An Examination of the "Problem of Evil", Theodicy, and a critique of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense response to the Logical Problem of Evil
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Author
Hawreluk, PeterReaders/Advisors
Diaz, EmilianoTerm and Year
Spring 2019Date Published
2019
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
An overview of the Problem of Evil, it's components/arguments of the Logical Problem of Evil & Evidential Problem of Evil. Offers an overview of the branch of Apologetics that addresses it, Theodicy. Then explores/critiques Philosopher Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense. First explains some simple possible solutions to the Problem of Evil, but shows the downsides in regards to theism. A general overview of a number of Theodicy's follow. Explaining the concept of a Theodicy, then listing a number of specific one's, explaining what they are and offering a number of critiques/rebuttals for each. The latter half of the paper then focuses on Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense. A logical suggestion that is in response/answer to the supposed Logical Contradiction between an Omniscient, Omnibenevolent, and Omnipotent God and the existence of evil at all. Plantinga states that God could not create a world were we have free will and no evil/a world that we only do the good and avoid the evil via a supposed logical contradiction in such a world. I outline the reasoning of the Defense and explore Plantiga's provided "possible worlds" in regards to free will and and the existence of moral evil/the ability to do evil. I then sectionally offer critiques/explorations of Plantinga's reasonings and offer counterarguments. Examples include objections to the conception of an Omnipotent God being limited to only what is logically possible; exploring the value in free will and Plantinga's conception of a "Morally Significant" free will; and how his conception of Morally Significant free will conflicts with traditional theistic conceptions of heaven, along with being problematic for God's supposed free will.Accessibility Statement
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