‘Sign’ing the Nation’s Contract: Constructing the Walls of American Citizenship

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And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.

– Genesis 1:3

Section I

Identity: What it *Was*, *Is*, and *Will Be*

> In other words, it is the divine word, the word of divine right, which, like the *intuitus originarius* which Kant ascribed to God, creates what it states, in contrast to all derived, observational statements, which simply record a pre-existent given. One should never forget that language, by virtue of the infinite generative but also *originative* capacity — in the Kantian sense — which it derives from its power to produce existence by producing the collectively recognized, and thus realized, representation of existence, is no doubt the principal support of the dream of absolute power.
>
> – Pierre Bourdieu[1]

Who is the citizen? In other words, the question can be rephrased instead as "who am I?" Looking back on my childhood, I now recognize "Semper Fi" — a common refrain I heard in the spaces I inhabited growing up — as somehow molding a facet of my personal identity. *Semper fidelus*, always faithful: the motto of the United States Marine Corps. My father served from 1992 until 1997. He was posted at Camp Pendleton, California. His new

[1] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 45.

bride and young daughter soon followed him to where he was stationed. An All-American family.

For me, the Latin phrase resonates for innumerable reasons: each one shifting to and fro in my mind, mixing with memories and echoing with experiences, ultimately accumulating into an amorphous mass of meaning for me to make sense of. This, I think, is true for every word I come into contact with.

I don't know that I can articulate the depth of meaning that these Latin words possess for me, for not only do they hold the weight of accumulation in my own life (a mere speck in the grand scheme of the universe), but the weight of accumulation across the nation's history… and beyond. For that reason, among others, I'm not quite sure where to even begin. And I think that's partially because I can't say with certainty where *I* start. Or where *we* start.

In a class of undergraduates entitled "Contemporary Multi-Ethnic American Literature," I gave a presentation on my graduate thesis research as it related to Suzan-Lori Parks's play *Father Comes Home from the Wars*. In the course of the lesson, I asked students to participate in a brief activity where they had the power to assign labels to themselves. Taking inspiration from Parks's explanation of "characters" in her piece "from Elements of Style,"[2] I urged students to recognize all the aspects of their complicated identities, and "name" themselves to acknowledge the various roles that constitute their identities.

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[2] "They are not *characters*. To call them so could be an injustice. They are *figures*, *figments*, *ghosts*, *roles*, *lovers* maybe, *speakers* maybe, *shadows*, *slips*, *players* maybe, maybe *someone else's pulse*." Suzan-Lori Parks, "from Elements of Style" in *The America Play and Other Works* (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1995), 12.

This activity served as a bit of a social experiment for me. I doubted citizenship would be at the forefront of the students' minds during the activity and wanted to see if my prediction would prove to be correct. Among students who shared their labels with the class, "citizen" was not one of the roles named. When I prompted them, asking if anyone had written down "citizen," one student responded, "I wrote 'American.' Does that count?"

This paper investigates the way language constructs and reinforces national identity. In other words, I am examining how the role of the "citizen" is defined within the confines of language. Section I lays out the the theoretical framework for Section II's analysis of the judicial opinions of Associate Supreme Court Justice Justice Robert H. Jackson and former Lieutenant Governor of New York Stanley N. Lundine. I took an interdisciplinary approach for the research and writing of my thesis because of the intersectional quality possessed by the concept "American citizenship." I see the various disciplines as working together to demonstrate the overlapping of language-use and naming; labels and identity; land, ownership, and nationhood; citizenship and belonging in society; and more, which will become clear in the course of this paper.

Using a primarily sociolinguistic lens, my thesis analyzes the language used in political speeches and legal documents (including U.S. legislation; judicial opinions of Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson; and speeches of former Lieutenant Governor of New York Stanley N. Lundine). In doing so, I explain how the American "citizen" has been constructed through language utilized in various formats and contexts. In analyzing the public pronouncements of two prominent New Yorkers, from separate branches of government, I was able to gain insight on the ways "citizenship" was given

meaning both in the 20th century alone, as well as the way certain language concerning citizenship continued to gain meaning through accumulation.

My research draws connections to the current U.S. political climate to examine the way political and legal rhetoric frames national identity and citizenship. Overall, my thesis is a reflection on what it has meant and currently means to be "American" alongside an examination of how citizenship status is attained. In Section III, I conclude by reflecting on how Americans, as a nation, have reached this point in history as well as by reflecting on where Americans, as "citizens," may go from here.

Prior to studying the humanities, I took for granted all of the aspects of identity that interact with each other in order to become the concept of a person's overall identity. I also overlooked the fluidity of identity and how the language we use to define ourselves is perpetually in flux. My amazement at discovering identity to be multifaceted was rivaled only by the later revelation that identity does not simply *exist*, but that it is *constructed* through language, specifically language that describes difference. I am inclined to think that many of us would not only be surprised by these revelations of mine, but would be overwhelmingly uncomfortable at even the slightest thought that hints to such conclusions. I would argue that these same individuals would be likely to take the idea of an underlying self for granted in that they would simply assume we each have a self. You know yourself to exist, therefore you are a self. No further thought required. David Hume disagrees and argues in "Of Personal Identity" from his book *A Treatise of Human Nature*, that there is, in fact, no underlying self at all.

Hume notes that there are philosophers who wrongly believe that we are conscious of our "self" on an intimate and personal level at every moment of life, therefore being aware of both the "existence and… continuance in existence" of the self.[3] However, Hume denies the possibility of this by claiming that we are only ever aware of perceptions. He says, "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."[4] In this way, Hume presents perceptions as a block to any sort of intimate awareness of a self. Basically, his argument goes as follows:

1. There must be one impression that gives rise to every real idea.
2. The self is not one impression, but that to which our several impressions and subsequent ideas are supposed to have reference to.
3. If an impression gives rise to an idea of the self, then the impression must be invariable and constant.
4. No impression is invariable and constant.
5. Therefore, no impression can give rise to an idea of the self.
6. Therefore, there is no idea of the self.
7. Therefore, there is no self.

He defines impressions as perceptions of experience such as "pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations," which all "succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time."[5] Since no impression is constant and invariable according to Hume, he concludes

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[3] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1776), 448.
[4] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1776), 449.
[5] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1776), 448.

that man is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other… and are in perpetual flux and movement."[6]

Hume questions on what grounds perceptions can be connected to or belong to the self since all perceptions are "different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no Deed of tiny thing to support their existence."[7] In other words:

1. If something is distinct, then it is distinguishable.
2. If something is distinguishable, then it is able to be separated by thought or imagination.
3. All perceptions are distinct.
4. Therefore, all perceptions are distinguishable.
5. Therefore, perceptions may be separated by thought or imagination.
6. Therefore, perceptions may be conceived of as existing separately.

This separate existence of perceptions gives the notion of an experience existing regardless of the existence of a being that may partake in the experience. Hume uses this point to emphasize that man is simply an aggregation of perceptions, and I would argue that it shows there is something inherently special about being an entity that has the ability to perceive[8].

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[6] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1776), 450.
[7] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1776), 449.
[8] Consider the expression: "If a tree falls in a forest, and no one is around to hear it, does it still make a sound?" We're inclined to answer yes because sound exists whether or not there is someone to hear it. Following this train of thought, I believe that Hume is correct in ascribing a separate existence to perceptions, but I think he is wrong in failing to recognize the existence of a being capable of experiencing perceptions. The very ability to perceive shows that there is something capable of perceiving at all — namely, a self.

In "On the Observability of the Self," Roderick Chisholm states that the main problem Hume and those sympathetic to Hume's argument appear to have is the fact that "one is never aware of a *subject* of experience," and "although we may apprehend things that are… manifested or presented to the self… we cannot apprehend the self as it is in itself."[9] Chisholm cites Bertrand Russell as frequently stating the problem in that "the self or subject is not 'empirically discoverable.'"[10] In other words, those who are prone to think that we do not possess a self think so because of their inability to experience a self firsthand (without perceptions getting in the way). In his paper, "The No-Self Theory," James Giles sums it up by saying what Hume meant about invariable impressions was that without experience of a self, there is no evidence to substantiate a belief in the self. Going on to say that our idea of something is not that the something *has*, but that the something *is*, Chisholm states, "our idea of 'a mind'… is not an idea only of 'particular perceptions,'" but an idea of that which does the perceiving.[11]

Chisholm argues that when Hume refers to himself within his argument, he shows that there is a self to refer to in the first place. Taking into consideration that this may merely be a semantics issue, Chisholm questions whether Hume could have made his argument in a selfless way, but concludes that it is essential to Hume's argument not only to report the data that has been found, but also the data that he *himself* found. Chisholm shows that in sentences "the verb is used to refer to a certain type of *undergoing*," and "this

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[9] Roderick Chisolm, "On the Observability of the Self," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 30, no. 1 (1969): 7, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105917.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Roderick Chisolm, "On the Observability of the Self," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 30, no. 1 (1969): 9, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105917.

undergoing is what traditionally has been called being in a conscious state, or being in a sentient state."[12] Proof of sentience provides proof for the existence of a self. James Giles uses Buddhism as a complementary theory to Hume's argument and argues that "although we may use words like 'self' and 'I,' we should not be led into thinking that they actually refer to something, for they are but grammatical devices."[13] Giles claims that these words are terms that are understood because of "mutual agreement" and are thereby "used at the conventional level."[14] Paul Hopper's "Emergent Grammar" supports Giles's argument from a linguistic perspective. Hopper writes that grammar is often assumed to exist outside of the language speaker and as a result is viewed as being a fixed set of rules that discourse then uses in its "'implementation' of structures," but explains this is not the case and that grammar is instead

> like speech itself [and] must be viewed as a real-time, social phenomenon, and therefore is temporal; its structure is always deferred, always in a process but never arriving, and therefore emergent.[15]

In this way, Hopper shows how grammar and discourse simultaneously affect each other, contributing to the construction and existence of each entity. Paul Giles presents the notion of a self and language-use in a similar relation to each other. Acknowledging the paradox that may be found in using personal language correctly when these terms ultimately refer to nothing, Giles uses Descartes's famous quote, "I think, therefore I am," as

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[12] Roderick Chisolm, "On the Observability of the Self," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 30, no. 1 (1969): 16, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105917.
[13] James Giles. "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity," *Philosophy East and West* 43, no. 2 (1993): 185, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612.
[14] James Giles. "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity," *Philosophy East and West* 43, no. 2 (1993): 188, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612
[15] Paul Hopper. "Emergent Grammar." *Berkeley Linguistic Society* 13 (1987): 3.

an example to show that Descartes was only aware of "just thinking, not an I that was doing the thinking," and claims Descartes should have said, "'there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts.'"[16] I think Giles is wrong to say that "such a deduction… does not suffice to prove the existence of an I,"[17] because I argue that a verb necessitates a subject. Whereas he sees the subject as a "convention of grammar" that fulfills a "practical need,"[18] I see the subject as an undeniably existing sentient being. To acknowledge the act of experiencing shows sentience.

It is relevant to recognize the semantics issue as a related, interwoven yet separate aspect of the question regarding the existence of a self. Thinking abstractly, we can acknowledge that the signified exists without the signifier. The signifier is simply how we make sense of the world around us. In this way, language provides us with a means to enforce order on the world. However, without our words that define, the things we seek to define will still exist without our definition. Theoretically, anyway. Here complications arise from the interconnectedness of language and identity. A thing achieves actualization through language. In other words, its identity is solidified, somehow becoming more real to us, despite the intangibility of language.

Chisholm questions whether a man is able to be aware of *himself as experiencing* without being aware of *himself* and says that the answer is no. He claims that "in being aware of ourselves as experiencing, we are… aware of the self or person."[19] I agree with

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[16] Paul Hopper. "Emergent Grammar." *Berkeley Linguistic Society* 13 (1987): 3.
[17] Ibid.
[18] James Giles. "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity," *Philosophy East and West* 43, no. 2 (1993): 189, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612
[19] Roderick Chisolm, "On the Observability of the Self," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 30, no. 1 (1969): 18, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105917.

Chisholm and argue that humankind's ability to experience perceptions proves sentience, which thereby proves selfhood or the existence of an underlying self. But how does language fit in with these philosophical arguments for selfhood? What does it mean that the method we use to articulate the experience of perceptions somehow sets those experiences in stone? That language gives an essence of tangibility to that which we deem intangible?

When I first read Hume's "Of Personal Identity," I instantly disagreed. My approach to his argument was one in which I was still firmly rooted in my personal beliefs. I steadfastly believed that an inherent self exists. That identity exists. Looking back, perhaps it was simply my desire to believe that made me believe at all. I wanted there to be a self — wanted there to be an inherent identity — because otherwise, everything I thought I knew would have been — maybe not a lie — but also not entirely true.[20] To not believe in the self or identity is dangerous. And frankly, rather frightening. But it can also be freeing.

There may or may not be a self. There may or may not be such a thing as an inherent identity. While these are related questions to my thesis, they are not the point of the quest my thesis embarks on. I recognize that I have presented conflicting philosophical theories on the existence of a self, and my reason for doing so is to show that we can not simply take for granted that a self truly exists. Much of an individual's identity is constructed by factors existing outside of the individual, but the question remains whether

[20] (Un)fortunately, I am living and writing in a time period where we are seeing the rise of "alternative facts." I wonder how the concept of "alternative facts" will affect our collective perception and understanding of words, specifically the *meaning* of "truth," and how ultimately, the word's usage will be affected.

any aspect of identity is inherent to an individual — in other words, if any part of identity exists naturally. I open my paper with these competing theories to raise the questions of what is inherent and what is constructed in terms of identity. I also have incorporated these philosophical arguments to show the link between questions of identity and language use. For now, I will not take a stance on whether or not a self exists. Whether or not the case can be made for inherent identity, the fact remains that in our reality, people exist — people with identities. Real or imagined, intrinsic or constructed, identity exists in the world we live in. Identity of the self may have inherent qualities, but it undoubtedly has constructed qualities: the qualities that we label ourselves with — labels that designate effectively establishing order in our world. I bring up the idea of an inherent identity — of the existence of self — because that is the ideology that informs the Enlightenment documents that serve as part of the foundation to American citizenship and national identity. However, my thesis focuses on the constructed aspect of identity, namely in the way that identity is constructed through language and maintained through continued language-use performance.

In "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach," Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall define identity as "the social positioning of self and other,"[21] and propose five principles of how identity is constructed through language: emergence, positionality, indexicality, relationality, and partialness. The emergence principle holds that "[i]dentity is best viewed as the emergent product rather than the pre-existing source of linguistic and other semiotic practices and therefore as fundamentally a social and cultural

[21] Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall. "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach." Discourse Studies 7 no. 4-5 (2005): 586.

phenomenon,"[22] which echoes Hopper's argument for the relationship between grammar and discourse as well as Giles's argument for the relationship between the existence of a self and language-use. Bucholtz and Hall recognize that identity's emergence is the same as "with performance, culture, and grammar itself."[23] For the positionality principle, they explain that their "perspective… broadens the traditional referential range of identity to encompass not only more widely recognized constructs of social subjectivity but also local identity categories and transitory interactional positions,"[24] and go on to write of the indexicality principle that it "involves the creation of semiotic links between linguistic forms and social meanings."[25] These three principles lead Bucholtz and Hill to discuss the relationality principle which builds on the preceding three and states that

> [i]dentities are intersubjectively constructed through several, often overlapping, complementary relations, including similarity/difference, genuineness/artifice, and authority/delegitimacy.[26]

I reference Bucholtz and Hill's interdisciplinary sociocultural linguistic approach to present a general explanation of how identity is linguistically constructed. One such constructed quality of identity is the national identity component to an individual's overall identity. A national identity possesses no inherent qualities. Nothing uniquely belongs to the piece of land designated with borders. A national identity is constructed and only

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[22] Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall. "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach." Discourse Studies 7 no. 4-5 (2005): 588.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall. "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach." Discourse Studies 7 no. 4-5 (2005): 592.
[25] Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall. "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach." Discourse Studies 7 no. 4-5 (2005): 594.
[26] Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall. "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach." Discourse Studies 7 no. 4-5 (2005): 598.

constructed. Free yourself from the thinking that this belongs to you in any natural or meaningful way. The nation you "belong" to has merely lent you a citizenship coat that can just as easily be tossed aside on an especially warm day[27] or replaced with the latest fashion trend.[28]

In many ways, the preceding and following words may feel like a slap in the face to some who read my thesis. The words may be perceived as ungrateful or entitled, or unjustified rebellious liberalism. The words may seem to others as if I, by not only thinking them, but writing them, am biting the hand that has fed me (so to speak). I now take this opportunity to tell you that that is not my intention.

In the grand scheme of time and universe and nation, I have only just recently begun to doubt the narrative I have been taught since I can remember. Only *just* started to realize I no longer buy into the "pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps" mentality. Only *just* started to see the American dream for what it truly is: a dream. I don't know that I would say "I'm proud to be an American,"[29] but I don't know that I would say I'm not. Due to my newfound awareness, I am certainly much more appreciative of the many layers of privilege I possess: one layer owing completely to my American citizenship status. I think in some ways, it is for this reason — my privilege as an American citizen — that I am compelled to write this thesis. Questioning — wondering and critical thought — is not *wrong* and should not be

[27] Climate change is real.
[28] Being America's first family should not serve as a marketing opportunity.
[29] Lyrics from country artist Lee Greenwood's 1992 song "God Bless the U.S.A." — a song I, personally, only remember playing in the immediate follow-up to the September 11th terror attacks. I remember singing along enthusiastically when it would play over the loudspeaker at school once we had already recited the Pledge of Allegiance.

considered to be a mark of shame. I have come to realize that my work is for the People[30] — but not the nation.

[30] TBD: to be defined.

People with a Capital "P":
Marks of American Personhood

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, —That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
>
> – Declaration of Independence

The legal documents that construct American citizenship assume the existence of a self. In other words, in order to acquire the status of "citizen," one is required to be a sentient being. In the well-known lines of the Declaration, Enlightenment ideals echo through the words chosen by Thomas Jefferson as he penned one of the nation's most important documents. "We" and "self-evident" provide reinforcement for ideas of selfhood and agency. We see this again in the Constitution with the famous beginning line of "We

the People," where the document itself served as legislation to create order[31] where it was seen to be lacking. In this way, these documents mark the beginning of legislative language that constructs the American "citizen," heavily influenced by Enlightenment thought.

Citizenship continued to be constructed through legal language with every amendment to the Constitution. Amendments can therefore be seen as a type of accumulation to the word and meaning of "citizen" and how that label interacts with the concept of a national identity. The Fourteenth ("All **persons** born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are **citizens** of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of **citizens** of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any **person** of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any **person** within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"[32]), Fifteenth ("The right of **citizens** of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"[33]), and Nineteenth ("The right of **citizens** of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex"[34]) Amendments all explicitly refer to a subject in their wordings, which again ties into Enlightenment ideals of selfhood and agency.

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[31] "in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America," *United States Constitution*

[32] Fourteenth Amendment to the *United States Constitution*, 1866

[33] Fifteenth Amendment to the *United States Constitution*, 1869

[34] Nineteenth Amendment to the *United States Constitution*, 1919

The Thirteenth Amendment, however, was worded in a way in which the subject who was personally victimized by the institution of slavery, is left out of the amendment's language. The wording, instead, purposefully reflects the prohibition of slavery as an entity:

> Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.[35]

What does it mean that the very people affected by slavery are omitted from the legislation? Why wasn't the amendment worded to include the subject — the person — who through enslavement had been refused the label of "person" in the Enlightenment sense? Or, is it because of this denial of selfhood and sentience, that the amendment had to be worded in the way that it was? To acknowledge the personhood of slaves would have forced unwilling persons to acknowledge slavery as the abomination it was (and still is).

The Emancipation Proclamation, on the other hand, was worded with the subject(s) expressly in mind, declaring "all persons held as slaves" within the rebellious Confederate states "are, and henceforward shall be free."[36] Here "persons" implies a subject — a self — a sentient being — a being, which is inherently believed to be free based on the very definition of its existence. Using "are" in declaring enslaved persons to be free implied that they were *always* free, acting as if this proclamation was simply a reminder to something the nation had accidentally forgotten. Issued by President Lincoln in 1863, the

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[35] Thirteenth Amendment to the *United States Constitution*, 1865
[36] Emancipation Proclamation, President Abraham Lincoln, 1863

proclamation (despite its "expansive wording"[37]) did not resolutely end slavery in the United States. The proclamation was limited in that it "applied only to states that had seceded from the Union, leaving slavery untouched in the loyal border states… expressly exempted parts of the Confederacy that had already come under Northern control… [and m]ost important[ly], the freedom it promised depended upon Union military victory" (U.S. National Archives). Hence the "freedom" that is articulated to be *so* natural and undeniably ever-present by Lincoln's words, is actually caged into an existence accompanied by boundaries — an existence that only exists if certain conditions are met.

If it is true that existence as a citizen is caged by linguistic boundaries, it challenges the Enlightenment documents that posit the existence of an inherent self that by definition possesses certain natural rights. Furthermore, it shows a contradiction between the linguistic construction of national identity and citizenship, and the Enlightenment documents' claim that a self exists, which by definition possesses certain natural and unalienable rights. I believe that problems with understanding the American citizenship label and its accompanying rights and obligations stem from this contradiction. Not only does this issue point to way language constructs identity, but also language's tie to the land, which it also designates. U.S. citizenship is often celebrated for its enforcement of uniquely American ideals and yet these are ideals that are also argued to be universal. The label of "American," tied more specifically to the land itself, is an integral component of citizenship as the citizen derives its existence from the nation. Language, then, is simultaneously

[37] "Emancipation Proclamation," *U.S. National Archives*, 2017

constructing the citizen's identity through the designation of both personhood and nationhood.

(Empty) Language and the Spaces It Fills

> "It might be asked if there is any way of dating what might be called the moment of emergence of an awareness of space and its production: when and where, why and how, did a neglected knowledge and misconstrued reality begin to be recognized?"
>
> – Henri Lefebvre (178)

Wai Chee Dimock gives one of the most eloquent descriptions of language when she writes that language is "a medium intertwined with human history and bearing witness to its long life through the evolution and migration of words" (Dimock 276). In this chapter, I discuss how language designates and through designation constructs the spaces of reality. My understanding of language overlaps my understanding of identity. Language, like identity, is multidirectional.[38] I feel that it is important to acknowledge the circular — almost cyclical — relationship that exists between language and space as well as language

[38] "The definition of possession cancels itself out. The relationship between possessor and possessed is, like ownership is, multidirectional." Suzan-Lori Parks, "Possession" in *The America Play and Other Works* (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1995), 3.

and the objects it seeks to define. Consider the instances in which the word "body" is used in reference to another "thing." The following examples are most pertinent to reflect upon for the purposes of this piece: *body* of language; *body* of land; and the human *body*. Reflect for a moment on the way "body" is used interchangeably to designate these separate masses. The word holds the same meaning in each use, yet these are seemingly entirely different "bodies." I would argue that these bodies are irrevocably intertwined in exactly the same way as Dimock describes the medium of language. We articulate identity through language — language we often possess because of the land we inhabit — the land we inhabit being the foundation upon which much of our identity is derived. But what makes anything so? Does language give meaning? Or rather, does meaning exist independently of language in which language is the only means by which an attempt can be made to express any semblance of meaning? Is language limited or limitless? Can it be both?

When we use language, whether written or spoken, we often take for granted what is actually happening through our linguistic expression. The subtleties of language may go unnoticed by many of us, leading to a complete unawareness of all that is possible to *do* through language. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Michel Foucault concludes

> "Words and things" is the entirely serious title of a problem, it is the ironic title of a work that modifies its own form, displaces its own data, and reveals, at the end of the day, a quite different task. A task that consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to, contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than

> use these signs to designate things. It is this *more* that renders them irreducible to the language… and to speech. It is this "more" that we must reveal and describe.[39]

When I analyze the political and legal rhetoric used to produce, reproduce, and regulate citizenship in later chapters, I seek to look *beyond* the word to uncover the "more" that Foucault refers to. Those who are capable of harnessing the power of words through an awareness of intentionality and purpose may be able to gain access to even greater power. "Knowledge is power," is a well-known adage, and it is one that closely parallels with a similar statement, that: *language* is power. Since language is the way we articulate and communicate our knowledge, these two phrases go hand in hand.

Words are more than simply designs on a page or sounds we make. They are complex organisms that combine with each other in intricate ways. Furthermore, words are tied to their history, forever carrying the baggage of each use into the future, never to be severed from all the implications and associations that accompany the accumulation of usage. As American linguist Dwight Bolinger has written, "[language] can never be separated from its past."[40] The identity of language is an intersection of numerous (if not infinite) spaces and times. Ironically, language itself, whose function is to designate and define meaning, is an entity that may be impossible to have its own designation or definition. Language is fluid and ever-changing; an accumulation of everything it comes into contact with.

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[39] Michel Foucault. "The Archaeology of Knowledge," in *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 96.
[40] Dwight Bolinger. *Language – The Loaded Weapon*, (London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1980), 16.

In his *Course in General Linguistics*, Ferdinand de Saussure asserts "language is form and not a substance."[41] On the surface, Saussure makes a simple statement here, but upon further analysis the statement reveals its more complicated insinuations. By equating language to form rather than substance, Saussure is depicting language as a method in flux. As a form, language is more malleable and subject to change while as a substance, language would be a static object. Language is not set in stone. The "rules" that govern language are subject to change in such a way that maybe to call them "rules" is not wholly correct.

Discussing the relationship between sign and signifier (AKA the "thing" and the word that designates what that "thing" is), Saussure claims that it is an arbitrary relationship and that there is no intrinsic value to the sign. He explains that "if words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have exact equivalents in meaning from one language to the next; but this is not true."[42] Words not only gain signification because of their belonging to a set system, but *value* as well, which, as Saussure rightly points out, "is something quite different."[43] The system that Saussure refers to here is the language system, but I think this train of thought can also be applied to the worldly system in which the language system operates. The value that emanates from a word exists because of the word's inclusion into a system that is both social and political. Both Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault wrote about the way language and discourse work with and within systems in *Language and Symbolic Power* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* respectively.

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[41] Ferdinand de Saussure. "Course in General Linguistics," in *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, trans. Wade Baskin, (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 71.
[42] Ferdinand de Saussure. "Course in General Linguistics," in *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, trans. Wade Baskin, (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 67.
[43] Ibid.

In a discussion of Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*, Pierre Bourdieu explains that Saussure attempts to prove that "it is not space which defines language but language which defines its space."[44] In some ways, I agree with Saussure, but I think this is an overly simplistic way of defining language. Language is very much affected by the spaces it comes into contact with and to reduce language as exerting a one-way relationship onto the things it designates is an inaccurate portrayal of what language is and *does*.

Language's function is to designate — to achieve and maintain order in terms of the way we perceive and make sense of the world around us. Think about the language we use to identify ourselves and others. In keeping with the concept of what is happening between sign and signifier, I think it is commonly believed that identity exists first and the description of said identity comes after. However, much scholarship has pointed out that identity exists because of difference, but difference does not exist because of identity. In other words, the condition of difference is what allows for the possibility of identity to exist. Foucault writes

> In any case, these divisions – whether our own, or those contemporary with the discourse under examination – are always themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, institutionalized types: they, in turn, are facts of discourse that deserve to be analyzed beside others; of course, they also have complex relations with each other, but they are not intrinsic, autochthonous, and universally recognizable characteristics.[45]

[44] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 44.
[45] Michel Foucault. "The Archaeology of Knowledge," in *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 91.

Potentially, it is through the attempts to define that we further the divide between ourselves and others. The function works best when there is a plain set of opposites. Thus, existing in contrast, or rather, identity in contrast is most successful when this difference is a binary that "easily" categorizes us. Here lies evidence of another function of language: categorization.

John Edwards analyzes the interplay of identity between individuals and groups in his 2009 text *Language and Identity*. He remarks on how language is used to designate and assign group labels thereby creating "boundaries." He writes about the benefits that result from group identity (and conformity) explaining "we favour those with whom we are associated or aligned, our hopes and expectations are often higher for them, we bleed when they bleed, and so on."[46] His discussion on group identity here provides a foundation for his later discussion of nationalism. Edwards refers to the "social psychology of categorisation and identity" and explains

> [t]he assumption here is that besides our uniquely personal sense of self, we also have social identities based upon the various groups to which we belong. Thus we can maintain and enhance self-esteem through valued social affiliations.[47]

Edwards describes the borders that result from group identity construction as "'us and them' borders."[48] Our earlier discussion of Dimock in conjunction with Edwards's concept of "borders," reflects the power that language possesses in its capacity to construct. Language constructs our reality by constructing the borders of the bodies of our selves and

[46] John Edwards. *Language and Identity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26.
[47] John Edwards. *Language and Identity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27.
[48] John Edwards. *Language and Identity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26.

our lands. This construction may be intangible, but it exists and is enormous in force. Again, the circular relationship between language and identity is noted by Edwards when he writes,

> It is easy to see that there are circular and mutually reinforcing reactions at work here, but it is surely also reasonable to think that some dawning sense of "groupness" and hence of boundaries must develop very early on in the prosecution of individual negotiations.[49]

*   *   *

> "To speak of *the* language, without further specification, as linguists do, is tacitly to accept the *official* definition of the *official* language of a political unit. This language is the one which, within the territorial limits of that unit, imposes itself on the whole population as the only legitimate language… Produced by authors who have the authority to write, fixed and codified by grammarians and teachers who are also charged with the task of inculcating its mastery, the language is a *code*, in the sense of a cipher enabling equivalences to be established between sounds and meanings, but also in the sense of a system of norms regulating linguistic practices."
>
> – Pierre Bourdieu[50]

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[49] John Edwards. *Language and Identity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26.
[50] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 45.

A discussion of general linguistics is necessary to examine the basic functionality of language — how words are the building blocks of sentences and how language-use weaves words into sentences into passages and so on. However, to conclude with only this type of examination would be an error. Reducing words to their most minimalistic function does not do justice to their infinite and complex existence. In *Language & Symbolic Power*, Pierre Bourdieu echoes my critique of linguistics when he writes that "linguists merely incorporate into their theory a pre-constructed object, ignoring its *social laws of construction* and masking its social genesis."[51] Taking a more detailed approach will aid in my examination of language by achieving a more thorough understanding of it and all of its capabilities. For the purposes of this paper, I will utilize a sociolinguistic framework. This theoretical approach ties particularly well to the relationship between language and identity formation, particularly national identity formation. This relationship lies at the core of my thesis and its analysis of citizenship.

Contrary to popular opinion, and despite many attempts to the contrary, the United States of America does not have an official language. English is the lingua franca — the common adopted language — but it is not and has never been the national official language. The issues surrounding America's lack of an official language could be discussed in an entirely different piece. For the purposes of this piece I will be examining the use of the English language in the United States as it pertains to the origin and maintenance of national identity and the role of citizenship. Pierre Bourdieu writes:

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[51] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 44.

> The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by an official language. Obligatory on official occasions and in official places…, this state language becomes the theoretical norm against which all linguistic practices are objectively measured.[52]

On one hand, there are innocent motivations behind a nation's desire for an official language, namely practical reasons, one being to achieve optimum functionality. Living in a capitalist society, easy communication leads to the best conditions under which economic transactions can flourish. A common language is also unifying. Ignoring the variations within a single language for a moment, we can imagine a world in which if a single language was spoken, there would be no Other. However, by positing the existence of an "official" language, other languages are implicitly deemed as unofficial or somehow less legitimate. Thus, the attempt to unify through a single language simultaneously divides by calling attention to the existence of Other languages. Here we merely catch a glimpse of the way language can be manipulated albeit in subtle ways, but manipulated nonetheless.

In "Imagined Communities," Benedict Anderson writes that the significations of "nation-ness" as well as nationalism are "cultural artefacts of a particular kind."[53] He claims that in order to fully understand these significations, it is necessary to "consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy."[54] Ultimately,

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[52] Ibid.
[53] Benedict Anderson. "Imagined Communities." in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 4.
[54] Ibid.

Anderson argues that the nation is an imagined community and in being imagined, it is therefore constructed and does not naturally exist. He explains that the nation "is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion,"[55] and goes on to write

> Gellner makes a comparable point when he rules that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist." The drawback to this formulation, however, is that Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretenses that he assimilates "invention" to "fabrication" and "falsity", [sic] rather than to "imagining" and "creation"… In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.[56]

The community aspect in Anderson's definition of nationhood is important because it is this community that builds a "deep, horizontal comradeship,"[57] and Anderson argues it is "this fraternity that makes it possible… for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly as to die for such limited imaginings."[58] Thus, the nation becomes the literal

[55] Benedict Anderson. "Imagined Communities." in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 6.
[56] Benedict Anderson. "Imagined Communities." in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 6.
[57] Benedict Anderson. "Imagined Communities." in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 7.
[58] Ibid.

and metaphorical ground by which a mass of people become unified. With such unification comes the desire for conformity in order to solidify the bonds of unity. Bourdieu writes

> Thus, only when the making of the 'nation', an entirely abstract group based on law, creates new usages and functions does it become indispensable to forge a *standard* language, impersonal and anonymous like the official uses it has to serve, and by the same token to undertake the work of normalizing the products of the linguistic habitus.[59]

It is this standard language that also forges an "us vs. them" mentality. At face value, "us" refers to a select group of individuals (for whatever unifying reason) and therefore posits an Other that we would linguistically equate to "them."

"American" refers to the physical space of the United States of America, but the colonists who created this label were from elsewhere with ("imagined") ties to other lands. The native people who did have a connection to the land now known as the United States, were excluded from the creation of the nation as well as the label to describe the citizens in regard to the newly forming national identity.

Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, leaves me hesitant to legitimize a connection between identity and place as one that relies on the construction of the imagined community of a nation because identity and place are two things that are also entirely constructed. Neither identity nor place seems to naturally exist because of the linguistic designation and therefore linguistic construction. In *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre raises the question: "It might be asked if there is any way of dating what

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[59] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 48.

might be called the moment of emergence of an awareness of space and its production: when and where, why and how, did a neglected knowledge and misconstrued reality begin to be recognized?"[60] In response to this, I refer back to Anderson and posit an answer that involves when nations were formed and especially when capitalism became the dominant system within nations. Citing Paul Klee, Lefebvre writes that "artists… do not show space, they create it."[61] I feel this is the same for many of the spaces that society as a whole has created, including the nation. The next question is: is it possible for this imagined space to truly exist without some kind of identity to accompany it? For instance, is America "real" without Americans who inhabit the space and validate the nation's claim to land and title? I argue that for the nation to "exist," it requires a citizenry that affirms the nation by accepting the national identity and adopting it. Remembering my student who used the label of "American," but not "citizen," raises questions about citizenship's relationship to national identity. Can you have one without the other? I would argue that it is not possible. However, I believe that the link between the two is taken for granted, which is why my student used the label of "American," but not "citizen." Despite my reluctance to definitively draw a link between place and identity, I can not ignore land as an identifying marker of identity because of the way the physical land of a nation often signifies a particular culture, thereby signifying identity.

In *Indigenous Identity: What Is It, and Who Really Has It?*, Hilary Weaver explains that "[i]dentity is shaped, in part, by recognition, absence of recognition, or misrecognition

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[60] Henri Lefebvre. "The Production of Space." *Architecture Theory Since 1968*. ed. by Michael K. Hays. trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 178.
[61] Henri Lefebvre. "The Production of Space." *Architecture Theory Since 1968*. ed. Michael K. Hays. trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 178.

by others"[62] and cites "The Politics of Identity" in order to discuss the damaging effects this can potentially have:

> A person or group can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.[63]

She explains that identity is a "combination of self-identification and the perceptions of others."[64] The three components of identity that she discusses in her piece are self-identification, community identification, and external identification. Each of these facets interact in such a way that acceptance and rejection, inclusion and exclusion are continually reinforcing and challenging each other in order to form an individual's identity. Weaver's analysis of these three factors of identity articulates a type of continuous negotiation of identity between individual and collective identities. Because of this negotiation, it becomes clear that identity is less about how you personally define yourself on an individual level, but more about how you define yourself in relation to others in addition to how *they* define *you*. Thus, the "American" identity — or the identity of the American citizen — can not exist without the Other (be it the immigrant or the indigenous person or yet *another* category of an Other). Yet because of this, the label of citizen is

[62] Hilary N. Weaver. "Indigenous Identity: What is it and Who Really Has It?" *American Indian Quarterly* 25 (2001): 243.
[63] Hilary N. Weaver. "Indigenous Identity: What is it and Who Really Has It?" *American Indian Quarterly* 25 (2001): 243.
[64] Ibid.

further complicated, for if the identity merely exists because of an imagined construct of contrast, then that identity has shown itself to be a mere construction as well.

In *Indians and Immigrants — Entangled Histories*, Gunlög Fur writes, "It was the land itself that brought Indians and immigrants into contact and conflict. All concurrent histories begin there, and the significance of land cannot be overstated."[65] The complexities associated with defining American identity stem from a connection to the land — of issues of ownership and authority. The land, therefore, is an integral part of the imagined space of the nation, and a uniform national identity is essential for the nation's success.

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[65] Gunlög Fur. "Indians and Immigrants — Entangled Histories." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 33, no. 3 (2014): 61.

The (Un)Written and (Un)Spoken Contracts of Land & Language

In delineating our borders, we designate our places and our sense of belonging — our very identities. All of the labels we use differentiate us from others. Again we see how language is used to mark identity in contrast. Again we see that in the process of unifying, division also occurs. Beyond the division of "nation" against "nation" is the division that occurs within the nation to establish and maintain the legitimacy of a chosen language thereby perpetuating the exclusivity and selectivity of power. In other words, the use and practice of legitimate language ensures that power is delegated only to those who have mastered its use. Thus the existence of a legitimate language within a nation does not entail that all of the nation's people get an equitable share of the power that accompanies the language use.

After the legitimacy of a language is ascertained, the reproduction of said legitimacy becomes crucial to the continued success of that language and the power that stems from its use. The use of legitimate language becomes institutionalized. Educational and political institutions carry out the reproduction of legitimate language and are charged with the continuous process of maintaining its hegemony. We must not forget that these institutions were also involved in the creation of legitimate language. In this way it becomes evident that "legitimate" language does not generate itself naturally — it is not a pre-existing entity that was discovered, but rather is very much man-made. With the

system being involved at every stage of a legitimate language's development, it is clear that the system is inextricably linked to its chosen (legitimate) language. Here, it is plain to see what Foucault discusses in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, which is how discourse works with and *within* systems to create them. We see a circular relationship existing between the two and it becomes evident that the system perpetuates the language just as the language perpetuates the system. Now the question is: should we continue to live in a reality where this circular relationship between language and the system exists? And if you answer in the negative, how should one go about breaking that "self-sufficient" circular process?

The first step is to recognize the circular relationship between the system in power and the language used to harness that power. Bourdieu writes, "Specialized discourses can derive their efficacy from the hidden correspondence between the structure of the social space within which they are produced… and the structure of the field of social classes within which the recipients are situated and in relation to which they interpret the message."[66] I think this is a relationship that often goes unnoticed by the lay person, which is unfortunate considering that person's (proper or improper) use of the legitimate language marks his or her acceptance or lack thereof into the system. Regardless of whether the individual is accepted into the system and linguistic community, the system remains, its power maintained — just as a well-oiled machine where all speakers act as some cog or another to make the system's machine run.

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[66] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 41.

The system does not crumble because of the disunity between a people unified by a legitimate language and those who do not conform to the "legitimate" language, but rather is strengthened by that divide. "All linguistic practices are measured against the legitimate practices," writes Bourdieu, explaining that the legitimate practices are the "practices of those who are dominant."[67] He continues, "Speakers lacking the legitimate competence are *de facto* excluded from the social domains in which this competence is required, or are condemned to silence."[68]

"Integration into a single 'linguistic community'" which Bourdieu describes as "a product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions"[69] can also be seen as conformity. Conformity is not always a positive for those conforming; however, it is often a positive for those in positions of power who benefit from a mass of people unified and aligned to the institution of power. America's melting pot metaphor may come to mind here: consider how the English language is not the official language, but is still used to achieve a sense of conformity, assimilation, and consensus. Bourdieu summarizes it best when he writes:

> This structural constancy of the social values of the uses of legitimate language becomes intelligible when one knows that the logic and the aims of the strategies seeking to modify it are governed by the structure itself, through the position occupied in the structure by the agent who performs them.[70]

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[67] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 53.
[68] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 55.
[69] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 46.
[70] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 64.

Understanding how language becomes "legitimate" is only one part of the equation. What gives words their weight? What invests speech with power? What gives communication any intelligible meaning? Bourdieu claims "Language at most represents… authority, manifests and symbolizes it."[71] Herein lies the second part of the equation: once legitimate language has been established, that same language is used to delegate power to individuals. These individuals must possess a mastery of language — legitimate and otherwise — but beyond that, these individuals must acquire the power to use such language, power they are given from others outside of themselves.

Saussure writes that "Language… is the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community."[72] This statement hints to the reason behind language's immense power, and yet Saussure never truly gets there. The power derives from beyond language itself — it comes from the speaker and the spoken to — from the relationship and interactions between speakers and their audience. Meanwhile, language is the overarching, omnipresent means by which all of these complex entities and relations are intricately bound together. Again, language is form. Language is the way in which identity and power (and everything else) come into being. Yet to support this fact by saying it is because of the power inherent to language would be to drastically oversimplify what happens — or rather, what we are doing — through language. Bourdieu provides the following caution:

[71] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 109.
[72] Ferdinand de Saussure. "Course in General Linguistics," in *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, trans. Wade Baskin, (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 59.

> As soon as one treats language as an autonomous object, accepting the radical separation which Saussure made between internal and external linguistics, between the science of language and the science of the social uses of language, one is condemned to looking within words for the power of words, that is, looking for it where it is not to be found,

and explains

> The power of words is nothing other than the *delegated power* of the spokesperson, and his speech — that is, the substance of his discourses and, inseparably, his way of speaking — is no more than a testimony, and one among others, of the *guarantee of delegation*, which is vested in him.[73]

Thus, language, when wielded by someone of authority, holds power both because of the power invested into the words as well as the speaker who is using them. Authority, therefore, is a self-perpetuating entity, brought into existence and maintaining its existence through a circular mode of reinforcement. Authority is yet another system that feeds into the greater "system."

It is not enough for the authority of language to be merely "understood," says Bourdieu, but to be "*recognized* as such."[74] The conditions of legitimate usage must be met, which entail that an utterance be made *by* a person deemed "legitimate" *in* a situation deemed "legitimate" *to* an audience deemed "legitimate." Who or what set these conditions in the first place? Somehow it feels as if it has always been this way. Upon analysis of Bourdieu's writings, it slowly becomes clear that the practice of legitimate language is

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[73] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 107.
[74] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 113.

something all speakers are implicitly agreeing to — maybe without even fully realizing they are doing so — thereby investing power and perpetuating the power structure. Once aware that the power comes not from the speakers, but the audience's compliance and implicit consent, this awareness opens the door of possibility. If the audience recognizes their ability of delegating power, they realize their power and agency. Thus, those who do are not delegated the power as "legitimate" speakers, but are compliant in the "legitimate" language setup, will find that they have much more control over the language and power system than it appears on the surface.

Bourdieu writes: "The language of authority never governs without the collaboration of those it governs, without the help of the social mechanisms capable of producing the complicity."[75] He also writes, "For ritual to function and operate it must first of all present itself and be perceived as legitimate."[76] I'm reminded here of the phrase "Fake it till you make it." Is this what the system has been doing all along? In the following section, I present two examples of individuals writing from delegated positions of authority invested with power through language. In analyzing the words both spoken and written by a member of the federal judiciary and a state executive who also served as a member of Congress, it becomes clear that these words both perpetuate the existing system while simultaneously adding to its construction. Examining their words provides insight on what specific aspects of the system these individuals were trying to maintain and possibly challenge.

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[75] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 113.
[76] Pierre Bourdieu. *Language & Symbolic Power*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 115.

Section II

One Part of Many:
The Citizen's Construction by Justice Robert H. Jackson

Robert H. Jackson is recorded as once having told his future biographer that "[his] work, if it lives at all, will live in what [he] write[s]."[77] That has most certainly proven to be true. He wrote wisely and clearly, and from a space clearly influenced by his past, but also looking objectively towards the future. He began his career in public service by practicing law in Chautauqua County. It is due to his small town roots that I have any connection to the man at all. During the spring semester of my first year in the master's program, I was given the opportunity to work with the Jackson Center located in Jamestown, New York as part of my graduate assistantship with SUNY Fredonia's English department. The purpose of my project was to analyze recovered archival documents from Jackson's days as a Jamestown lawyer and compare them to his later judicial opinions as a Supreme Court Associate Justice. The hope was that a clear trajectory could be established between his writing style at the beginning and end of his professional careers.

After reading and analyzing over two hundred and fifty archival documents and dozens of judicial opinions, I felt that I came to know Jackson — the man behind the words I had read — in a way I had never quite experienced during other research endeavors. I

[77] Nanneska Nall Magee. "Playing It Dangerous: Justice Jackson's Passionate Style." *2 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing* (1991): 124.

somewhat unexpectedly came to admire the man I had been tasked with researching. My appreciation arose from learning of his awareness of the power of language, intentionality behind word choice and meaning, and his foresight to recognize how what he was writing then would affect the nation for generations to come. Through my study of the justice, I began to recognize the ways Jackson was contributing to the American concept of citizenship. The words he penned for his opinions implicitly held meaning for what citizenship meant for him writing in the present moment as well as holding on to meanings accumulated from the past. Beyond that, I believe it was his origins and small-town roots that largely impacted his own perception and meaning of citizenship. The medium of the judicial opinion is unique to examine in terms of citizenship construction because of the unique standpoint Jackson was writing from.

In Lauren Berlant's *Keywords for American Cultural Studies* entry entitled "Citizenship," she writes

> Citizenship is the practical site of a theoretical existence, in that it allows for the reproduction of a variety of kinds of law in everyday life. It is an abstract idea on behalf of which people engage in personal and political acts… It is also, importantly, an ordinary space of activity that many people occupy without thinking much about it, as the administration of citizenship is usually delegated to the political sphere and only periodically worried over during exceptional crises or the election season.[78]

Unlike the average citizen, Jackson was in a position where he would constantly be ruminating on what the concept of citizenship entails or rather, should entail. As an

[78] Lauren Berlant, "Citizenship," in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, ed. Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 41.

impartial judge and defender of Justice and Truth, Jackson's station as a Supreme Court Associate Justice required him to write and decide cases for the optimum greater good. In one of the highest positions that enforces justice, he was tasked to write with the clarity of truth and the motivation of justice. In upholding American ideals, he often wrote ideally — for how things should be carried out in a perfect world. In other words, he was responsible to the overall citizenry. His life term appointment by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 gave him the freedom to uphold the law truthfully, whether or not that was the popular opinion of citizens. He was free to add to the nation's framework as he saw best, accompanied by the privilege of not having to concern himself with playing politics in order to get re-elected. Beyond citizenship as a relation,[79] citizenship "most simply… refers to a[n individual's] standing within the law,"[80] which is why examining Justice Jackson's judicial opinions are particularly relevant to this thesis investigation.

For many reasons, Robert H. Jackson can be cited as an example of the American Dream coming to full fruition as a small-town boy who attained success and achieved lasting greatness by marking his spot in history as a Supreme Court Justice and the Chief U.S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. Jackson is usually described as being mostly self-taught especially when it comes to legal knowledge. Phil C. Neal, a former law clerk of Jackson's, stated the "individuality of Justice Jackson's approach to legal problems was a hallmark of his judicial work, just as rugged independence was a hallmark of his

[79] This relation being between individuals of a nation who share the same, unified identity.
[80] Lauren Berlant, "Citizenship," in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, ed. Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 41.

character,"[81] and recalls that Jackson, himself, "liked to point out, [that] he was probably the last Supreme Court Justice there would ever be who received his legal training primarily by apprenticeship rather than formal study."[82] In this way, I guess you could say that Jackson pulled himself up by his bootstraps. He was an exceptional man, but in terms of the American Dream, he was the exception and not necessarily the rule.

Robert H. Jackson grew up in Frewsburg, New York, a hamlet located a few miles from Jamestown, just north of the New York/Pennsylvania border. After graduating from high school, Jackson decided to study for an additional year at Jamestown High School where he came under the mentorship of Mary R. Willard, one of his greatest influences. In a tribute to Willard after her death, Jackson said, "None owes her a greater debt or would make more prompt acknowledgment than I."[83] His remarks connect her with his knowledge of the power of language:

> A correct and full understanding of the written word is the threshold of knowledge, and ability to write simple direct English is the beginning of power… A noble thought worthily expressed, a dramatic event graphically described, a knotty problem lucidly stated, were to her marks of the craftsman and, in a student, foretellers of a career.[84]

Jackson scholars recognize Mary Willard as a key figure in fostering Jackson's development into the well-known writer he is today. As a trusted mentor and friend upon

[81] Phil C. Neal. "Justice Jackson: A Law Clerk's Recollections, A Tribute to Justice Robert H. Jackson," *68 Albany Law Review* (2004): 556.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Robert H. Jackson. "Tribute to Mary R. Willard," 1931.
[84] Ibid.

their meeting up until her death, Willard played a large role in shaping Jackson's beliefs and opinions. Often described as an individualist, Jackson had the following to say regarding his former teacher:

> Mary Willard belonged peculiarly to that period before the war, when we were less distracted by mechanical speech transmission and less confined to mechanical thought, when our work was measured by excellence rather than quantity, when individuality was prized and cultivated and standardization was an emblem of inferiority. Strongly individual herself, she sought and encouraged independence, poise and indifference to social pressure which in this day so largely shapes conduct and governs opinion.[85]

After his year at Jamestown High School, Jackson worked at his mother's cousin's law firm. He later spent a year studying at Albany Law School before he returned to his apprenticeship at the Jamestown firm. He passed the New York State bar examination at age twenty-one without ever attending college.[86] He would go on to successfully practice law in Jamestown for twenty years. In fact, Jackson had the most lawyering experience of any of President Roosevelt's appointees to Supreme Court.[87]

Jackson's "humble" beginnings offer valuable insight into understanding his later career as an Associate Supreme Court Justice. I think Jackson remained connected to his fellow citizens regardless of the success he experienced in his professional life. More than

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[85] Robert H. Jackson. "Tribute to Mary R. Willard," 1931.
[86] John Q. Barrett. "A Jackson Portrait for Jamestown, 'A Magnet in the Room.'" *59 Buffalo Law Review* 50 no. 3 (2002): 809-817.
[87] Nanneska Nall Magee. "Playing It Dangerous: Justice Jackson's Passionate Style." *2 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing* (1991): 123-141.

that, I think where he came from was always in the back of his mind. There is a conversational nature to his writing that I imagine must also stem from Mary Willard's influence and emphasis on public speaking. In *Playing it Dangerous*, Magee cites Justice Felix Frankfurter and writes, "Jackson belonged to 'the naturalistic school' [of opinion writers]. He wrote as he talked, and talked as he felt."[88] Although his opinions sound natural and flow very easily for his audience, Jackson did not choose his words without thorough and considerate contemplation. He "constantly blended legal language and informal idiom,"[89] and his opinions are very accessible to the average person.

Jackson's writing style is devoid of jargon, lofty language, and overly complex sentence structure. Reflecting on his memory of Jackson's feelings towards the opinion written for *Brown v. Board of Education*, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., a former law clerk of Jackson's, said "basically, he very much liked the idea that [the opinion] was simple, short, people could understand it, you could easily agree."[90] The accessibility of his writing seems to be evidence of his intention to write so that the common person as well as the practicing attorney could understand his writing. Jackson never forgot his roots. For Jackson, I think it went beyond being an American, but that he was concerned for the common people. His concern for the common people is representative of his concern for the citizenry. The people he was writing for were American citizens and this is a significant (though maybe seemingly obvious) fact to remember when reading his written opinions. The accessible

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[88] Nanneska Nall Magee. "Playing It Dangerous: Justice Jackson's Passionate Style." *2 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing* (1991): 135.
[89] Nanneska Nall Magee. "Playing It Dangerous: Justice Jackson's Passionate Style." *2 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing* (1991): 136.
[90] John David Fassett, Earl E. Pollock, E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., Frank E.A. Sander, & John Q. Barrett, "Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education," *St. John's Law Review* 78 no. 3 (2004): 554.

quality of his writing is indicative of Jackson's persistent humility despite all of his successes and achievements. His humility demonstrates that he thought of himself as a protector of the law; someone entrusted with maintaining its integrity and keeping a record for the generations to follow. Magee gives an accurate summary of Jackson's opinions with the observation that "Jackson sounds, instead, as if he recognized the minutiae and chaos of life all too well and was attempting to create in his writing 'a momentary stay against confusion' while preserving the right to laugh at the mess he and others were making."[91] In this way, Jackson was a wise and powerful man who never let the authority and power of his position go to his head.

As a Supreme Court Justice, Jackson was mindful of the framework he was contributing to, and because of this he chose his words carefully and intentionally. Jackson wanted to avoid setting up harmful limitations to the law, and his writing often demonstrates that he was cognizant of the power of language and how he often made judgments on a case-by-case basis. During a roundtable interview, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., who served as Jackson's law clerk during the Supreme Court October Terms 1953 and 1954, said of Jackson:

> He thought that you had to interpret — as a very practical man, which he was — he thought you had to interpret the Constitution in terms of today's world.[92]

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[91] Nanneska Nall Magee. "Playing It Dangerous: Justice Jackson's Passionate Style." *2 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing* (1991): 123-141.
[92] John David Fassett, Earl E. Pollock, E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., Frank E.A. Sander, & John Q. Barrett, "Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education," *St. John's Law Review* 78 no. 3 (2004): 554.

Jackson's wisdom in recognizing the power of language is evident through the awareness he reveals through his writings and judicial opinions. As a member of the judicial branch, he is writing and interpreting words knowing the extensive possibilities language possesses in terms of both usage and interpretation. He wrote from a standpoint where he was working for the greater good of the nation, but more than that, the greater good of the citizenry. I think Jackson was writing with the individual subject at the forefront of his consciousness as many of his opinions, which I will discuss in detail later in this chapter, show the need to protect the individual from overly limiting language in legal decisions.

Jackson recognizes the law's anchoring in our nation's past by his repeated references to the U.S. Constitution in *Cramer v. United States*. In this case, the Court had to decide whether Anthony Cramer, a German immigrant, had committed treason during the U.S. involvement in World War II. Jackson explains the context that framed how America's founding fathers defined treason in the Constitution by saying how the Revolution and Benedict Arnold's betrayal were still fresh in their minds. He wrote that deciding this case had to begin with a thorough understanding of the definition and context of "treason," reading a statute on treason "only as our forebears read it — through the eyes of succeeding generations of English judges, to whom it has been the core of all decision, and of common-law commentators, to whom it has been the text,"[93] thereby displaying how our legal system builds upon our collective past, national and beyond. This particular case is evidence of how word meaning is affected by contact and is yet another example of the way

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[93] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 18 (1945)

words generally acquire additional meaning through accumulation as well as the way that a nation and its legislative documents can also experience accumulation.

In framing his own judicial opinion within the Constitutional framework provided by our forefathers, Jackson exhibits knowledge and understanding of our nation's past as well as expressing respect for our nation's foundation and beginnings of government. This respect he shows is more directed at the power of language in recognizing that words are only as powerful as our investment in them. However, Jackson also recognizes the limits of language as seen in Cramer's case in the form of the U.S. Constitution, which is specifically evident when he writes, "Our problem begins where the Constitution ends."[94] While he exhibits knowledge and understanding of our nation's beginnings, and even appreciation to a certain extent, Jackson recognizes the inevitability of changing contexts within which interpretation occurs. In *Cramer*, Jackson's opinion describes the evolution behind the word "treason" and how it pertained to the understanding of America's forefathers and the Continental Congress — a collective understanding that was inextricably linked to past contexts, which included the accumulation of legislation stemming from the English monarchy.

Writing specifically to the context of the American Revolution, Jackson explains:

> When our forefathers took up the task of forming an independent political organization for New World society, no one of them appears to have doubted that to bring into being a new government would originate a new allegiance for its citizens and inhabitants. Nor were they reluctant to punish as treason any genuine breach of

[94] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 30 (1945)

> allegiance, as every government time out of mind had done. The betrayal of Washington by Arnold was fresh in mind. They were far more awake to powerful enemies with designs on this continent than some of the intervening generations have been. England was entrenched in Canada to the north and Spain had repossessed Florida to the south, and each had been the scene of invasion of the Colonies; the King of France had but lately been dispossessed in the Ohio Valley; Spain claimed the Mississippi Valley; and, except for the seaboard, the settlements were surrounded by Indians — not negligible as enemies themselves, and especially threatening when allied to European foes. The proposed national government could not for some years become firmly seated in the tradition or in the habits of the people. There is no evidence that the forefathers intended to withdraw the treason offense from use as an effective instrument of the new nation's security against treachery that would aid external enemies.[95]

Jackson alludes to something interesting in pointing out the forefathers' recognition of the new nation, new government, and essentially *new people* they were participating in creating. Defining treason in the context of the new nation was defining an aspect of American citizenship. Here it is important to realize how the concept/term "treason" (and with it, the concept of "citizen") evolved (and continues to evolve) as a result of the combination of changing contexts, shifting meanings, and various perspectives. In this way, I see the concepts of "treason" and "citizen" not only being irrevocably linked, but as serving as intricate mirrors of each other. The sentence, "The proposed national

[95] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1945)

government could not for some years become firmly seated in the tradition or in the habits of the people," indicates the gradual process of *becoming* specifically in terms of the American nation. Just as language is constantly in flux, so, too, are the "things" that language designates. In other words, because language is the fluctuating medium used to define and designate, the "things" or *identities* language articulates are necessarily in flux as well.

Jackson elaborates on the framework of the revolutionary context, writing:

> The forefathers also had suffered from disloyalty. Success of the Revolution had been threatened by the adherence of a considerable part of the population to the king. The Continental Congress adopted a resolution after a report by its "Committee on Spies" which in effect declared that all persons residing within any colony owed allegiance to it, and that if any such persons adhered to the King of Great Britain, giving him aid and comfort, they were guilty of treason, and which urged the colonies to pass laws for punishment of such offenders "as shall be provably attainted of open deed." Many of the colonies complied, and a variety of laws, mostly modeled on English law, resulted. Some of the legislation in later years became so broad and loose as to make treason of mere utterance of opinion. Many a citizen in a time of unsettled and shifting loyalties was thus threatened under English law which made him guilty of treason if he adhered to the government of his colony and also under colonial law which made him guilty of treason if he adhered to his king.[96]

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[96] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1945)

Treason and citizenship are linked to the nation and the governing power. Thus, as the nation and power shift, the definitions of treason and citizenship shift as well. Here, consideration of perspective (and resulting perceptions) is key. After all, Jackson comments, "*Now*[97] the treason offense was under revision by a Convention whose members almost to a man had themselves been guilty of treason under any interpretation of British law."[98] Again, we see a statement infused with the belief that language and meaning are in perpetual flux. Additionally, here we see how contact and context are relevant factors for understanding language meaning as well.

Connected to his earlier mentioned call to read a treason statute "only as our forebears read it,"[99] Jackson states, "We, of course, can make no independent judgment as to the inward meanings of the terms used in a six-century-old statute, written in a form of Norman French that had become obsolete long before our Revolution."[100] Here, Jackson demonstrates his understanding of language yet again. Of course language can not be judged independently, for it is inextricably linked to an infinite number of factors through *contact*, context being one of them. At the same time that this statute can not be separated from its past,[101] Jackson is recognizing the limitations we face in our abilities to completely comprehend a context (or perspective) that is different to our own. For this reason alone, the capacity to effectively communicate through language is uncertain at best.

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[97] The italicization is my own doing. Words, such as "now," that situate us in time are endlessly intriguing. I argue that context is something we must always take into consideration when interpreting a word, statement, full document, etc., but in doing so, it undeniably adds infinite layers of complexity to language use. Not only does this show the way in which language is always fluctuating, but also reinforces Saussure's assertion that "language is form and not a substance."

[98] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 14 (1945)

[99] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 18 (1945)

[100] Ibid.

[101] Remember Bolinger here.

While Jackson clearly advocates for attempting to understand context, he elaborates on the limitations faced in this endeavor when he writes, "Historical materials are, therefore, of little help; necessity as well as desire taught a concept that differed from all historical models in the drafting of our treason clause."[102] He continues:

> Treason statutes theretofore had been adapted to a society in which the state was personified by a king, on whose person were focused the allegiances and loyalties of the subject. When government was made representative of the whole body of the governed, there was none to say "I am the State" and a concept of treason as compassing or imagining a ruler's death was no longer fitting.[103]

Remembering Bourdieu's discussion of the delegation of authority through language, we see something that is unique to the American nation in terms of delegating power. With a government that is "representative" of the body of the governed in its entirety, power is delegated in a different way than if it were delegated to a single individual of authority such as a king. Does this convolute power delegation for the United States, or is it a benefit in that such delegation divides power in a more equitable and just fashion?[104] Again, is it both?

"We turn then to the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 so far as we have record of them,"[105] begins Jackson in the second section of his *Cramer* opinion, where he then continues by detailing the reviews and criticisms of how "treason" was

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[102] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
[103] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1945)
[104] Consider the branches of government and how they were set to exist in order to exact a balance of power.
[105] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 22 (1945)

defined in United States legislation. Describing certain drafts and the feedback they received as often contradictory (for example, on the inclusion of a phrase from the Statute of Edward III, some thought the words had a restrictive effect while others thought "that they gave a more extensive meaning"[106]), Jackson shows how differences in perspective and opinion compete to prevent language use from having any kind of clear uniformity or infallibly defined power. He also depicts how the concept of treason, by attempting to be fit into a concretely articulated definition, is almost brought into existence by meeting the requirements set forth in such a definition. In this way, he conveys how language constructs since "treason" as we know it would not exist without meeting the constraints set in legislation that defines it. I would argue that the same can be said of attempts to define the American citizen — that citizenship seems to be attained in fulfilling requirements, or rather fitting into the constraints of a constructed system of categorization.

Jackson is mindful of every framework that contributes to the greater network of context for legislation, especially when he writes the reminder:

> For it must be remembered that the constitutional provision establishes a minimum of proof of incriminating acts, without which there can be no conviction, but it is not otherwise a limitation on the evidence with which a jury may be persuaded that it ought to convict. The Constitution does not exclude or set up standards to test evidence which will show the relevant acts of persons other than the accused or their identity or enemy character or other surrounding circumstances. Nor does it

[106] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 23 (1945)

> preclude any proper evidence of non-incriminating facts about a defendant, such for example as his nationality, naturalization, and residence.[107]

He wisely acknowledges the intentions and purpose behind the words chosen in the Constitution when he says, "The words of the Constitution were chosen, not to make it hard to prove merely routine and everyday acts, but to make the proof of acts that convict of treason as sure as trial processes may."[108] In this sentence alone, Jackson is marking his awareness of the power to harness language towards specificity or obscurity. Proficient language users must be aware of this seesaw-like quality of language in order to attempt achieving optimum balance. Jackson's acknowledgment shows that the power of language lies not solely in the utterance, but the interpretation (or performance) as well.

Jackson's thorough awareness and understanding of language (both in its capacities and limitations) lead him to provide an accurate criticism of the Constitution's framing of "treason" when he writes:

> The framers' effort to compress into two sentences the law of one of the most intricate of crimes gives a superficial appearance of clarity and simplicity which proves illusory when it is put to practical application. There are few subjects on which the temptation to utter abstract interpretative generalizations is greater or on which they are more to be distrusted. The little clause is packed with controversy and difficulty. The offense is one of subtlety, and it is easy to

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[107] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 33 (1945)
[108] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 35 (1945)

> demonstrate lack of logic in almost any interpretation by hypothetical cases, to which real treasons rarely will conform.[109]

Jackson depicts part of the reason Cramer's case was dismissed in that the conditions for treason were not met,[110] expressing that "[t]he provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them."[111] He fully acknowledges the enormous difficulty that lies in defining treason[112], but maintains that it is the obligation of the Court to interpret within the definition that has been provided for them.

Jackson concludes the opinion of the Court in *Cramer v. United States* with the following:

> Time has not made the accusation of treachery less poisonous, nor the task of judging one charged with betraying the country, including his triers, less susceptible to the influence of suspicion and rancor. The innovations made by the forefathers in the law of treason were conceived in a faith such as Paine put in the maxim that "He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from

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[109] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1945)
[110] Namely, giving aid or comfort (explicitly, as an overt act) to enemies of the United States.
[111] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945)
[112] He writes, "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this constitutional provision. Perhaps the framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that 'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy,'" *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945).

oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach himself." We still put trust in it.[113]

Jackson's incorporation of the maxim attributed to Thomas Paine into his conclusion is extremely telling as to the function and obligation of the Supreme Court, in terms of its responsibilities to both the nation and citizenry, and perhaps the citizenry more so, since after all, it is the citizenry that composes or *constructs* the nation. Without the governed, there would be nothing to govern. Without "citizens," there is no "nation." Paine's maxim resonates through various other opinions written by Jackson. Echoes of the maxim can also be seen in the Fourteenth Amendment, in which the Constitutional rights, recognized as natural and self-evident, are guaranteed to both citizens and *all other persons*. In this way, there appears to be almost a double-edged sword of citizenship for the nation, for the rights attributed to its citizens are declared unalienable. The label of "unalienable" marks rights as belonging to all persons regardless of citizenship. The Paine maxim encourages a line of similar thought by promoting justice and equality for all — friend or foe, citizen or foreigner, insider or outsider. If this is the case, why should American citizens be compelled to believe they owe anything to their nation for recognizing the rights supposedly intrinsic to personhood? Why, if the nation fails to supply those natural rights to its citizens, should the citizenry continue to delegate power to the state when it seems the power-infused language of legislation is not being interpreted, or *performed* accordingly?

[113] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945)

In *Cramer v. United States*, it was obviously necessary to frame the defendant as a citizen since citizenship status provides the basis by which a conviction of treason could be imposed. As such, Jackson opens his opinion by writing, "Cramer owed allegiance to the United States. A German by birth, he had been a resident of the United States since 1925 and was naturalized in 1936."[114] As a naturalized citizen of the United States, therefore, Anthony Cramer was expected, by the American nation, to shed any remaining sympathies or associations to his homeland that would interfere with or contradict his loyalty to the United States. Jackson's opinions often include a framing of those on trial as citizens, which makes sense since as citizens, they owe an obligation to the Court as an agent of order within the nation.

In *McGrath v. Kristensen*, Kristensen is portrayed as a contrasting figure to the framework of citizenship. This case invokes a question of residency as it relates to citizenship, for Kristensen — a Danish citizen by birth — was never naturalized in the United States yet took up "residence"[115] in the United States for a prolonged period of time. Because he inhabited the designated space of the United States, he was met with an expectation to return the nation with military service. Since in taking up residency in the United States, Kristensen sought the advantages that accompany American life, including protection under the flag,[116] but failed to meet the requirement of military service, the

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[114] *Cramer v. United States*, 325 U.S. 1, 3 (1945)
[115] "The regulations… either made an alien in Kristensen's situation a nonresident of the United States for the purpose of the Selective Training and Service Act, between February 7 and May 17, 1942, or they were nondeterminative [sic] of status in that period. In the absence of a determinative regulation, the meaning of the word "residing" in § 3 (a) requires examination. The meaning of that word, of course, depends upon the meaning of "residence." "Residence" sometimes equals domicile, as in voting. Again, as in taxation, one who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a 'resident,'" *McGrath v. Kristensen*, 340 U.S. 162, 174-175 (1950)
[116] *McGrath v. Kristensen*, 340 U.S. 162, 176 (1950)

Court affirmed the decision to deport Kristensen. In this way, residency is only *properly* possessed when the person meets the requirements for inhabiting the space in which he lives. In his concurring opinion, Jackson wrote, "Of course, if an alien is not a mere sojourner but acquires residence here in any permanent sense, he submits himself to our law and assumes the obligations of a resident toward this country."[117] In this way, residency is a prerequisite of citizenship and again we see an overlapping between the way language designates land and human body — in other words, how even the spaces within our world are linguistically constructed.

Once an individual has citizenship status, rights of citizenship follow. Rights, such as the freedom of speech and freedom of religion, heralded as true American ideals. In *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, Jackson posits the subjects of the case as "Appellees, citizens of the United States and of West Virginia."[118] The status of citizenship, therefore, situates itself at the heart of the case. As practitioners of the Jehovah's Witness faith, the appellees were being unconstitutionally forced to salute the flag — or face the consequences — and as a result, brought their case before the Court. Jackson importantly notes:

> The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin. But the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question

[117] *McGrath v. Kristensen*, 340 U.S. 162, 177 (1950)
[118] *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943)

> in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The State asserts power to condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child. The latter stand on a right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude.[119]

Jackson's discussion here calls to mind the overridability of rights between the individual and state. In other words, between the citizen and the nation. The nation, of course, is able to revoke rights that it bestows upon its citizens (if the "proper" situation calls for such action). The question remains whether it is within the nation's power to do so when such rights are, as earlier agreed, "unalienable." In his discussion of the case, Jackson writes that the "validity of the asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one, presents questions of power that must be considered independently of any idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in question,"[120] and continues:

> The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our Constitution. We examine rather than assume existence of

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119 *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 630-631 (1943)
120 *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943)

> this power and, against this broader definition of issues in this case, reexamine specific grounds assigned for the Gobitis decision.[121]

In this way, the case presents an opportunity for more abstract consideration of American rights and ideals in relation to the construction of citizenship and what that label encompasses.

In addition to core American values and ideals, Jackson's argument in support of the appellees also rests heavily on the American Bill of Rights. He explains the relevance of the Bill of Rights to *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* by writing

> The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.[122]

Again, here is wording that heavily implies these rights exist regardless of citizenship, yet the title of "American citizen" causes the rights to be recognized by the nation. The same is true of the Court's decision to dismiss the indictment in the case of *United States v. Ballard*, which was a case that investigated whether leaders in the religious "I AM" group defrauded their followers. In this case, while Jackson disagreed with the indicted for moral reasons, his position as a Supreme Court Justice prevented him from exacting judgment as he wished to. He explains his own personal opinion on the charges, writing

[121] *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 635-636 (1943)

[122] *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)

> If I might agree to their conviction without creating a precedent, I cheerfully would do so. I can see in their teachings nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth. But that does not dispose of the constitutional question whether misrepresentation of religious experience or belief is prosecutable; it rather emphasizes the danger of such prosecutions.[123]

Here, Jackson's awareness of the power of language, specifically in terms of precedent-setting, becomes evident. Paine's maxim is relevant to this point once more, for if the nation is to protect the citizenry's right to freedom of religion, it must protect the right for all religions — regardless of whether the religion is deemed "worthy" or "good" or "real," etc. In fact, nearing the conclusion of his dissent, Jackson writes, "that is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."[124]

Tying Jackson's statement back to Paine, to have one, we must also have the other. Yet to reduce this idea to a binary set of things, is to oversimplify something that is beyond complicated and nuanced, and merely adds to the accumulation of construction. These examples of Jackson's opinions provide evidence for the way citizenship is constructed. The writings and decisions show how and what the citizen is allowed to do, under which circumstances and conditions, and only after certain requirements are met. Only when all of the factors are fine tuned[125] in such a way to allow for the status and enjoyment of

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[123] *United States v. Ballard*, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944)
[124] *United States v. Ballard*, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944)
[125] Think of the "Fine Tuning" philosophical argument for the existence of God.

citizenship, is the circular obligational relationship between nation and citizen seen to exist.

Another Part of Many:

The Citizen's Construction by Lieutenant Governor Stanley N. Lundine

"[T]he civil rights of all citizens are more respected today than they were thirty years ago."

– Former Lieutenant Governor Stanley N. Lundine

Lincoln Junior High School, April 30, 1987

Nearly thirty years after Stanley N. Lundine, former Lieutenant Governor of New York, uttered the above statement, I was allowed access to the Stanley Lundine Papers, a collection at the Archives and Special Collections of the Daniel A. Reed Library at the State University of New York at Fredonia. For my thesis, I chose to work with the collection's 1987 speech cards. It is a vast collection that includes his various writings and research, itineraries, correspondence, office reports and meeting minutes, and more. In his own words, the lieutenant governor donated the collection to the State University of New York at Fredonia because it was "fitting."[126] At the time of donation, the college was located in

[126] "Lt. Gov. Lundine Gives Papers to Reed Library." *Statement* (Fredonia, NY) 15, no. 4, June 1987.

Lundine's former congressional representative district and was "the only four-year arts and sciences college in his home county."[127]

Stanley N. Lundine was born on February 4, 1939 in Jamestown, New York, where thirty years later, he would be elected to be one of the youngest mayors in the nation. His biography in the ninety-first edition of *The New York Red Book* states that Lundine was "drawn to public service"[128] because of inspiration from President John F. Kennedy. In several of his speeches as lieutenant governor, Lundine also attributes John F. Kennedy as one of his greatest sources of inspiration and motivation. Lundine worked for Kennedy's campaign in the spring of 1960 and as a result of his work, was invited to Kennedy's inauguration. Relevant to remember here, especially in relation to my thesis topic, is former President Kennedy's inaugural address in which he famously spoke the following words: "Ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country."

My involvement with the collection was a result of both my existing connection to the archives through my graduate assistantship position as well as my research interests. I chose to look at the speech cards from the speeches Lundine performed in 1987 because unlike the speech transcripts included in the collection, many speech cards had been personally annotated by Lundine. It was a serendipitous coincidence that the speech cards were all from the year 1987, which marks the year of my thesis, 2017, as the thirty year anniversary of the speeches I examined, which numbered to nearly one hundred. Lundine was elected lieutenant governor in 1986 alongside Governor Mario M. Cuomo, whom he

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[127] "Lt. Gov. Lundine Gives Papers to Reed Library." *Statement* (Fredonia, NY) 15, no. 4, June 1987.
[128] *The New York Red Book*, 91st edition, (1987): 31.

was a "full-fledged partner with."[129] The pair also won re-election in 1990. Prior to his terms as lieutenant governor, Lundine was elected to Congress in 1976 as "the first Democrat to be elected from the Southern Tier in more than a century."[130] Lundine was a congressman for the following eleven years until he let his term run out so that he could run for lieutenant governor of New York.

My purpose in analyzing the former lieutenant governor's speeches served two functions: first, to see if and if so, how, he was portraying (and therefore constructing) citizenship; and second, to explore how Lundine was embodying the authority he had been delegated by the People of the State of New York. Lundine's speech acts work to different effects than Justice Jackson's opinions, yet they are both working in very similar ways. Unlike Jackson, Lundine had to always be aware of his audience since re-election was a concern he would have in the back of his mind. Jackson, on the other hand, did not have to be popular with the citizenry as he possessed the privilege of a life term.

Lundine's political speeches are an example of Bourdieu's delegation. By physically voicing his speeches, Lundine's words became actions. These speech acts included language that constructed a concept of "citizenship" while discussing larger, overarching regional and national issues. By incorporating the concept of "citizenship" as an underlying thread to his speeches, Lundine contributed to the overall definition of "citizen" in very meaningful albeit subtle ways.

For many of his speeches, Lundine followed a similar pattern. First he would acknowledge the audience's role in his own success: namely his election as Lieutenant

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[129] *The New York Red Book*, 91st edition, (1987): 31.
[130] Ibid.

Governor of New York. On the face of his speech, this acknowledgment appears when he thanks his audience for having him and allowing him the opportunity to speak. In terms of power delegation, the audience is complicit with delegation by providing him the opportunity to speak. The audience invests authority into his words by giving him permission to speak through the offer of the opportunity. In essence, Lundine is given and maintains his authority through the actual performance of the speech.

Throughout the speeches I read, Lundine consistently calls for his audience to enter into a partnership — usually with him and the Cuomo administration in general, as well as public and private sectors, various levels of government, each other, etc. — in order to achieve "success." Through his invocation of partnership and referring to his audience members as "partners" Lundine implicitly marks his audience members as equals. The partnership allocates a certain level of power and agency to those addressed in Lundine's speeches. Nearly all of the speeches I read from 1987 concluded with Lundine's affirmation of this so-called partnership as a way of calling his audience to some type of action.

To both connect with his audience and assert his own legitimacy and credibility as a political leader, Lundine remarks upon his past experiences in his political roles, including his elected positions of authority and leadership and his natural position of a citizen. He refers to the time he spent as a mayor to emphasize the importance of political work at the local level, something he often argues is the most effective. Meanwhile, Lundine refers to his experience serving as a congressman to add to his credibility and make the case for his knowledge and expertise when it comes to drafting and passing legislation. He smartly

plays to his hometown roots when on April 30, 1987, he gave a speech at Lincoln Junior High School, a middle school in Jamestown, New York. He begins:

> As a graduate of Lincoln Jr. High, I am especially honored to be here tonight. I have always been proud to call Jamestown my home and to say that I was educated here in public schools.[131]

The opening of his speech sets the stage for connection between the speaker and the audience, and in this case, Lundine uses the shared connection as a platform by which he can also incorporate promoting his (and the Cuomo administration's) agenda.

Lundine argues that "the challenge *today*[132] of raising a child to be an educated and responsible member of society is greater than ever."[133] As a Democrat, Lundine's speeches consistently demonstrate an agenda that worked for investment in education, family support, and community growth and sustainability. The network of his speeches depict a metaphorical tapestry woven together by the thematic threads of economy, education, citizenship, and nationhood. Upon examination, each speech arguably displays a linear projection of the path to success for the nation: that of constructing the "proper" citizen. A "proper" citizen is an individual who is educated and employed; informed and involved in politics; and civically engaged in other ways, including aid to his or her local community and the families of citizens that inhabit it. Perhaps most importantly, the "proper" citizen contributes to society at both the local level and in the greater sense of the nation. The

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[131] Lundine, Stanley. Remarks by Lt. Governor Lundine. April 30, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.
[132] Today as in April 30, 1987. (Italics are my own.)
[133] Lundine, Stanley. Remarks by Lt. Governor Lundine. April 30, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

ways a "proper" citizen "contributes" takes many forms, including labor, family, and economic contributions. The responsibility that Lundine remarks upon in terms of the "member of society" (AKA citizen), is arguably connected to the citizen's role as a consumer. Lundine's recipe for citizenship may be boiled down (admittedly very simplistically) to something like this:

Step 1: *Get* an education.

Step 2: *Get* a well-paying[134] job.

Step 3: *Have* a family. Participate in your local community.

Repeat steps 1-3 for the next generation. Do what you can to aid in the repetition of the process in order to perpetuate the existence of the cycle.

The opportunity that arises from an education and the (allegedly) resulting employment and the (allegedly) resulting enjoyment of prosperity and fullness of life[135] is part of the good ol' American Dream.[136] Lundine arguably attributed the same line of thinking to opportunity.[137]

In his speech to the audience gathered at Lincoln Junior High School, he spoke the following:

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[134] Reaching an accurate definition of "well-paying" is separate task in itself and requires much deliberation (as has been evidenced in the long-running discussion on the minimum wage, especially in the 2016 Presidential campaign season.) In terms of Lundine's speeches, he does not explain what specifically qualifies as well-paying, but uses the well known concept of "breadwinning" to connect to his audiences.

[135] There is no evidence to support this as a "legitimate" sequence of events.

[136] There is also no evidence to support the existence of the American Dream.

[137] There is evidence to support this via handwritten annotations in a speech Lundine made at the NAACP Annual Appreciation Awards Luncheon on February 28, 1987 where he wrote that opportunity is also a dream.

> Even if our parents didn't have much education themselves, they all shared *a common dream*[138] for their children: to go to college, to get ahead. As children, we adopted that dream as our own.[139]

Education's purpose is not only to legitimize language, which includes the circular process producing and reproducing legitimate language, but to instill values of citizenship — thereby including the circular process of producing and reproducing citizenship. Education is an institution by which language and citizenship are constructed, monitored, and enforced by the system of power. The institution of education is instrumental in perpetuating the system and the subjects[140] by whom the system is constructed,[141] but the institution's power is reinforced by the persons who participate in it. The family unit is given the responsibility of encouraging education to children (i.e., citizens-in-training) and ensuring the success of the educational institution. In Lundine's discussion of adopting the dream of our parents, the concepts of legacy and inheritance should come to mind. Ruminating on these sentiments and their relation to citizenship makes me wonder on the legitimacy of national identity, and leads me to question if it is actually something that is merely passed down from one generation to the next — something that is taught through repeated rehearsal and practice.

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[138] Italics are my own.

[139] Lundine, Stanley. Remarks by Lt. Governor Lundine. April 30, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

[140] AKA, Citizens.

[141] Break it down: the system constructs its subjects. The subjects collectively make up the mass that constructs the system. Everything is a construction. Who is the "true" agent *doing* the constructing? Who "truly" has the power in this circular system. Consider how this may resonate similarly to the mereological fallacy in the philosophical argument for the existence of God.

Judith Butler explains gender identity, citing Simone de Beauvoir's discussion of becoming a woman and writing, "In this sense, gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time — an identity instituted through a *stylized repetition of acts*."[142] Butler's explanation of gender identity can also be used to explain national identity. Thus it becomes clear that facets of identity are wholly constructed and not at all inherent to an individual. The stylized repetition gives the illusion that an identity is naturally occurring. The consistency of the performance is what prevents it from being challenged. Tradition. Conformity. Things that can be oddly comforting unless you are excluded from them. Ironically, it is highly likely one may experience discomfort while trying to achieve conformity, but it is in working to achieve it that one will also experience feelings of belonging and being on the "right" path. The concept of citizenship succeeds because of conformity and because people *want* to feel as if they belong — the need for belonging is arguably something that has been ingrained into us. In an interview of Claudia Rankine, Lauren Berlant describes citizenship as something that "involves metabolizing in the language of your flesh what you call the 'ordinary' injury of racist encounter, which is partly an effect of your stated desire to be happy, to have a good experience, to enjoy the game of sociality."[143] In other words, citizenship is a performance where the script is provided by agents of the system such as Lundine.

Lundine begins to draw his speech to a close by explaining:

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[142] Judith Butler. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." *Theatre Journal* 40 no. 4 (1988): 519.
[143] Lauren Berlant. "Claudia Rankine." *BOMB*, Fall 2014.

> But no amount of money can hold that ladder steady for our children. No amount of money can give our children the confidence they need and the willingness they must have to climb higher.
>
> It is up to the families, the community, and the schools themselves to do that.
>
> Together, we must provide the bedrock values for our educational system. We must reinforce our basic American principles, which are often neglected or maligned. Principles such as equality, tolerance, the need to contribute to the common good, the rule of law, and the love of family and country.[144]

This excerpt along with the overall message of the entire speech (along with the shared underlying theme in other speeches) clearly portrays Lundine's "it-takes-a-village" liberal humanist outlook on citizenship and nationhood. His speeches depict citizenship, a means to nationhood, as a series of steps or building blocks, of course beginning with the individual, but more specifically starting at home, growing to the local community, and finally building to the nation. In this way, citizenship can be seen as not quite being about the individual anymore, although arguably it never was. Citizenship constructs nationhood. The system does not exist because of individuals, but the collective of individuals. The success of a system is dependent on the greater whole, be it the family unit or the local community, until it reaches complete fulfillment in the form of the nation.

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[144] Lundine, Stanley. Remarks by Lt. Governor Lundine. April 30, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

Citizenship's construction of nationhood expressly relies on an individual's natural drive for a sense of belonging. This sense of belonging is similar to Anderson's discussion of fraternity.[145] More than that, it is this same fraternity that promotes the feeling of "love of family and country" that Lundine expresses as a basic American principle.

Lundine ultimately advocates for the well-being of the family unit because he sees success of the family as leading to success of the nation. The family that Lundine seems to wish for, however, is the stereotypical ideal. In this way, Lundine ties together the American Dream ideal with an idyllic family home. When acknowledging derivatives of the ideal family unit, he presents these "strays" as negative situations, unfortunate but inescapable in his/our period of time, that need to be corrected or resolved. Typically when he makes speeches that talk about doing right by our children, he paints young citizens-in-training as being at a fork in the road. There are two paths the child citizen's life could take: one being the path of education to employment and ultimately life as a contributing member of society; the other a path overrun with drugs and alcohol to be a life of misery culminating in either death or prison. This second path has uses for the success of the system as well. After all, the system's success relies on the money it makes, in the nation's case this means the nation's success is reliant on the success of its economy.

Some of the lieutenant governor's speeches discuss the building of new prisons and expansion of existing prisons within New York State, and demonstrate an underlying "prisons-for-profit" mindset.[146] In a statement given during a visit to the "North Country,"

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[145] Benedict Anderson. "Imagined Communities." in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 48-59.

[146] Which arguably may not have been Lundine's intent, although I would argue that this is connected to the underlying economic tone that exists in many, if not all, of his speeches.

Lundine offers building two new medium-security prisons as a means to benefit the state economy, particularly at the local level of the North Country area. An increase in construction jobs would be one benefit to the local economy, but an important consideration to remember is that this increase in jobs would be temporary. At least, until the next prison was built. After making his case for the prisons, he ends his speech by remarking on the benefits that will be experienced by "North Country residents, like all New Yorkers"[147] through the Cuomo administration's proposal to increase the investments made in education. He gives a similar speech to the Consulting Engineers Council when he says

> We've built over 9,000 new cells in our prisons and we've appointed dozens of new judges to our courts. We have to make the criminal justice system more accountable, to ensure that our streets are safer.
>
> In this area, the Governor has proposed a Determinate Parole program, which would make judges more accountable for the minimum sentences they set.
>
> In education, too, we'll be looking for more results. The education budget for this coming school year would be over $7 billion, a 52% increase since Governor Cuomo took office.[148]

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[147] Lundine, Stanley. Statement by Lt. Gov. Stan Lundine on His North Country Visit. 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

[148] Lundine, Stanley. Consulting Engineers Council, February 9, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

His juxtaposition of the administration's investment in both prisons and education is an interesting one. Not only does it show the two clear paths that citizens may take, but it also displays the subtle division of "insiders" and "outsiders" within a single citizenship community. This type of division is effective in promoting citizens to be "good" and reassures them of their reward for behaving appropriately, namely, a booming economy and safe environment to live and raise a family in.

In a speech at the Bronx Community Forum, Lundine claims children are "our most valuable resource."[149] By this statement, Lundine saying much more than simply repurposing the well known phrase of "children are our future." Children are resources because they are evidence of continued growth, both of the citizenry and nation. The next generation is meant to continue the work done by the previous generation. Beyond that, children will grow up into citizens, ideally becoming contributing consumers within the larger social, political, and economic systems. For this development to successfully occur, it is the responsibility of the parents and all adult citizens of the earlier generation to ensure that the legacy and tradition of American citizenship and contribution (including consumerism) is passed down to the next generation.

In his speech to the New York State Child Care Coordinating Council on March 24, 1987, Lundine said that the "important service" his audience members provide "is not what some call a 'women's issue,'" but instead asserts that it is "a family issue, and an issue for

[149] Lundine, Stanley. Talking Points by Stanley N. Lundine. March 3, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

society and every citizen."[150] He goes on to argue that "with so many single women raising children alone, *society*[151] needs to help these mothers find quality affordable child care, so they can get off the welfare rolls and become tax payers [sic] instead of tax consumers."[152] His assertion that it is society's obligation to care for the next generation of citizens provides further evidence of his "it-takes-a-village" mentality. Society takes on this responsibility for the greater good of society as a whole with nation's prosperity as the ultimate end in mind. The portrait of single mothers he paints here is one that indicates who is a valuable (and proper) citizen in Lundine's eyes: the contributing member of society. The proper citizen, in this way, is contributing to the workings of the nation through labor production and consumption. To consume the benefits of the nation without "properly" contributing first, as these single mothers on welfare do according to Lundine, marks you as falling short of the ideal citizen role. However, to consume while simultaneously contributing to the system marks you as acting just as a perfect little citizen *should*.

Consider Lundine's use of the word "results" in the earlier discussed speech to the Consulting Engineers Council ("In education, too, we'll be looking for more results."[153]). The word choice here is rather telling. "Results" demonstrates a quantitative mode of

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[150] Lundine, Stanley. Speech to NY State Child Care Coordinating Council, March 24, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.
[151] Italics are my own.
[152] Lundine, Stanley. Speech to NY State Child Care Coordinating Council, March 24, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.
[153] Lundine, Stanley. Consulting Engineers Council, February 9, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

evaluative thinking and reduces individual citizens to a simple number dependent upon whether they are successful as students or inmates. Again, this is indicative of the two paths an individual may take, one being the "right" path, the other not (even though it still feeds into perpetuating the system anyway). In this way, citizens contribute to the success of the nation based on their participation in the capitalist economic system. Essentially, citizens are simply a resource for the nation. In some ways, the nation may need the citizenry in order to exist more than the citizenry needs the nation in order to exist. Of course, without the nation there are no citizens, but the individuals who *are* citizens will always exist (albeit separately from their constructed national identity).

Lundine needs his constituents in a similar way to the way a nation needs its citizens. In his Democratic dinner speech in Clinton County, Lundine uses words like "beautiful" and "magnificent" to compliment the area he was visiting during the hours before he makes his speech. He then says that "[t]he most valuable resource of the North Country is the fine people here, people who have the hard-working, independent spirit that helped make our state and our country great," and he thinks "the Democratic Party can harness the strength of the people here in Clinton County and in the rest of the North Country to make our party stronger and to elect more good Democrats to public office."[154] First, I wonder if this was an effective use of flattery by the lieutenant governor and whether it achieved the desired effect on his audience. The speech continues in a complimentary tone, describing audience members as "committed" and making "a great

[154] Lundine, Stanley. Clinton County Democratic Dinner Speech, February 10, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

team" that is ensuring "a bright future" with "more success at the ballot box."[155] "I want you to know," Lundine promises his audience, "that you can count on the Governor and I to keep Clinton County Democrats in mind."[156]

My intention is not to vilify Lundine. He is a politician. Realistically, he wants to be re-elected, or elected in a new position that furthers his political career, in the future. His desire for career advancement could possibly be a selfish one, or rather, a very typical symptom of being human. However, his desire for his own success as well as the success of the Democratic party could have altruistic intentions as well. Lundine could be promoting the party's aims because he truly believes that this is the best way to achieve the greater good for all American citizens. After an annotation that reminds Lundine to contrast the Democratic party with the goings-on in Washington under the Reagan administration, Lundine goes on to say

> Ours is the party and the government that works. A party and a government that is for upstate and downstate, for New Yorkers of every race and religion, for the poor, for the middle-class and for the industrial leaders that provide jobs for our people.
>
> We are not for the politics of exclusion, but inclusion. We don't seek to pit one region or group against another, but rather to have all groups work together as the Family of New York… The other party calls itself the Grand Old Party. Well, we're the Grand Party of the Future. We love and cherish our past and cling to our

[155] Lundine, Stanley. Clinton County Democratic Dinner Speech, February 10, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.
[156] Ibid.

> important traditions, but unlike the Republicans we don't seek yesterday's solutions for the problems of today and tomorrow… We Democrats are, as the governor says, progressive pragmatists. We want to do what is right but we also want to make sure what we do is practical and will yield good results.[157]

There is that pesky "results" word again. This is one of the more moving speeches I have read, but it distinguishes itself from other speeches because of the certain degree of freedom Lundine experiences as a result of speaking to fellow Democrats and assumedly like minded individuals. However, with this freedom remains the concern for re-election. He must continue to be aware of the way his speech will impact his standing both as lieutenant governor and as a politician in the party's future. Aside from that, Lundine's above language is cloaked by grand descriptions of flattery and idealism. Ideally, the party may strive for everything Lundine has said, but practically (as Lundine even admits), the party must still do what it has to do in order to be successful. Perhaps this is indicative of political language's limitations.

Regardless of Lundine's potential good intentions, with the combination of the economic thread that lies beneath his speeches as well as the high likelihood of an underlying concern for re-election, is Lundine evidence that government has become a business? Has capitalism corrupted the very ideal of American democracy?[158] An equally worrying question to ask here is, am I really the "partner" Lundine marks me as being, or is

[157] Lundine, Stanley. Clinton County Democratic Dinner Speech, February 10, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.
[158] Perhaps this is a question that requires a more thorough investigation in a separate thesis.

this simply done to further his own agenda? The lieutenant governor closes his speech with the following words:

> We need you to help take our message to the people. It's a message that says Democrats in office will give the people government that is good, fair and efficient. It's a message that says we are the party of the people. And it's a message that offers hope for tomorrow rather than fear of what tomorrow will bring.
>
> I invite you to be our partners in this mission. Together, we can accomplish great things.[159]

His closing is appealing; both emotionally-stirring and inspiring. Here, he makes a distinction between public officials (agents of the system) and "the people" (the citizenry and constituents behind the agents). Yet, despite the changing roles within society, every individual remains a citizen and therefore Lundine's label of "partner" may be applied. Is Lundine's invitation and offer for partnership a promise? Is it something that is even possible to guarantee? Or, more worryingly, is it merely a string of empty words, designed to evoke the passion of nationalism to garner support of the citizenry, and nothing more than that?

In a commencement address given at Southwestern Central High School in Jamestown, New York on June 19, 1987, Lundine spoke the following to graduates:

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[159] Lundine, Stanley. Clinton County Democratic Dinner Speech, February 10, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

> As you leave here today, you will be embarking upon a new phase of your lives. Whether or not you plan to further your education, begin a career, or enter military service, you will be entering a time of transition.
>
> You will no longer be observers of society, you will be participants — with the right to vote and to voice your views as an adult member of society.[160]

He goes on to relate their time of transition to his own transition between his position as a Congressman and his new position as lieutenant governor "in partnership"[161] with Governor Cuomo. After establishing this unifying link between himself and the graduates, Lundine continues by saying that "all of us here today, no matter our age or station in life, have had to put ourselves to the test many times, by making informed decisions that not only serve our personal interests, but also offer a larger benefit to society."

Throughout his speech, Lundine consistently compares the graduates to the nation, in terms of the transition both are experiencing as well as the choices and actions both will make in the future. His comparison almost equates the citizen with the nation, setting similar obligations and responsibilities for both. If both citizen and nation work in the same way, they both seem to share in the action of ensuring the existence of the other. In other words, both the citizen and the nation perpetuate the meaning behind the respective labels of "citizen" and "nation."

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[160] Lundine, Stanley. Commencement Address by Stanley N. Lundine, June 19, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.
[161] Ibid.

In a way, Lundine's commencement address serves to mark these graduates as citizens in a different way than they would have previously been acknowledged. As adult members of society, the label of "citizen" for graduates has been renewed in a sense. They are now able to *fully* participate in society. On the surface, this participation seems to indicate a participation in the nation and betterment of society, but underlying it is the concept of participating in an economic sense. Lundine encourages the graduates in his audience to challenge themselves to become the best they can be at their chosen professions. He explains that "[b]y becoming highly skilled in your chosen profession, you can make the most direct contribution to yourself, your family, and your community."[162] Here, again, we see evidence of the building blocks Lundine consistently alludes to in his speeches.

Even though the underlying economic message of Lundine's commencement address is an insidious aspect of the speech, perhaps it is necessary to note that the nation's entanglement with economical aims is through no fault of Lundine. After all, the world was running on money long before Lundine was ever elected to lieutenant governor. In many of his speeches, Lundine acknowledges the unfortunate fact that everything takes money, even actions that appear to be just and fair or an inherent right of a person, such as education or special educational needs. "The mentally disabled must not be ignored and warehoused in large state institutions where they lose their identities and ties with their families and communities. Rather, they must be given every opportunity to live as normal

[162] Lundine, Stanley. Commencement Address by Stanley N. Lundine, June 19, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

lives as possible,"[163] said Lundine in his speech congratulating Rabbi Stauber and the members of Door of Hope for the programs supporting citizens with special needs in the community. His statement reflects how a sense of identity is rooted in ties to an individual's family and community just as Hilary Weaver discussed in *Indigenous Identity: What Is It, and Who Really Has It?* Lundine applauds the programs run by the Door of Hope for giving individuals with special needs "a greater feeling of self-worth, a greater feeling of fitting in with the rest of society."[164] These words imply that these programs also give individuals a sense of belonging. In this way, the programs that create a sense of inclusion and belonging for individuals with special needs, also instill them with the purpose of participation within society to the level they are able, thereby ultimately conforming to the system "everyone else" in society is also involved in.

Lundine goes on to say

> We share with you a strong determination to tear down barriers of neglect and discrimination against the mentally handicapped.
>
> The barriers go up because some people concentrate so much on what the mentally disabled CAN'T do that they overlook with the disabled CAN do.

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[163] Lundine, Stanley. Speech to Door of Hope Dinner by Stanley N. Lundine, May 25, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

[164] Ibid.

> Just as it is wrong to discriminate against Jews or other groups based on religion or race, it is wrong to build a wall of prejudice around the mentally disabled.[165]

On the face of his speech, these words sound as if they are compassionately promising aid to those who have been treated poorly by society in general, and partially that may be true. Lundine recycles his phrasing of barriers and the disabled being capable in their own right in his keynote speech to the Rehabilitation Workshop Marketing Association. Amid praising the disabled for still being capable workers, Lundine switches between expressing the morality of offering jobs to disabled persons ("To deny them the opportunity to work is simply wrong."[166]) and the benefits that the nation will see if such "morality" is followed. He explains

> Wrong because it deprives the disabled of jobs they so badly need, and wrong because it deprives our economy of the valuable contributions they can make.
>
> Without jobs, the disabled have no choice but to live entirely on public assistance benefits.

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[165] Lundine, Stanley. Speech to Door of Hope Dinner by Stanley N. Lundine, May 25, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

[166] Lundine, Stanley. Speech to Rehabilitation Workshop Marketing Association by Stanley N. Lundine, May 28, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

> With jobs — even at the low-end of the payscale — the disabled can become at least partially self-sufficient, cutting the amount of money taxpayers spend to help care for them.[167]

Here, Lundine is using "wrong" with its moral implications and yet his argument strays from moral philosophy into the economic area rather quickly. From there, Lundine argues that job opportunities give disabled persons a greater sense of self-worth, etc., recycling similar phrasing on "worth" and "fitting in" from his earlier speech to the Door of Hope. His speech pretends to be concerned with the well being of disabled citizens, but instead seems to be more focused on the economic drain that disabled persons would be without jobs where they can contribute to society as consumer citizens.

The label of "citizen" branches off from the subject of the "self." Citizenship entails the obligation of involvement both in the political and economical system of the nation. Beyond that, Lundine's speeches demonstrate a positioning of the role of the citizen alongside that of a worker and a consumer — one who is able to contribute to the prosperity of the nation's economy through participation in the labor force in addition to an ability to *consume* within the economy.

Lundine's words provide evidence for his own inner conflict at negotiating the inconsistencies between the subject as a person and as a citizen. His position within the system as a figure with delegated authority, unfortunately posits him in a place where he is only allowed limited language. Political language is limited in that it must maintain itself

[167] Lundine, Stanley. Speech to Rehabilitation Workshop Marketing Association by Stanley N. Lundine, May 28, 1987. MSS 25, Box 68a, Stanley N. Lundine Papers. Daniel A. Reed Library, Archives & Special Collections, State University of New York at Fredonia. Fredonia, New York.

using the power delegated into it, in virtue of being political language. Lundine is stuck in his position of power, only allowed to use the language he has been delegated by the system (and the people who perhaps unknowingly feed it). As a political figure of authority, Lundine is only allowed a finite set of language to push back against the system and promote the progress and change he wishes to see. This limitation Lundine experiences goes beyond his own concerns for pleasing his constituents enough to achieve re-election and concerns for pleasing the conventions and traditions of his party to achieve continued success in the governmental system. Thus, Lundine's speeches show that while language may be a flawed medium carried out by flawed human beings, political language, itself, is specifically limited and self-perpetuating within the system that utilizes it. As a result of the limitations experienced by political language users, Lundine is nearly powerless to correct the system that the language has constructed.[168]

Lundine's speeches shift between portraying the subject as a self and as a citizen. Partially this shift may be because of Lundine's own inner strife in reconciling how the citizen has subtly become an entirely separate entity from the self, but the shift may also be a large indication of the conflation between the self and citizen that has been occurring for a very long time. Ultimately, what Lundine's speeches show is a contradiction between the inherent rights of a person and the delegated rights of a citizen. Many times, both in Lundine's speeches and elsewhere, the citizenship and personhood of a subject are conflated. This is evidenced when he talks about "duties" and "rights" belonging to the citizen and the self separately, which leaves the subject to experience a conflict between

[168] "For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." *The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantled the Master's House*, Audre Lorde (1983).

two components of a single identity. The economical enmeshing of nationhood with capitalism have made it so that the label of "citizen" has been partially removed from its Enlightenment roots of selfhood. The citizen is no longer simply a person, but a member in a system in which participation is required to ensure the continued existence of the system itself. The citizen is a cog in the machine of the nation. Citizenship, therefore, is a contract between the individual and the state. It is a contract that is implicitly consented to and often without the full awareness of what citizenship entails. The contract is a complex relation in which the citizenry constructs the nation, yet the label of "nation" establishes and secures the label and contract of "citizenship." The confusion that results from the conflation of the self and citizen can have, and I think, *is having*, sinister consequences. Through language it is possible to mask the subject thereby causing the self at the heart of the matter to be forgotten. Language can be dangerous when it falsely oversimplifies, objectifies, or creates a constructed illusion of reality. Language is powerful and for as much as it can be used to conceal and mislead, it can also be used to uncover and reveal *Truth*.

<u>Section III</u>

Reflections & Timely Connections

The question of who is the "citizen" should be phrased instead as who should the citizen be? Not in terms of what the citizen should do for the nation, but what the citizen simply is as its own identity. The citizenry constitutes the nation. Many times, citizenship is often equated with nationhood, language conflated in a way that blurs the lines between national and personal identities. The resulting identity crisis impacts the well-oiled workings of the machine, so much so, that the entire system could potentially collapse.

Robert H. Jackson's judicial opinions show the challenge language can face in terms of attaining clarity of communication. In attempting to achieve clarity, Jackson also had to be wary of the precedent he would be setting within the law. He had to write with a healthy balance — without going too far as to be restrictive and without failing to go far enough as to be vague. Everything Jackson wrote as an Associate Supreme Court Justice contributed to the construction of citizenship and nationhood. His delegated position allowed him to write within an imagined, ideal space. Meanwhile, Stanley N. Lundine's position was far more constrained both by the system he was working within and the constituents he was responsible to. The balance that Lundine had to maintain existed more in the push and pull between the conventions of the political system and the approval of his constituents. Lundine is an example of Bourdieu's delegated power, but more specifically how the delegation of power process has likely been misunderstood or unknown to the

masses. Lundine received his power from the system, but the system receives its power from the people — Lundine's constituents. The delegated power is maintained in a circular fashion seemingly without a way to break the cycle. Lundine was not in a position to break that cycle, being a part of the system and receiving authority from that same system. Therefore change must be made by a party that does the action of delegating power. If the system, more interested in its own maintained existence, is not willing to make that change, then the responsibility falls to the People.[169]

Many people may be unaware of the power of language and many more may be unaware of the power they themselves possess in their abilities to delegate power and authority into language. The first step to promote change and encourage progress is to recognize this power and help raise others to this same awareness. The written word is powerful for the record it keeps. The spoken word is powerful for the action it causes — that of bringing *something* into existence — bringing *something* to life. Justice Robert H. Jackson and Former Lieutenant Governor Stanley N. Lundine are examples of the power of language in its respective formats, written and spoken. Both the written and spoken word are powerful for the element of *voice* that each possesses. This voice belongs to the language-user — the one who has been invested with authority and power through delegation.

So what does it mean to be American? What did it mean before and what does it mean now? I propose that the American national identity has always had a hollow meaning because it is not an inherent quality of identity. The American identity is an identity that

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[169] Once more.

has been in perpetual flux and construction. "American" has never and will never be a concrete entity. Anything that has been constructed can be *de*-constructed and even *re*-constructed. Language and identity are entirely malleable. Again, language is form. Perhaps then, identity, too, is form. It is up to the subject to recognize these forms and harness his/her/their power to use these forms as he/she/they wish.

In "Spatial Stories," Michel de Certeau explains that

> [a] *space* exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is composed of intersections of mobile elements… In short, *space is a practiced place*.[170]

Following this line of thought, I now understand that the "American" space both as a land and as a label of citizenship is a practiced place where language both constructs and maintains these spatial identities. The American "space" is where *being* occurs according to de Certeau, and meanwhile the space is in a constant state of *becoming* because of the forms of "being" including all of the interactions between people and other entities: their relationships and social exchanges, obligations and expectations, rights and duties, etc. The human body is what lives in a "space" and must adhere to the rules set upon it by the place itself. Between these relations and de Certeau's mention of "contacts,"[171] there are echoes of Wai Chee Dimock's work in *Shades of the Planet* where she discusses how language and people evolve through the contact of separate communities. Language is the form that

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[170] Michel de Certeau. "Spatial Stories." in *The Practice of Everyday Life*. trans. Steven F. Rendall, 117. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
[171] Michel de Certeau. "Spatial Stories." in *The Practice of Everyday Life*. trans. Steven F. Rendall, 127. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

constructs a space, essentially constructing our very reality. Hence, the power of language lies in its ability to construct.

At the Association of Writers and Writing Programs 2017 Conference held in Washington D.C., American writer Dean Rader said, "The monuments look different now."[172] He expressed this statement in relation to the context of America's current political climate, the controversial 2016 Presidential election, and how this affects poets, artists, and writers who typically incorporate activism and a push for progress into their work. In "Spatial Stories," de Certeau wrote, "Stories thus carry out a labor that constantly transforms places into spaces or spaces into places"[173] and in "Literary Geography," Virginia Woolf explains that "[a] writer's country is a territory within his own brain."[174] In putting de Certeau and Woolf in conversation with each other, I propose that any language-user, but specifically the writer, has the ability to construct a form of reality. The writer then can present stories that have yet to be told, bringing awareness to voices who have historically been silenced. Suzan-Lori Parks is a prime example of a writer utilizing the power of language to comment on the system and construct a different perspective (or version of reality) that has previously gone unnoticed. Throughout my master's program and thesis completion, Suzan-Lori Parks has provided immense inspiration to me. Her influence resulted in the somewhat unconventional formatting of my thesis. I wanted my thesis to use the power of language to challenge the way language has traditionally been

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[172] "Writing Against Borders: Literature and the (Un)Making of Nationhood" Panel, Dean Rader, AWP Conference February 11, 2017

[173] Michel de Certeau. "Spatial Stories." in *The Practice of Everyday Life*. trans. Steven F. Rendall, 118. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

[174] Virginia Woolf. "Literary Geography." In *Essays of Virginia Woolf,* Vol. 1. edited by Andrew McNeillie, 35. Harvest, 1986.

used in the past. My thesis is meant to be accessible to all since it ultimately calls for every American's participation in constructing what it means to be American.

Dean Rader went on to say that who we are as writers depends on our relationship to language and therefore land and nationhood as well.[175] In this way, language and identity are interdependent on each other and as fluctuating entities, they are in a constant state of becoming. As language-users, we each have the ability to contribute and influence this state of becoming. When we speak or write — anytime we use language — we are building *something*. We are contributing to something much larger than we can even imagine. My hope for the future is that we can think of something to build beside walls. With Jackson writing in the aftermath of World War II and Lundine during Ronald Reagan's presidency, an era where the Democratic party's power began declining, both of these delegated authority figures were using language to construct citizenship in a moment when what it meant to be "American" was being redefined. Now, too, is a moment of redefining American citizenship. Arguably every "moment" of American history is an opportunity to redefine citizenship since identity is constantly in flux just as language is.

We can not separate words from their past. Their accumulated meanings and accompanying baggage are something we must carry. However, we are in control of how language grows in the future. I think it is time we stop rehearsing a similar script of citizenship and nationhood, and work together to write a new one. We can acknowledge our roots while simultaneously acknowledging the impermanence of the "nation." Then, and only then, can we look beyond the imagined and constructed borders we have

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[175] Virginia Woolf. "Literary Geography." In *Essays of Virginia Woolf,* Vol. 1. edited by Andrew McNeillie, 35. Harvest, 1986.

implicitly assigned ourselves. From here we should realize it should not be about what it means to be “American” necessarily, but what it means to be a subject — what it means to be a person. For that reason, I propose we move beyond thinking of the American citizen and to the global citizen instead, using a transnational and planetary perspective recognizing the power each voice possesses.

Through writing this thesis, in a way, I am tapping into the power of my own voice — my own power and authority as a citizen, language-user, and writer. Citizenship is a privilege I never asked for, one I did not know I had until just recently, and one that I definitely took for granted. So, who is the citizen? The citizen is me. Now, I formally name myself as a citizen with intention and purpose, fully aware of the baggage this word carries, the accumulation it has accrued over time and space. My naming myself as a citizen calls my citizenship into being with renewed meaning. Here is where I start.

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