• Mass Art, High Art, and the Avant-Garde: A Response to David Novitz

      Carroll, Noel; University of Wisconsin, Madison (1992-01-01)
      David Novitz proposes several alleged counterexamples to my theory of mass art. This paper responds to these alleged counterexamples.
    • Meaning in Life without Free Will

      Pereboom, Derk; University of Vermont (2003-01-01)
      Even if determinism precludes responsibility and accountability, it does not eliminate everything that we deem valuable. This paper argues that life can be meaningful even if we do not have free will.
    • Mind and Brain in the 17th Century

      Bennett, Jonathan (1994-01-01)
      The 17th century saw an enormous amount of energy dedicated to the question of whether matter can think. This paper follows certain strands of this debate in Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Spinoza. These strands of the debate are still relevant today.
    • Moral Issues in Medical Experiementation on Humans

      Cohen, Carl; University of Michigan (1979-01-01)
    • Moral Responsibility and the Corporation

      De George, Richard T.; University of Kansas (1981-01-01)
    • Morse Peckham's "Romanticism and Behavior": A Reply

      Abrams, M. H.; Cornell University (1974-01-01)
    • Mrs. Foot on the Sufficiency of Hypothetical Imperatives

      Beck, Lewis White; University of Rochester (1971-01-01)
      The issue between Mrs. Foot and Immanuel Kant is this: does the reason why one ought to do something always lie in expected, desired consequences, so that the command to do it is hypothetical? Mrs. Foot argues that the answer is “yes,” and that any alternative use of “ought” is unintelligible. I think that her argument for this claim is stronger when it is directed at the intuitionists than when it is directed at Kant. An analogy with logic, which is full of categorical imperatives, supports Kant’s position against Mrs. Foot.
    • Naturalism, Realism and Pragmatism

      Williams, Michael; Johns Hopkins University (2007-09-01)
      This paper contrasts two varieties of naturalism: realistic naturalism and pragmatic naturalism. These two views both reject a priori knowledge, but then they differ in many ways. For realistic naturalists, meaning and knowledge are to be understood in terms of causal relations. By contrast, pragmatists think that meaning and knowledge can be understood only in relation to normatively constructed practices.
    • Nietzsche's New Happiness: Longing, Boredom, and the Elusiveness of Fulfillment

      Reginster, Bernard; Brown University (2007-11-01)
      At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the elusiveness of fulfillment was a source of much perplexity. You believe that the possession of something that you desire will bring you fulfillment, but the acquisition of it leaves you dissatisfied. Arthur Schopenhauer said that this is because the objects of desire lack any intrinsic value. By contrast, Nietzsche argued that our experience of boredom reflects our desire to engage in a challenging form of activity.
    • No Need for Morality: The Case of the Competitive Market

      Gauthier, David; University of Pittsburgh (1982-01-01)
    • Noel Carroll’s Theory of Mass Art

      Novitz, David; University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand (1992-01-01)
      There is much in Noell Carroll’s article, “The Nature of Mass Art,” that is timely and helpful. However, this paper will focus on what is wrong with the theory that Carroll presents in that paper.
    • Objectivity and Nonfiction

      Brownson, Carol; SUNY College at Fredonia (1983-01-01)
    • Objectivity and the Transactional Theory of Perception

      Freeman, Eugene; San Jose State College (1972-01-01)
      The visual demonstrations of Professor Adelbert Ames support the transactional theory of perception. This theory asserts that the very contents of our sense experiences are shaped by our past experiences, as well as our expectations of future experiences. This theory, in turn, supports a critical realism about the relationship between perception and reality.
    • Official Secrets and the Right to Know

      Kane, Peter E.; The College at Brockport (1983-01-01)
    • On Being in the Mind

      Firth, Roderick; Harvard University (1971-01-01)
      There is exactly one good reason to prefer dualism to the identity theory, and it is is this: whereas brain events occur in a particular spatial location inside the head, it is nonsensical to say that mental events occur in any particular location. Professor Shaffer’s other objections to the identity theory are either parasitic on this one, or else unsuccessful.
    • On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?

      Martin Alcoff,; Syracuse University (1999-01-01)
      On what basis should we make an epistemic assessment of another’s authority to impart knowledge? Is social identity a legitimate feature to take into account when assessing epistemic reliability? This paper argues that, in some cases, social identity is a relevant feature to take into account in assessing a person’s credibility.
    • On Keating on the Competitive Motif in Athletics and Playful Activity

      Osterhoudt, Robert G.; University of Minnesota (1973-01-01)
    • On Sparshott’s ‘Vision and Dream in the Cinema’

      Glickman, Jack; The College at Brockport (1971-01-01)
      I agree with much of Professor Sparshott’s argument. I would add that when film is not taken as a recording of events that occurred, it is taken as a recording of events that were contrived; and that it is taken as a recording entails that no film is taken as present time. When we are caught up in viewing a film, we are primarily concerned with the story. Our fundamental concern is not with the film’s space and time, but with certain characters in human situations. Our main concern is with human experience.
    • On the Banality of Literary Truths

      Kivy, Peter; Rutgers University (1997-01-01)
      The propositional theory of literary truth says that the purpose of literary works is to express propositions. One objection to this theory is that the propositions that can be extracted from literary works are too banal to constitute the purpose of those works. This paper defends the propositional theory against this objection.