• Racism and the Discourse of Phobias: Negrophobia, Xenophobia and More---Dialogue with Kim and Sundstrom

      Garcia, J. L .A. (2020)
      The article discusses recism as a topic for conceptual analysis, touching on other phobias as well.
    • Radical Philosophy and Critical Theory: Examination and Defense

      Nielsen, Kai; Oxford University (1975-01-01)
    • Re-Humanizing Descartes

      Simmons, Alison; Harvard University (2011-07-31)
      Descartes’ mind-body dualism and his quest for objective knowledge can appear de-humanizing. My aim in this paper is to re-humanize Descartes. When we take a closer look at what Descartes actually says about human beings, it casts his entire thought in a much different light.
    • Records and the Man

      Weiss, Paul; Catholic University of America (1972-01-01)
      Athletic records are cherished because of their assumed impartiality and objectivity. However, athletic records do not fully and accurately describe the events that they purport to describe. That is because athletic records do not take account of the myriad factors that influence the outcome of any athletic event. Contingency, novelty, luck, obstacles and opportunities all make a difference to what is achieved. Since records abstract from all of these, they do not tell us what did occur, but only the outcome of a multitude of factors of which we take no notice. The singular goal of an athlete is to make maximal use of his body to attain an outstanding result in the particular situation in which he finds himself.
    • Rejoiner to Professor Freeman

      Greenstein, Harold; The College at Brockport (1972-01-01)
      I agree with Professor Freeman that critical realism is the right solution to the problem concerning the relationship between perception and reality. I also agree that critical realism is a metaphysical theory in certain respects. However, I disagree with his assertion that critical realism can be affirmed only as an article of metaphysical faith. Any claim to prove something is an empirical claim, and it can be tested like any other empirical claim.
    • Religion and Belief

      Keene, J. Calvin; St. Lawrence University (1971-01-01)
      I agree with Dr. Blanshard that religion needs reason, and belief should be made as rational as possible. It is an ethical responsibility to believe the truth. But belief always includes an element of tentativeness. So belief is sometimes appropriate, even in the absence of compelling evidence. Moreover, religion is related to a very different reality than is science. Consequently, the kinds of evidence that are appropriate to the one are not necessarily appropriate to the other. Insofar as God is conceived as a person, rather than an impersonal object, God cannot be approached or studied in the way in which we study impersonal objects.
    • Religious Knowledge

      Hawthorne, John; Oxford University (2007-12-01)
      This paper will examine two strategies by which religious believers might attempt to defend the rationality of religious belief. The first strategy is a “fine tuning argument.” The main shortcoming of that strategy is that it ignores the crucial issue of the appropriate prior probabilities. The second strategy is what might be called a “trust” strategy. According to this strategy, a belief that is based on trusting someone who knows something is thereby also an instance of knowledge. This strategy might suffice in some respects, but it involves reliance on a mechanism that is doubtful as a prototype for all of our beliefs.
    • Remarks on Violence and Paying the Penalty

      Nielsen, Kai; University of Alberta, Calgary (1970-01-01)
      The civil disobedient need not accept his punishment in order to demonstrate his commitment to the rule of law, and in some circumstances it would be inappropriate to do so. The use of violence is justified when and only when the pain, suffering, and injustice that we overcome thereby outweighs the pain, suffering and injustice that results from our actions. There have been circumstances in recent history in which, it is plausible to believe, these conditions were met.
    • Remarks on ‘Philosophy and the Curriculum’

      Wilson, John D.; Wells College (1971-01-01)
      The ‘philosophy-of’ approach advocated by Professor Scheffler would be enormously helpful to the future teacher. Systematic experience with the philosophical literature in his area will do more to bolster the confidence of the teacher than almost anything else that he or she will learn in the liberal arts.
    • Reply to Carol Brownson and Jack C. Wolf

      Carroll, Noel; School of Visual Arts (1983-01-01)
    • Resources and Environmental Policy

      Narveson, Jan (1994-01-01)
      Resources for people are not finite. There are no global shortages of anything that we have to worry about, nothing requiring the imposition of extra-market controls.
    • Response to Beadsley on "Semiotic Aesthetics and Aesthetic Education"

      Henderson, Ian H.; The College at Brockport (1973-01-01)
    • Response to Professor A. J. Ayer

      Taylor, Richard; University of Rochester (1970-01-01)
      Professor Ryle does not deny the common distinction between inner and outer, nor that between public and private. What he denies is that either of these distinctions entail a third distinction – between minds and bodies. As far as I can tell, Professor Ayer has not shown that Ryle is mistaken about that.
    • Response to Professor Marshall Cohen

      Hughes, Graham; New York University (1970-01-01)
      At trial, a civil disobedient may appeal to his reasonable belief in the unconstitutionality of the law that he violated. However, he cannot appeal to any technical difficulties that would require him to lie about his performance of the act in question, or about the role of his conscience in motivating his action.
    • Response to Weitz

      Alston, William P.; Rutgers University (1972-01-01)
      Professor Weitz contends that there are no necessary conditions of human action. This paper will focus on his objections to the theories of Roderick Chisholm, Donald Davidson, and others. The disagreement turns on the correct interpretation of certain cases. For example, is falling in love an action? What about missing a target?
    • Responsibility in a World of Causes

      Vargas, Manuel; University of San Francisco (2010-09-01)
      A familiar chain of reasoning goes like this: if everything is caused, then no one is genuinely free; if no one is genuinely free, then no one can be morally responsible for anything; so if everything is caused, then no one can be morally responsible for anything. This paper will challenge the part of this reasoning that concerns moral responsibility. What is at stake for us when we ascribe moral responsibility to ourselves and others? This paper will argue that we can reconcile the idea of moral responsibility with a broadly scientific worldview.
    • Rights and the Right to Know

      Schauer, Frederick; College of William and Mary (1983-01-01)
    • Romanticism and Behavior

      Peckham, Morse; University of South Carolina (1974-01-01)
    • Science and Art: Heuristic and Aesthetic Dimensions of Scientific Discovery

      Wartofsky, Max W.; Baruch College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York (1994-01-01)
      A familiar thesis in the philosophy of science is that considerations of form play a heuristic role in scientific discovery, and that these formal considerations may be characterized as aesthetic. The purpose of this paper is to understand what this claim comes to, and to explore the question of why aesthetic form does indeed play such a powerful heuristic role in scientific thought.
    • Self-Trust and the Diversity of Religions

      Zagzebski, Linda; University of Oklahoma (2006-01-01)
      The diversity of religions poses two, distinct challenges for belief in a particular religion. The first challenge is based upon an epistemic egalitarianism, according to which all normal human beings are roughly equal in their ability to get knowledge. I argue that this challenge is based on some mistaken assumptions. The second challenge arises from our admiration of people of other faiths. I argue that this second challenge is very serious, since it is rooted in our trust of ourselves.