Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJoshi, Hrishikesh
dc.description.abstractWhat might an ideal epistemic agent look like? The picture given to us by philosophers over time suggests something like an autonomous thinker who appropriately responds to her evidence wherever it may point. She would believe those things for which there are the best (epistemic) reasons and wouldn’t simply believe on the basis of what is comfortable or what is popular. Thus, Descartes sought to rebuild his belief system from the foundations of only those beliefs of which he could be rationally certain. Socrates challenged the widely held philosophical and theological assumptions of his time, for which he was put to death. Mill enjoins us to follow the argument wherever it leads, even if it goes against commonly held opinion.en_US
dc.publisherSUNY Brockport, Philosophic Exchangeen_US
dc.subjectEpistemic Agenten_US
dc.subjectSocially motivated beliefen_US
dc.title2023-2024 Joshi. Socially Motivated Belief and Its Epistemic Discontentsen_US
dc.description.institutionSUNY Brockporten_US
dc.description.departmentPhilosophic Exchangeen_US
dc.accessibility.statementThis publication has been checked against freely available accessibility tools and deemed accessible. Should you have a problem accessing it, please email for assistance.en_US

Files in this item

2023-2024. Joshi. Socially ...

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • Philosophic Exchange
    Philosophic Exchange is published by the Center for Philosophic Exchange, at the College at Brockport. The Center for Philosophic Exchange was founded by SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould in 1969 to conduct a continuing program of philosophical inquiry, relating to both academic and public issues. Each year the Center hosts four speakers, and each speaker gives a public lecture that is intended for a general audience. These lectures are then published in this journal.

Show simple item record