How Feasible is it for Los Angeles to host the Olympic Games in 2028 given the city’s existing transportation, lodging, and other resources?

A Senior Honors Thesis

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Abstract

Hosting the Olympics is a monumental task that can negatively affect a host city. It is well established that hosting the Olympics is a costly venture. The aim of this paper is to determine how feasible it is for the city of Los Angeles to host the 2028 Olympic Games given the city's existing transportation, lodging, and other resources. To test the hypothesis that Los Angeles is relatively well suited to host the 2028 Olympic Games, I examined three past Olympic Games in order to determine where they succeeded and where they fell short. The studied games include London 2012, Sochi 2014, and Rio 2016. London 2012 was largely a success, while Sochi and Rio struggled. London was able to succeed by focusing on the legacy of the games, while Sochi and Rio were deterred by corruption from Game organizers and government officials. I also examined public data in Los Angeles including existing venues, budgets, infrastructure, and lodging. The results showed that showed that little construction would have to be done for sports venues. These results suggest that Los Angeles is more well suited to host the games compared to most countries due to its existing infrastructure.
Introduction

The Olympic Games take place over 16 days, but they have a long-lasting effect on the country and city that hosts them and the people that live there. Oftentimes hosting the Olympic Games leaves the host city in a precarious financial position that leaves the citizens with the bill. This was most evident after the financial disaster of the 1976 Montreal Winter Games left the taxpayers with $1.5 billion in debt (McBride, 2018). Hosting a mega event like the Olympics is an incredibly hard task that requires diligent planning and coordination between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), host city organizing committee, and the local and federal government of the host. There are many costs associated with the games. The first cost is the bid, which entails hiring consultants, planning, and travel. This cost is generally anywhere from $50 million to $100 million. After completing the bidding process, the next most pressing need includes the sport venues that oftentimes are highly specialized for non-traditional sports like cycling or skiing. There is also a need for a venue big enough to hold the opening and closing ceremonies. Another big cost is infrastructure including lodging and transportation. Host cities normally construct an Olympic Village to house athletes. The IOC also requires the host to have 40,000 hotel rooms, which forces some host cities to construct more. Transportation also must be improved to ensure that athletes and spectators can travel to and from the venues with ease, this is done through both upgrades and constructing new roads train/rail lines, and airports. These infrastructure costs are oftentimes the highest presumably because they will outlast the Olympic Games. Operational costs also comprise a portion of the budget including security and administrative roles.
Throughout the 20th century, the Olympics did not bring a severe cost problem to host cities. By the latter half of the century, this had changed which was most evident with Montreal in 1976. The rising costs and recent Olympic and political disasters in Mexico City and Munich also left the games in a precarious position. The renowned success of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles helped to change the image of the games and once again made them appealing to countries to host after Los Angeles became the first city to turn a profit from the games. Today, the Olympics are in a similar position as they were in the back half of the 20th century, and once again the IOC has looked to Los Angeles to turn this around by awarding them the 2028 games. Many people in Los Angeles still view the Olympics in a positive light after their experiences at the 1984 Games (Pells, 2017). LA28 is the Olympic Organizing Committee for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics (LA28, 2020). LA28 is responsible for planning and overseeing the games. The goals of LA28 are to host a sustainable and cost-effective games while providing a great experience for all parties involved (LA28 Building on Olympic Agenda, 2020). Los Angeles is uniquely positioned to host for a variety of reasons. Having a plethora of professional and collegiate teams in the area is an invaluable asset as LA28, will not have to construct any permanent sports venues. Having two big prominent universities in UCLA and USC in Los Angeles also helps to alleviate the issue of lodging for athletes and media and cuts down on costs since a new Olympic Village will not need to be constructed. Traffic should also not be a big concern for the duration of the games if LA28 implements strategies used for the 1984 Games and if Mayor Eric Garcetti’s twenty-eight by ‘28 imitative is successful.
Olympic Movement

Olympism is based on the three values of excellence, friendship and respect. These values set the foundation for the Olympic Movement, which helps to make the world a better place through growing sport, culture, and education (What are the values of Olympism, 2020). The Olympic Movement is carried out by the IOC and its goal is to make a positive impact by teaching today’s youth through sport in congruence with the values of Olympism. Belonging to the Olympic Movement also requires following the Olympic Charter. The three main parties that follow the Olympic Movement are the IOC, International Sport Federations (IFs) and the National Organizing Committees (NOCs). IFs are regulators of the games, and the NOCs are the nourishers of the games. In addition to these three main parties the Olympic Movement also includes the Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs), the national associations, clubs, athletes, and various judges, referees, and coaches. Pierre de Coubertin led a movement to bring back the ancient Greek Olympics and ultimately ended up becoming the founder of the modern Olympic Games and the first IOC President (International Olympic Committee, 2020). de Coubertin intentionally noted in the Olympic Charter that the IOC and the Olympics were no place for politics. It was de Coubertin’s vision of good will and amateurism that defined the early Olympics.

de Coubertin revived the movement from the historic Greek Olympics in 1892. De Coubertin went on to create and become the president of the International Olympic Committee in 1894. The first summer games were held in Athens in 1896 and the first winter games were held in France in 1924. Since its inception, the IOC’s influence has grown over time. The IOC’s authority comes from the Olympic Charter, which was
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published by de Coubertin in 1894. The Olympic Charter is the foundation of the Olympic Movement. Countries agree to the charter and the authority of the IOC to enforce rules by agreeing to the Olympic Charter. The IOC has largely tried to keep politics out of the Olympic Games but in some cases the games have been used for political gain or nationalism by host countries. The first example of this was the 1936 Summer Games in Germany when Hitler used the games to showcase Germany as a world superpower and his Nazi ideology (Goldblatt, 2016). Politics have also been interconnected with various other Olympic Games such as the 1968 Mexico City Games in which John Carlos and Tommy Smith protested while receiving their medals; the 1972 Games in Munich when 11 Israeli athletes were murdered by terrorists; the 1980 boycott by the US of the Moscow Olympics and the 1984 boycott by the USSR of the LA Olympics (Avery Brundage, 2020; IOC, 2020). While de Coubertin’s vision of “pure” Olympism was mostly fulfilled, albeit with complications, it was eventual head of the IOC, Avery Brundage, who fought hardest to maintain those ideals.

Avery Brundage was a very powerful figure during his tenure as IOC President. Avery Brundage served as the President of the United States Olympic Committee before becoming the President of the IOC in 1952. He would hold this position until 1972 (Avery Brundage, 2020). Brundage competed in the 1912 Olympics and took great pride in amateurism, upholding the Olympic Movement, and keeping politics out of the games, at times to his own detriment. In 1936, as President of the USOC Brundage looked past the problematic regime in Nazi Germany and refused to boycott the Games which many people called for. At the 1968 Games in Mexico City when John Carlos and Tommie Smith raised their fists with black gloves on during the national anthem in a show of
black pride and protesting the racial and socioeconomic conditions black people face in the United States. Furious, Brundage kicked the athletes out of the Olympic Village, barring them from further competition in the games (Gomez, 2018). The 1972 Games brought more controversy for Brundage, with African American Olympians Vince Matthews and Wayne Collett stroking their beards and twirling their medals while refusing to stand for at attention for the national anthem. For this, Brundage banned them for life. Brundage also reportedly played a large rule in Rule 50. Rule 50 is a rule that does not permit any demonstrations of political, religious, or racial protest in Olympic sites and venues (Ramnanansingh, 2020). Brundage also faced heavy criticism when he was unwilling to postpone the 1972 Munich Olympics in the wake of Palestinian terrorist attack on Israeli athletes (Avery Brundage, 2020). Avery Brundage is a dominating figure in the history of the Olympics who did everything he could to uphold De Coubertin’s Olympic ideals of amateurism and of an Olympic Games free of politics. Perhaps Brundage’s biggest challenge to maintaining those ideals occurred toward the end of his tenure when he had to make hard decisions on how countries divvied up television revenue.

Splitting up television revenue was a large source of conflict under Brundage (Wenn, 2012). Brundage preferred to leave this to OCOGs to bring negotiated television contracts to the IOC for their approval. Brundage believed that money could corrupt the spirit of amateurism that was vital to the Olympic movement. Despite the IOC struggling with limited funding, Brundage believed that the IOC should not be an organization focused on wealth and commercial gain. Sooner or later, Brundage realized that the IOC could not squander this available revenue. The IOC modified Rule 49 of the Olympic
Charter changing who would manage television rights negotiations, the availability of royalty-free footage, and which party would distribute the revenue from the transaction of Olympic television rights. The negotiations would be done by the OCOGs in order to protect the IOC from any controversy, but the IOC would be distributing the money in order to keep each parties' monetary aspirations in check. Brundage was able to have the IOC cash in on his terms.

Brundage had representatives from NOCs and IFs negotiate the division of television revenue. Their proposal became the foundation of the IOC’s first official guidelines of how to distribute revenue from television rights. The OCOG’s would receive 66%, and the IOC, IFs, and NOCs would receive a 11.1% share apiece. This agreement did not leave all parties involved satisfied. Unfortunately, despite Brundage’s best efforts to maintain de Coubertin’s vision of Olympism, it is likely the television problem largely fueled the modern commercialization of the Games. Brundage’s successor, Lord Killanin took a more hands-on approach to negotiating the television which proved to be more successful in which the IOC would act as a joint negotiator with OCOG’s. Lord Killanin shared similar views to Brundage in terms of amateurism and Olympic ideals, but he helped to start the IOC in the direction of commercializing the games.

Modern Day Olympic Games, IOC Corruption, Lord Killanin and the Commercialization of the Games

Killanin’s successor, Juan Antonio Samaranch, became IOC President in 1980 (Peacock & Darnell, 2012). Samaranch is a key figure in the history of the IOC because he furthered the commercial movement that Killanin had brought. Samaranch first did
this by establishing the IOC as the sole negotiator for television deals (Wenn, 2012). Samaranch also implemented a few other changes to the Olympics. Samaranch gradually began letting professional athletes participate in the Olympic Games which was a big contrast from Brundage’s amateurism ideals (Peacock & Darnell, 2012). The most notable example of integrating professionals into the Olympics was the Dream Team at the 1992 Barcelona Games (Celebrating the Legacy of Juan Antonio Samaranch, 2020). Samaranch led The Olympic Partner (TOP) Programme that helped to give sponsors exclusivity in specific categories. This programme has grown even more and continues to bring in revenue. Samaranch was able to successfully navigate the boycotts in the 1980’s while preserving the Olympic Movement in a turbulent world. Samaranch’s tenure ended on a sour note in which the IOC kicked six members out in 1999 after Salt Lake City bidders provided impermissible benefits to IOC members to win votes (Siddons, 1999).

In 2001, Jacques Rogge became President of the IOC and he was able to regain the credibility of the IOC in the wake of the Salt Lake City Scandal. Rogge generated unprecedented revenue during his tenure, and it included the largely successful 2012 London Games (Bond, 2013). Rogge did face criticism in his disregard for human rights that was evident in Beijing and Sochi. During his tenure, the costs for the games rose dramatically as well. Rogge’s inability to avoid controversy and rising costs was not avoided by his successor, Thomas Bach. Bach became President in 2013 and has had a tumultuous tenure which has included allegations of bribes to IOC members in order to secure votes for hosting rights for both the Rio and Tokyo Games; fewer and fewer countries wanting to host the games due to countries struggling after hosting the games; and from the postponement of the 2020 games because of the pandemic (Thomas Bach,
2020; Ingle, 2019; Slodkowski et al., 2019). Money, politics, and corporatization of the Games has sullied what was once a beacon of hope and optimism for sports fans across the globe. Today, a very complicated bidding process has tarnished the Games’ reputation for many.

**Bidding Process**

The Candidature Process is broken down into two stages; the first is the Invitation Phase which is not a formal commitment for a city to bid; and the Candidature Process which involves three stages that the city has to be approved at each stage and a formal commitment to bid on the Games (Olympic Games Candidature Process, 2020). The Invitation Phase is a preliminary step in which potential host cities share their ideas with the IOC and receive feedback prior to officially becoming a candidate. This phase focuses on learning best practices of hosting the games and the sustainability and legacy of the games are strongly emphasized. This phase concludes by inviting cities to officially commit to being an official Candidate City. After this, the cities officially are in the Olympic Candidature Process, which takes about two years. Stage one of the candidature process involves the vision, games concept and strategy. Candidate Cities work to promote support nationwide from the public and stakeholders while also developing a concrete plan and vision for the games. This plan needs to place an emphasis on the long-term legacy and sustainability of the city and surrounding areas. Stage two of the candidature process involves the governance, legal and venue funding. The IOC works with the candidate city to determine if they have the necessary funding, support, and governance structures. Stage three of the candidature process involves the IOC examining how the games will be put on and determining if the Candidates can
provide a sustainable legacy from the games. An additional emphasis in this stage is analyzing the proposed athlete experience at the Games.

**IOC Decision Process**

The IOC Evaluation Commission will examine all of the submitted documents from potential bid cites and then will conduct on-site examinations for each city. The Evaluation Commission works to confirm information submitted from Candidate Cities, to study the feasibility of their proposals, and to determine how successful the Games will be in terms of a long-term legacy for the city and surrounding areas (Olympic Games Candidature Process, 2020). Candidate Cities then make presentations to the IOC which provides a key chance for the IOC to ask key questions about the Candidate’s ability to host the games. The Host City Election is decided by a secret ballot from the IOC members. The winner of the election then signs a Host City Contract with the IOC.

Due to recent problems with hosting the Olympic games and potential host cities being apprehensive to hosting the Games, the IOC has reformed its bidding process. Recently public opinion has been significantly negative when faced with the opportunity to host the Games. A recent example of a public vote and public opinion was in 2016 when the Mayor of Boston declared that Boston would not be able to sign the Olympic Host City Contract after the USOC had chosen Boston over LA to host the 2024 games (Sims, 2017). This was largely due to a grassroots effort led by Christopher Dempsey, founder of the No Boston Olympics Movement who helped to educate the public on what the costs of the games would entail for them. Dempsey cited that as the Boston people learned more about the bid and financial details, they became less willing and less in favor of Boston hosting the 2024 Olympic games.
Throughout the history of the games, the costs tend to be higher than what was budgeted for. This was evident with the first Olympic Games in 1896 when De Coubertin thought $250,000 would be enough (Goldblatt, 2016). The final cost was about $10 million in today’s money. In 2004 Athens spent about $14 billion, and according to Time Magazine writer, David Goldblatt, Rio’s costs including sport related and infrastructure construction is near $20 billion. The increasing cost of hosting the games is the main catalyst as to why the games are not as desirable as they once were perceived to be. The Olympics always have cost overrun, which means that the host country exceed their budget. This can burden both a country and taxpayers for years after the games have concluded. This cost overrun is seen in both the Summer and Winter Games, and from 1960-2014 the average cost overrun is 156% (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). A city and country planning to host the Olympics is one of the riskiest megaprojects in terms of financial cost.

In 2013, the new Mayor of Los Angeles, Eric Garcetti signed a letter to the USOC declaring the city’s interest in hosting the 2024 Summer Olympic Games (Reid, 2017). Garcetti sought the help of sports executive and Wasserman CEO, Casey Wasserman to put together a list of candidates to spearhead the movement. It turned out that Wasserman himself was the best candidate on the list. Garcetti eventually got Wasserman to sign on. After Boston dropped out of the bidding for the 2024 Games, Los Angeles was a prime candidate to host them along with Paris. Since eight cities had withdrawn bids for recent Olympic Games due to financial concerns associated with hosting the games, the IOC unprecedentedly decided to award the 2024 and 2028 games at the same time due to a growing concern that there would not be a practical candidate in 2028.
Wasserman and Garcetti were willing to wait longer to host the games because they were able to receive favorable terms that are generally not offered by the IOC. Now, the Los Angeles 2028 Olympics led by Garcetti and Wasserman are being looked to revitalize and change the Games and the Olympic movement that has been poisoned by a long stretch of corruption, greed, and a lack of connection to young viewers. Los Angeles received $2 billion, an increase from $1.7 billion Paris received for hosting the 2024 Games, 80% of the Olympics surplus, and over $60 million in applied costs savings, and nearly $40 million in in-kind services. This is a unique deal compared to any other Olympic Games, because the IOC agreed to give LA28 a $180 million advance which has never happened before. This will be used to support and engage the youth of Los Angeles now in a deliberate manner instead of after the games according to Derick L. Hulme, Author of *The Political Olympics: Moscow, Afghanistan, and the 1980 U.S. Boycott*. The original budget was revised and now it is just under $7 billion at $6.68 billion which is a $1.36 billion increase from the original budget accounting for inflation over an extended lead up time to the games (AP, 2019). These costs include venue infrastructure costs, which increased from $1.19 billion to $1.46 billion and the contingency fund that is being guaranteed by both the city and state which increased from $487 million to $615 million. LA28 has been adamant that the contingency fund will not be necessary. Los Angeles also received the additional funds to cover operations over the longer planning period. The budget for the games includes $2.51 billion in just domestic sponsorship revenue, an ambitious goal that LA28 plans to reach.

The three main costs of hosting the Olympics are indirect capital (non-OCOG indirect costs) costs like infrastructure improvements including transportation and
lodging upgrades; direct capital costs (non-OCOG direct costs) which include the construction of housing for athletes and spectators, sports venues, and operational costs (OCOG costs) which includes technology, administration costs, security, and various other services (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). Due to the costly nature of constructing new sports venues cities, will have to use pre-existing venues in order to keep costs low. The IOC is also altering their timetable for awarding the games. Traditionally, hosts are voted on seven years prior to the Games, but this is no longer the case (IOC to change process of Olympic bid races, 2019). LA was voted on 11 years in advance of the Games. This is no longer the status quo because multiple potential host cities have dropped out of the bidding process due to the public outcry related to the costs of the Games. Presumably, the IOC is awarding the games in an unprecedented manner in order to pounce on a capable host city, like Los Angeles as soon as possible and due to the lack of other cities bidding. The longer lead up time to hosting the games should help local organizing committees in their planning process and it will give ample time for any necessary construction or infrastructure projects.

An Analysis of Recent Olympic Games

Throughout history, the games have been used for countries to showcase and transform themselves as a renowned country worldwide (Goldblatt, 2016). This was first seen with Rome in 1960, and Mexico, West Germany, and Tokyo all went on to do the same shortly after. Throughout history, the Olympics have been a tool for nations to showcase their power in an expensive manner. Recently past Olympic Games in London, Sochi, and Rio have had mixed results in terms of the preparation, the successes and failures, and the legacy of the games.
London (Summer Games, 2012)

London hosted the Summer Games in 2012. Their bid for the 2012 games had coordinated support from both the government and public (Peter J. Beck, 2012).

Costs/Revenues. The London games cost $15 billion and that is only accounting for sports related costs, meaning that does not include general infrastructure costs which oftentimes is more costly (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). London also had a cost overrun of 76%. The games generated over $5 billion in revenue (McBride, 2018).

Conditions for athletes at the games. There were no reports of questionable living quarters, as there has been at past Olympic Games.

Effects on the people of London: displacement, security/militarization, transit. In the post 9/11 world of mega events, London continued the trend of having a heavily militarized presence at the games. This presence was primarily designed to maintain order and prevent terrorism, but it also conveniently could stop or at least intimidate protestors (Zimbalist, 2017).

Over 1,000 people were displaced leading up to the games, this included 450 people from a housing cooperative in East London (Zimbalist, 2017). Gentrification was also present in the leadup to the 2012 games which only hurt residents who had already been living there by effectively pricing them out of the area and therefore displacing them.

Legacy. London has been one of the more proactive cities in terms by focusing on long term benefits including how the Olympic venues, park and infrastructure could add long-term benefits to the citizens of London. This included reviving a poorer area of the city, specifically, East London (Zimbalist, 2017). While it is nicer now, this effectively
priced out residents that were living in the area. London did make a positive effect on the environment by cleaning up the River Lee (Berg, 2016). An independent report cited that the London Olympics helped to jumpstart the revival of East London, sporting venues from the Olympics are all in use and managed properly, and poverty and social exclusion numbers have decreased in the areas where the Olympics were. The construction of the athlete's village left a positive legacy as it was turned into both private and social housing, and included a new health center, daycare, school, and a park for public use (Zimbalist, 2017). Overall, London was able to largely make a positive long-term impact on its residents, something that is rare from today’s hosts.

**Sochi (Winter Games, 2014)**

Sochi was awarded the 2014 Winter Games despite not having a winter climate. Sochi ended up being the warmest Winter Olympics since 1950 (Holthaus, 2014). During the games there were six days in which the temperature was more than 60 degrees. This was the first warning sign that the games would not go very smoothly.

**Costs/Revenues.** The cost of the Sochi 2014 Winter Games was $21.9 billion, and that figure is only limited to sports infrastructure (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). Meaning, it does not account for general infrastructure projects such as mass transit. Russian political opposition, Boris Nemtsov and Leonid Martynyuk, published a report indicating that the overall price of the games was about $50 billion. Sochi ended with a cost overrun of 289%.

**Athlete Experience: Olympic Village, Venues.** Due to Sochi not being an ideal climate for the winter games, snow was brought in from northern mountains throughout the games (Holthaus, 2020). These conditions were not ideal for skiers who at times
landed in puddles because of the snow constantly melting in the heat. Skiers even put snow in their suits in order to cool down in this warm and unfamiliar atmosphere (Barron-Lopez, 2014). One U.S. skier, Stacey Cook, said that it was difficult to adapt to the warm snow during competition. Various other skiers and curlers also complained about inconsistent conditions among competitors ultimately leaving an advantage to those who compete first (Levy, 2014). Snowboarder, Shaun White even pulled out of a snowboarding event due to safety concerns from what he perceived to be a dangerous course (Shaun White: Sochi, 2016). Accommodations for the athletes was not great for everybody, the Canadian Women’s Hockey Team had cramped conditions with up to three beds in a room for three athletes (Lee, 2014). There was also a shortage of pillows for athletes which then forced nearby residents to hand over their pillows. Throughout the village and hotels there were also various exposed wires and plumbing issues.

**Effects on the People of Sochi: Displacement, security/militarization, transit.**

A huge addition to the infrastructure of Sochi included the rail and roadway connecting the beaches to the mountains that used to only be connected by a single narrow road (Filipov, 2017). Months before the games began, Putin declared that all non-Olympic demonstrations, marches, and pickets between January 7th and March 21st of 2014 would be illegal (Zimbalist, 2017). This effectively barred Russian citizens from peaceful protest of the games and country. Similar to the London games, Sochi also heavily militarized the city due to many factors including the security of the games and feelings of dissent from citizens towards the government. It’s estimated that 2,000 families were displaced for construction of sports venues and infrastructure related construction (Luhn,
Majority of families were compensated for this displacement, but in many instances, they were not compensated fairly.

**Legacy**

The Sochi games will be remembered most for the corruption and the climate. Putin's political opposition, Alexei Navalny independently, and Boris Nemtsov and Leonid Martynyuk jointly published comprehensive reports detailing the alleged corruption at the Sochi 2014 Games. There have been reports that up to $30 billion in funds was stolen (Taylor, 2013). The corruption runs deep as many of the contracts for construction have gone to associates of President Vladimir Putin for higher than market value price. Prominent examples of corruption from Navalny’s report include the Olympic Stadium's construction cost going up 14 times, the hockey arena and bobsled course were built $260 million over the market price and by a company headed by politicians with no prior experience constructing these sports venues (Seddon, 2014). Arenas and venues used throughout the games have largely been unused and empty, and in one case, workers began to dissemble the roof of the stadium that held the opening and closing ceremonies of the games (Stewart, 2015). The Olympic Park is also largely abandoned and unused (Park, 2015). The disregard for the environment was also seen in Sochi as it has been in many Olympic cities. Sochi had a “Zero Waste” program with the promise of hosting the cleanest Olympic Games of all time (Luhn, 2014). Yet, there were multiple instances of construction waste caused harm, including polluting a river and triggering a landslide that destroyed homes. Construction was also done in and on areas that were environmentally protected. Ultimately, the Sochi games will be remembered for their tropical climate and rampant corruption.
Rio (Summer Games, 2016)

Rio was a country on the rise when they won the bid to the 2016 Summer Games in an effort to improve Rio and its reputation as a bid time city in the world. Rio had to invest heavily in the construction of new venues, athlete's village and the Olympic Park, and infrastructure improvement.

Revenue/Costs

Rio went way over budget in preparation for the 2016 games. There are varying reports, but the Olympics cost anywhere from $2 billion to $20 billion, odds are that the real cost is closer to $20 billion (Zimbalist, 2017). Rio’s Organizing Olympic Committee and the government both ran out of money which forced the federal government and city government to transfer them close to $1 billion and $60 million respectively. This money transferred for the Games is an emergency fund generally used for natural disasters.

Rio budgeted for a revenue of $3.02 billion (Zimbalist, 2017). Odds are that the Games-related revenue was dramatically lower than this. Generally, an influx of visitors helps the local economy, but the revenue reported in foreign spending by the Brazilian National Tourism Office increased by $360 million, but this appears to be inflated, and even taken at face value it does not make up for a deficit of more than $10 billion. Rio 2016 is projected to have a cost overrun of 51% (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016).

Conditions for Athletes at Games- Hospitality and Venues

The athlete's conditions were very suspect for the 2016 Rio Games. In 2015 a report conducted deemed that the Olympic water venues were unsafe because there was found to be high amounts of human waste which could lead to dangerous viruses and bacteria (Zimbalist, 2017). These water conditions were so bad that the USOC
encouraged athletes to receive Hepatitis A vaccination beforehand. The Olympic Village was also another disastrous aspect of the Games for athletes. Due to construction being rushed, much of the athlete housing was unfinished or of poor quality. This included sanitation issues, leaking pipes, collapsed sinks, the smell of gas throughout the village, and exposed wires in housing units (Zimbalist, 2017; Tran, 2016). Italy’s National Olympic Committee (CONI) even hired contractors themselves to make repairs throughout their apartments less than two weeks before the games began (Tran, 2016).

**Effects on the People of Rio: Displacement, security/militarization, transit.**

The effects on the citizens of Rio were largely negative in the lead up, during and after the games concluded. Similar to recent Olympic Games, the construction of new venues and infrastructure throughout the city led to the direct displacement of many residents through evictions and gentrification (Zimbalist, 2017). From 2009-2016, over 70,000 residents of Rio were displaced. The city and government had an increased police presence bordering on a military presence in an effort to reduce crime leading up to the games. This effort only led to an increase in violence in an effort to accommodate the Games, and this effect lasted after the games ended as the murder rate was substantially higher than in years past. Rio police and security forces also used excessive force on protesters in and around the sites of the games. Rio also developed Bus Rapid Transit routes (BRT) designed for the Games to get to and from Olympic venues. The BRTs hurt daily commuters during the Games by reducing the number of open lanes. The implementing of the BRTs caused evictions, displacing people from their homes. This included the 77,000 people living in favelas from 2009-2015. Majority of these people
were relocated more than 30 miles away which forced them to obtain new employment as well.

**Legacy.** The legacy of Rio 2016 is filled with financial and environmental despair, and corruption. The city of Rio owes the federal government over $30 billion which in turn forced the government to have a massive deficit (Zimbalist, 2017). Rio is filled with white elephants, extravagant stadiums that are not upkept and rarely utilized. A prime example of this is the Maracanã Stadium which is abandoned, vandalized, and filled with stray cats. As of 2017, only 15 of the 27 venues that hosted events during the Olympics had hosted any event kind of event since the Games ended (Drehs & Lajolo, 2017). Rio promised to plant 34 million trees in order to offset the Game’s carbon footprint and as of 2016 only 5.5 million had been planted (Zimbalist, 2017). In addition to Rio’s horrific water for athletes to compete in, cleaning additional waterways was another failed Olympic promise. The newly built golf course for the Olympics was also under scrutiny because the course boundary intruded on the Marapendi Nature Reserve which is the habitat to various threatened species. Brazil’s federal accountability office, the TCU found that nine of the ten sports groups including Brazil’s Olympic Committee were misusing public funds (Drehs & Lajolo, 2017). This included the President of the Aquatic Sports Federation being charged with the misappropriation of $13 million in public money. Not cleaning up the waterways in Rio, endangering species by constructing a golf course, and not planting the agreed upon trees to offset carbon emissions are the environmental shortcomings and ultimate legacy of the 2016 Rio Olympics that was yet again another unmet integral part included in their bid.
The preparation and administration of the Olympic Games ended up overwhelming the organizing committee so greatly that it placed a larger load on the local and federal governments which contributed to more corruption. Overall, due to poor planning of an event of this magnitude, the environmental and costs of the Games are substantially higher than is necessary.

**Los Angeles’ history with the Games**

Los Angeles has a rich history of hosting the Olympic Games. The city first hosted the games in 1932 and went on to host them again in 1984 (Congelio, 2015). The 1932 Games are considered to be in the “Golden Age” of the Olympics. The Golden Age effectively ended in 1936 when Hitler’s Nazi Germany hosted the games in order to showcase Nazi Germany as a worldwide power. The ‘36 Summer Games were by no means a spectacle as the Games are today. Post-World War II, the Southern California Olympic Committee (SCOOG) for the Olympic Games presented bids to the IOC for Los Angeles to host the Olympic Games. Their bid became serious for the 1976 Olympic Games. LA’s quest to host the 1976 Games fell short due to a power struggle between the SCOOG and the LAOCC, and because of Moscow’s bid to host the games as well. This put the IOC right in between the world’s two superpowers in the heart of the Cold War. To avoid any increased tensions or ill will towards the Olympic Movement, the IOC decided to award the 1976 games to Montreal.

Moscow went on to host the 1980 Games and Los Angeles turned towards 1984 to host the games. Despite the Committee's eagerness to host the Games, the public was apprehensive after Montreal’s financial disaster that came with the massive cost of $1.6 billion to host the games. Due to the recent disasters that had been the Olympics in
Montreal and Munich, Los Angeles was left as the only bidder for the 1984 Games when Tehran withdrew their bid. This left Los Angeles in a strong negotiating position with the IOC. The bid Committee would not give in to any of the IOC’s demands which angered the IOC. The demands included how the TV revenue would be divided. In order to avoid cost overruns, Los Angeles and the IOC ended up agreeing on three items. Los Angeles would have final say on any decision that could increase the cost of the 1984 games.

Second, the IOC agreed to let Los Angeles negotiate its own television rights if the city provided one-third of the revenue from the television deal was given to the IOC. Lastly, Killanin agreed to waive a rule in which the IOC would receive all proceeds from the games.

After receiving the first $1 million in revenues, the rest would be shared by the IOC on a “sliding scale”. Soon after this agreement the Mayor of LA declared that LA should withdraw their bid due to push back from the city and a decrease in money spent on essential services such as police, fire protection, and public schools. This seemingly change of heart ended up helping Los Angeles because the USOC agreed to take on the financial responsibility. The IOC President, Lord Killanin affirmed that after this agreement the USOC and the Los Angeles Olympics Organizing Committee had taken on the financial responsibility from the City of Los Angeles of the games if there are any cost overruns. The USOC was readily willing to do this as William Simon the treasurer of the USOC cited his confidence that Los Angeles would not have the same fate that Montreal did in 1976 with construction costs of $1.3 billion. Simon’s belief was rooted by the fact that Los Angeles already had the majority of the existing venues and only needed to build a swimming pool, velodrome (arena for track cycling) and a rowing
course along with upgrades at the Coliseum. Due to Los Angeles’s existing venues the Olympic Games could be hosted for the drastically reduced price of $183 million compared to Montreal’s cost of $1.6 billion.

Peter Ueberroth, the Chairman of the LAOOC, was largely responsible for making the 1984 Games a success. He was instrumental in deciding to use existing sports facilities and getting permission from UCLA and USC to use their dorms for the Olympic Village. An even more impressive feat by Ueberroth was he was able to commercialize the Olympics by getting private companies to cover the costs of construction and various costs through sponsorships and naming rights for the velodrome and swimming pool, which had to be built. Ueberroth helped to change the commercial nature of the Olympic Games by having corporate sponsors and selling the television rights to ABC for $225 million. The Federal Government provided $75 million for the games, with most of it going towards security.

**Results from the 1984 Games**

The 1984 Games also helped to spark an increased interest in hosting the games due to its success. Los Angeles became the first city to turn a profit from hosting the games and it became a model for future host cities. Shortly after the 1984 Games ended, Ueberroth declared that Los Angeles made a profit of $215 million (Congelio, 2015). The profits would create an endowment for the LA84 Foundation, who supports youth sports through funding for sporting events, various resources, and facilities throughout the city of Los Angeles. The endowment has grown to over $200 million and has helped over three million kids in LA (Walker, 2014. The foundation recently covered the costs of local high school’s equipment and expenses after budget cuts. Some of today’s most
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notable athletes such as Venus and Serena Williams and Allyson Felix benefitted from funded training and support from LA84 programs (Rosenberg, 2012). Ueberroth, and other game organizers were able to maintain a long-term view to ensure that Los Angeles was better off after the Olympics ended (Walker, 2014).

Methods: Examining LA’s Budget, Public Funding on stadiums, homeless issue, UCLA dorms, infrastructure

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the funding that Los Angeles plans to use in preparation for the games. I will examine various factors such as public funding on stadiums, the city’s budget, the homeless problem in Los Angeles, and the viability of using local universities’ dorms. This analysis will help me to determine how feasible it is for Los Angeles to host the 2028 Summer Games.

Local Colleges, dorms, and hotels

The IOC requires the host city to have at least 40,000 hotel rooms for spectators and an Olympic Village that can house 15,000 athletes and officials (Baade & Matheson, 2016). LA28 is planning to use dorms at UCLA and USC rather than constructing a brand-new Olympic Village (LA28; Stephens, 2017). Athletes will be housed at UCLA and media will be housed at USC (LA28; Stephens, 2017). UCLA is already constructing more dorms for an expanding student body and is on schedule to meet its goal of 17,000 beds for 2028 (Huang, 2017). USC will have over 3,000 beds for media. There are more than 125,000 hotel rooms within 30 miles of the games and over 40 more hotel developments in process providing ample housing for tourists and fans during the Games. Both campuses are centrally located to the games and UCLA has world class athletic
facilities for the athletes (LA28). Overall, Los Angeles is well suited to host the games in regard to lodging.

**Stadiums**

Los Angeles has a variety of venues that help to make it well suited to host the Olympics without having to build many new venues. LA28 does plan to transform Dedeaux Field at USC into a temporary aquatic center. As of this writing, it is unclear what the costs will be and who will be covering these costs. At Grand Park and LA City Hall there will also be a temporary venue for cycling (road) and the marathon and race walk events (LA28 Games Plan, 2020). At the Long Beach Sports Park which will host BMX and water polo events there will be temporary venues. The Valley Sports Park will also have temporary venues that will host events such as shooting, canoe slalom, and various equestrian events. Temporary venues will also be used at Santa Monica Beach for beach volleyball. While it is unknown at this time, whether LA28 will actually cover all costs of these temporary venues, the costs of temporary venues are significantly lower than constructing permanent venues.

**Transit/Infrastructure Funding**

Los Angeles plans to have three huge metro projects done by 2028 (Tinoco, 2018). These three projects have been put on an accelerated schedule because of the Olympic games as they were originally scheduled to finish in 2033, 2041, and 2035. Eric Garcetti has a “Twenty-eight by ‘28” plan that plans to accelerate the timelines of 28 projects and finish majority of them by 2028. Majority of these projects are funded by Measure R and Measure M, which are both voter-approved measures that increased the sales tax in the county in order to fund these projects. Measure R began in 2009 and
projects to generated $40 billion over 30 years (Metro FAQs). Measure M projects to generate $860 million each year for decades (Walker, 2016). Along with the public funding, Metro could receive state and federal grants, and Metro is pursuing public private partnerships (Tinoco, 2018). This massive amount of public resources and money could be used for other more pressing needs like to address the growing homeless population in Los Angeles.

**Homeless Problem in LA funding**

The proposed 2020-2021 Homeless Budget is only $399,686,962 down from $428,542,642 in 2019-2020 (LA City Homeless Budget). There have been a few measures from public funding used to combat the homeless problem. This has included, Measure H and Measure HHH. Measure H was approved by Los Angeles County Voters to increase the sales tax by a quarter-cent which will help bring in $355 each year to combat homelessness (Chiland, 2017). Soon after Measure H passed, Measure HHH passed which is a $1.2 billion project to build 10,000 units of housing for homeless residents until 2028 (Chiland, 2018). Measure HHH’s goal is to house all homeless people currently on the streets. Measure HHH is funded through issuing General Obligation Bonds (LA City Budget 2019-2020).

**Discussion**

The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games were largely very successful due to strong coordinated leadership among games organizers, local politicians and because favorable terms were received from the IOC. Leading up to the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic Games, LA28 was able to receive favorable terms by receiving money up front from the IOC. While Casey Wasserman is an experienced and a very connected sports executive, it is
fair to question Mayor Eric Garcetti, and Governor Gavin Newsom. Both politicians’ motives have been criticized lately (Hayes, 2020; Ronayne, 2020). Under their watch, Los Angeles’ homeless problem grew; specific to Newsom, not following his own COVID-19 guidelines, and allowing the biggest scam against California taxpayers in an unemployment fraud scheme to happen under his watch (2020 Greater Los Angeles Homeless, 2020; Bollag, 2020). It has been speculated that Mayor Garcetti will leave Los Angeles to join President-Elect Joe Biden’s cabinet after serving as co-chair of the Biden-Harris Campaign and most recently Biden asked Garcetti to co-chair his inauguration in January (Hayes, 2020; Smith, 2020). This unstable and shaky leadership does not bode well in preparation for an event as monumental as the 2028 Olympic Games and could lead to similar disastrous results seen in Rio and Sochi that most prominently negatively affected the citizens living there while the local leaders benefitted from the Games.

As of right now, more than seven years out from the 2028 Olympic Games it is hard to see these games being as successful and having the same positive effects that the 1984 games had. Despite Los Angeles seemingly being able to host a cost effective Olympics due to the existing sport venues and athlete village at local universities, the city has bigger problems to face rather than hosting a megaevent that notoriously least benefits the citizens residing in the city in which it takes place.
Conclusion

History seems to be repeating itself. Leading up to the 1984 Games, the Olympics were largely viewed to be a disaster which led to cities dropping out of the bidding process. Due to this, Los Angeles had unprecedented leverage over the IOC, which led them to veto any cost increasing decisions associated with the games, they were able to negotiate the television rights, and the IOC agreed to share all revenues for the first time (Congelio, 2015). The leadup to Los Angeles being awarded the 2028 Olympics was filled with cities dropping out of the bidding process due to financial concerns associated with hosting the games (Reid, 2017). As a result of this and an increasing fear that there would not be a suitable candidate to host the 2028 games while having two well suited cities bid for the 2024 Games, the IOC unprecedently awarded both the 2024 and 2028 games at the same time. Similar to 1984, Garcetti and Wasserman were able to receive more favorable terms from the IOC since they were willing to wait and accept the 2028 games. This included Los Angeles receiving $2 billion compared to Paris receiving $1.7 billion for the 2024 games. The IOC also provided LA28 with a $180 million advance which has never happened before. This has provided LA28 the unique opportunity to help the community before the games even happen. Whereas traditionally, the payoff from the games, if any, occurs after they have occurred.

Not having to build new permanent sports venues or an Olympic Village is an enormous advantage for LA28 that will help to keep costs down dramatically. Improving infrastructure through the various transit projects in the twenty-eight by ‘28 plan while costly, will help to alleviate traffic both during the games and after the games. Odds are that the homeless problem will get worse in Los Angeles before it gets better. Hosting the
Olympics in 2028 could contribute even more to this due to gentrification which could displace people living in and around the venues. Similar to most Olympic Games, the legacy of the 2028 Games projects to be a mix of positive and negative. Eight years out from the games, they appear to be financially responsible, as much as hosting the Olympics can be. The games will largely leave residents feeling positive about the city by seeing Los Angeles showcased and seeing youth sports benefit. Despite this, it is hard not to believe that the time, resources, and money of the organizing committee and local politicians could be better utilized to help the city of Los Angeles and its people. There are more pressing needs that have partly grown larger due to the ongoing pandemic including the growing homeless problem, struggling small businesses, and the air pollution in the city (Brody, 2020; Butler, 2017). Overall, Los Angeles is well suited as a country can be to host the 2028 Olympic Games which will bring a mix of positive and negative effects to the city and its people.
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