• Hearing the Emotions

      Kivy, Peter; Rutgers University (1988-01-01)
    • Heidegger's Paths

      Gadamer, Hans; Boston College (1979-01-01)
    • High-Risk Religion

      Battin, Margaret Pabst; University of Utah (1988-01-01)
    • How Can My Mind Move My Limbs? Mental Causation from Descartes to Contemporary Physicalism

      Kim, Jaegwon; Brown University (2000-01-01)
      Mental events enter into causal relations with bodily events. The philosophical task is to explain how this is possible. Descartes’ dualism of mental and material substances ultimately founders on the impossibility of pairing mental events with physical events as causes and effects. This is what I have called “the pairing problem.” Many contemporary views also fail to explain mental causation. In the end, we are left with a dilemma. If mental phenomena are irreducible to physical phenomena, then mental phenomena lose their causal efficacy. However, if mental phenomena are reducible to physical phenomena, then casts doubt on the very existence of mental phenomena.
    • Hume's Account of Personal Identity

      Pears, David; Oxford University (1975-01-01)
    • Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination

      Ricoeur, Paul; University of Nanterre, France (1976-01-01)
    • In Defense of Introspection

      Quinton, Anthony; New School of Social Research (1977-01-01)
      The author defends the conviction that we have direct knowledge or awareness of our own states of mind, that we do not have to observe our own speech and behavior in order to find out whether we are angry or elated or what we believe or hope or fear, and that, furthermore, we do often come to know, or at least reasonably to believe, such things about ourselves.
    • In Defense of the Hypothetical Imperative

      Foot, Philippa; Oxford University (1971-01-01)
      Kant insisted that moral precepts must be categorical imperatives, telling the agent what he should do, no matter what his desires or interests. Kant contrasted these categorical imperatives with hypothetical imperatives, which operate only on the condition of certain desires or interests. I believe it is a mistake to think that Kant has disposed of the hypothetical imperative in morals. In this paper, I will consider the arguments that he has brought against it, and respond to them.
    • Indian Philosophy's Alleged Religious Orientation

      Potter, Karl H.; University of Washington (1972-01-01)
      Until recently, it has been assumed that Indian philosophy is essentially religious. That is because it is essentially driven by the religious motivations of the Hindus and Buddhists who practice it. This paper defends this assumption against some recent revisionists who reject it.
    • Inevitability in History

      Beardsley, Monroe C.; Temple University (1971-01-01)
      Historians sometimes say that one event or set of events made another event inevitable. This paper proposes an analysis of the concept of inevitability that is employed in such claims. To say that one event E made another event F inevitable is to say that: (1) E and F occurred, and in that temporal order, and (2) After E, and because of E, no action within the power of any living person or persons who desired F not to occur would have been followed by the nonoccurrence of F. One of the corollaries of this analysis is that anyone who asserts an inevitability statement is thereby committed to a true generalization to the effect that conditions like E cause conditions like F
    • Infinity and the Double Language of Mathematics

      Benardete, Joseph A.; Syracuse University (1976-01-01)
    • Inventing Philosophy

      Cohen, Ted (1990-01-01)
      It is often suggested that Americans do not have a culture of their own, or a philosophy of their own. However, this charge assumes a European model of culture and philosophy, which Americans need not imitate. By contrast, this paper suggests an alternative, distinctly American model of philosophy. American philosophical practice is a kind of perpetual rebirth, a continuing innocence. It amounts to starting over, always, every time, and taking nothing for granted.
    • Is 'True Philosophy" Like True Art?

      Nielsen, Kai (1994-01-01)
      The question “What is philosophy?” is itself a contentious philosophical question. Some philosophers claim that other philosophers misunderstand the very point and purpose of philosophy. This paper explores several prominent conceptions of philosophy.
    • Is Chess Art?

      Lord, Catherine; Syracuse University (1984-01-01)
    • Is Patriotism Immoral?

      Arneson, Richard; University of California, San Diego (2013-07-15)
      The principle of patriotism says that we are morally required to favor our own nation and its people. But there is an opposed moral perspective: cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan regards herself as a citizen of the world and holds that national borders lack intrinsic, noninstrumental moral significance. The cosmopolitan view is that people are people, and our common humanity is the ground of our moral duties toward people. This paper examines some recent arguments for patriotism, and finds them all wanting. In the absence of any good argument for patriotism, perhaps we should consider cosmopolitanism.
    • Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational

      Martin Alcoff, Linda; Syracuse University (1996-01-01)
      Recent criticism of feminist philosophy poses a dilemma. Feminism is taken to be a substantive set of empirical claims and political commitments, whereas philosophy is taken to be a discipline of thought organized by the pursuit of truth, but uncommitted to any particular truth. This paper responds to this dilemma, and defends the project of feminist philosophy.
    • Is There A Mind-Body Problem?

      Chisholm, Roderick; Brown University (1978-01-01)
    • Justice and 'Discrimination For' in Higher Education

      Golightly, Cornelius L.; Wayne State University (1974-01-01)
    • Justice and Utility: Who Cares?

      Held, Virginia (1996-01-01)
      In recent decades, the dominant moral theories have been deontological and consequentialist. Also in the last few decades, feminist moral theory has developed. Is feminist moral theory distinctive, or is it just a version of one of these other types of theory? This paper discusses this issue.