Browsing Philosophic Exchange by Subject "Jerome Shaffer"

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Ethical and Epistemic Dilemmas of Behaviorism and the Identity Thesis

Stack, George J.; The College at Brockport (1971-01-01)

Jerome Shaffer’s argument against behaviorism and the identity theory assume that the wrongness of causing pain is constituted entirely by that effect. However, the intrinsic wrongness of such actions lies in the intentions of the agent, not in the physical responses of the victim.
On Being in the Mind

Firth, Roderick; Harvard University (1971-01-01)

There is exactly one good reason to prefer dualism to the identity theory, and it is is this: whereas brain events occur in a particular spatial location inside the head, it is nonsensical to say that mental events occur in any particular location. Professor Shaffer’s other objections to the identity theory are either parasitic on this one, or else unsuccessful.