesthetics proper, in favor of the second sub-field, the philosophy of art. This paper argues against that trajectory, and in favor of aesthetics proper.
    • Towards a Technoethics

      Bunge, Mario; McGill University (1975-01-01)
    • Towards a Theory of Punishment

      Bennett, Jonathan; Syracuse University (1980-01-01)
    • Tradition and Innovation: Metaphor in Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion

      Duhan Kaplan, Laura; University of North Carolina at Charlotte (2003-01-01)
      Philosophy aspires to be a radical discipline, with the power to critique existing social structures. However, the practice of philosophy as a discipline seems to be quite conservative, especially insofar as the terms of the discipline are established by a canon of philosophers from the past. How can philosophy be at once conservative and critical in these ways? The answer is that philosophers reinterpret the language they inherit in ways that both honor its older meanings and introduce new ones.
    • Tragic Error and Agent Responsibility

      Witt, Charlotte; University of New Hampshire (2005-09-01)
      The characters of tragedy are in some sense responsible for their errors. However, given their ignorance of the consequences of their actions, it seems that they ought not be held responsible by others for what they have done. This is a paradox. The way to resolve the paradox is to distinguish two kinds of agent responsibility: accountability and culpability. Being accountable is primarily a private affair, whereas being culpable entails the possibility of just punishment.
    • Transcendental Semiotics and the Paradigms of First Philosophy

      Apel, Karl-Otto; University of Frankfurt, Germany (1978-01-01)
    • Trust as Robustly Moral

      Carse, Alisa; Georgetown University (2010-10-01)
      Trust is more than mere reliance on another person. To trust someone is to rely on her goodwill for the care of something valuable. It is to have a confident expectation that the other person will take care of the valuable thing because she recognizes its value to you. It is to expect her to take care of it because she recognizes that she should take care of it. Therefore trust is a robustly moral attitude.
    • Truth and Convention in Morality

      Taylor, Richard; University of Rochester (1977-01-01)
      The author considers the question of whether there is one true or valid set of moral principles, or whether all ethics are the distillation of our inherited codes and prohibitions.
    • Two Constraints on Interpreting

      Stern, Laurent; Rutgers University (1987-01-01)
    • Unconscious Actions Emanating From the Human Cerebral Cortex

      Eccles, John C.; The College at Brockport (1972-01-01)
      This paper presents some recent work of Roger Sperry and his associates on “split-brain cases.” The remarkable finding is that, after surgery, the actions that are programmed from one side of the cerebral cortex are not recognized by the other side of the cerebral cortex as belonging to the subject.
    • Understanding the Human World: Structure, Instruction and Deconstruction

      Caws, Peter (1999-01-01)
      This paper offers an account of the emergence of the human from the natural, for the species and for the individual. I show how human sciences are possible, and suggest some strategies for change based on the understanding that the human sciences provide.
    • Values in Science and Science Education

      Michalos, Alex C.; University of Guelph (1973-01-01)
    • Virtue and Flourishing in Our Interpersonal Relationships

      Besser-Jones, Lorraine; Middlebury College (2011-01-01)
      The eudaimonistic thesis claims that being virtuous is a necessary aspect of the development of some important kind of happiness. To be true, it must be the case that virtue is associated with a kind of happiness that is clearly recognizable as something that we want, that we can appreciate as a good state for us to be in, that we can identify as a state of our own well-being. So here is the empirical question: in our ordinary experiences, is it the case that virtue is necessary to developing this kind of state? This is a very large, and very important, question. In this paper, I chip away at one piece of this question by exploring virtue’s role in mediating our relationships with others. Caring about others and treating them well is clearly part of being virtuous (no matter how we construe the virtues) and I think it is also one aspect of being virtuous that we can see to be an important part of our happiness—at least, in our non-skeptical moments.
    • Virtue Ethics

      Baier, Kurt; University of Pittsburgh (1982-01-01)
    • Vision and Dream in the Cinema

      Sparshott, F. E.; Victoria College, University of Toronto (1971-01-01)
      There are many ways in which filmgoing is like dreaming. The space and time of the film experience are distorted and illusory. For instance, one has the sense of being spatially present on the filmed scene. However, if we really accepted a change in the camera viewpoint as a change in our own position, rapid intercutting between different viewpoints would be intolerable. This suggests that in film our sense of space is somehow bracketed or held in suspense. Likewise, we take what we see in the film to be happening in the present, yet we tolerate jumps backward and forward in time. On reflection, these peculiarities of the film experience are extremely odd. Our ability to enjoy them testifies to the mind’s tendency to smooth things over, interpreting whatever confronts it in terms of the simplest pattern.