Women in Central and Eastern Europe have made gains as presidents and prime ministers. A notable exception to this is Belarus, where President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the longest dictator in Europe, has tightly clung to power since 1994. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya surprised many when she threw her hat in the ring for the 2020 presidential election. This article asks how Tsikhanouskaya arose as the 2020 opposition candidate and how gender shaped the campaign. Gender played a central role in her being able to stand in the election. Her husband had been a leading presidential candidate but was imprisoned by the regime. Like women who rose to executive leadership positions, Tsikhanouskaya ran in her husband’s place. Lukashenka permitted her candidacy because he did not see her as a political threat. Lukashenka regularly dimin‐ ished her candidacy using sexist rhetoric. Tsikhanouskaya’s own campaign highlighted more traditionally feminine traits such as being a nurturer, unifier, and non‐power seeking, and only being in politics by chance. Referring to herself as an “accidental candidate,” she made it clear that she sought to unify the Belarussian people against the dictatorship and would step aside after this was accomplished. As de facto opposition leader, she continues to highlight these more feminine qual‐ ities and craft a less threatening image.

The ‘post-materialist’ value hypothesis, positing heightened concern for the environment, should predict eventual convergence in environmental policies. In the meantime, surprisingly wide variations persist, even when controlling for income levels. Is there a role for public opinion to explain better the divergences and outcomes observed in environmental policies? This paper explores a possible mechanism by which widely hypothesized income effects on policy can occur via pressure from public opinion. By building upon a median voter model of environmental policy-making and developing an extension to include voter information characteristics, we test these effects on air pollution outcomes of varying (global, regional and local) scales. The results provide evidence of significant effects, but suggest two antecedent conditions necessary for political and opinion variables to have an effect: redistributive opportunities, and credible frameworks for addressing collective action problems. The implication is that relying on democratic reform alone may not suffice to improve environmental performance if underlying collective action problems are not addressed.

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, it attempts to explain why dispensationalist Christians were successful at influencing American foreign policy during the administration of George W. Bush, particularly towards the Middle East. Specifically, I connect this success to their ties to Washington neo-conservatives, the personal faith of Bush himself and his links to conservative Christians, and their broad cultural appeal and grassroots strength. Second, it will present two brief case studies on the influence that dispensationalism has had on US policy towards Israel and Iraq during the administration of George W. Bush.

What drives popular opinion on climate change? Recent failures to mobilize popular opinion in favour of the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been blamed on the unseasonably cool local weather and the unhealthy state of the economy. Using data from the European Union (EU), this article examines the effects of both annual temperature variations and economic growth rates on people’s attitudes regarding the mitigation of GHG emissions. It is found that although the state of the economy has a significant effect on people’s attitudes towards the mitigation of GHG emissions, variations in the annual temperature do not. Thus, while pessimism regarding policy changes during bad economic times appears justified, pessimism based on isolated spells of unseasonably cool weather does not.