

The Evolution of Men and Battle: How the Civil War Influenced the Indian Wars of the  
American West

A Senior Honors Thesis

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“This country is going to be drenched in blood... You people speak so lightly of war. You don’t know what you are talking about. War is a terrible thing... months of marching, exposure and suffering... a frightful loss of life and property... the demoralization of the people.”<sup>1</sup> General William Tecumseh Sherman spoke these few sentences prior to the Civil War. He knew that the inhabitants of the United States knew nothing of what was to come in the immediate future and foresaw the heinous war that would engulf the nation. His statement highlighted the suffering and demoralization of people and the destruction of property and life. Sherman spoke diligently on the matters, for what he predicted actually came true. His premonition summed up the military policy of the late Civil War that continued on into the Plains Indian Wars, and even included the psychological aspects of war found in the Civil War that again affected those who fought in the Plains Indian Wars.

William Tecumseh Sherman was one of many who served in both the Civil War and in the Plains Indian Wars. He, as well as others, created a connection between the two wars in a variety of ways. His ideas of total warfare, as well as others, forever intertwined the two events. The psychological impact of the Civil War upon such men as Sherman also impacted the Indian Plains Wars. William Tecumseh Sherman pursued his military career to the fullest in both the Civil War and the Indian Plains Wars. Others did the same. These connections between the two wars blossoms when looking at the two events. The Civil War impacted the battle tactics of the Indian Plains wars through the implementation of total war, and it impacted the psyche of the officers and soldiers of the men who fought in the West by creating battle-hardened veterans, psychologically unstable soldiers, and insubordinate officers who were egotistical and who ruined old friendships.

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<sup>1</sup> Gerald F. Linderman, *Embattled Courage* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 209.

A plethora of historical writings may be found on the individual wars of the Civil War and the Plains Indian wars. Less talk about the characteristics of the wars, in terms of military policy, and even less make a connection between the Civil War and the Plains Indian Wars. In Russell Weigley's book *In the American Way of War*, he makes a connection between the two wars by arguing, "The conduct of the Civil War had prepared the United States Army to employ a strategy of annihilation...in its wars against the Indians."<sup>2</sup> Weigley's argument contains the key idea of annihilation, which links to total war. He stated in his book that the idea of annihilation was different from the pre-Civil War era, in dealing with the Indians, because the army on the frontier only delivered the Indians west to their territory and then acted as a border patrol, making sure that Native Americans did not interfere with the lives of the Americans.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the idea of annihilation, and total war, came out of the Civil War and transferred to the frontier.

Another line of thought, against the ideas of Weigley, arrived from Robert Wooster, in his book titled *The Military and United States Indian Policy*. Wooster argues against the thought that total war arrived at the frontier from the Civil War. He believes that the Civil War reinforced offensive operations against the plains Indians, but nothing more.<sup>4</sup> "Although a direct connection between the Civil and Indian Wars appeals to those who stress the continuity of the American military strategy over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, evidence suggests that it has been greatly exaggerated."<sup>5</sup> Wooster claimed this by talking about the use of railroads, Indian scouts, racism, and winter operations. He also included politics, the geography of the

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<sup>2</sup> Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), 153.

<sup>3</sup> Weigley, 153.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Wooster, *The Military and the United States Indian Policy 1865-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 111.

<sup>5</sup> Wooster, 136.

West, and racism in his assertion that the Civil War did not influence, or directly influence, the Indian Wars.<sup>6</sup> Here laid the premises of the disconnection between the Civil War and the Plains Indian Wars.

These two main claims about how the Civil War did or did not affect the Plains Indian Wars dominate the literature as key consultants. Russell Weigley's argument laid a solid foundation of evidence of total war battle tactics in both the Civil War and the Indian Wars. His allegations prove true which will be shown later in this paper. The party that asserts Wooster's claims however fails to provide adequate amount of evidence. Wooster claimed the non-military correlation between the two wars, and yet talked about the offensive tactics that the frontiersmen use and the style of combat that pursue the Indians with, which show to be total warfare. He only talked about the expansion of Civil War military strategies such as Indian scouts and the use of railroads, which have little to do with total warfare in the American West. Wooster but then goes on to talk about the politics of the Civil War verses the Indian Wars and how the citizens viewed the geography of the American South verses the American West. Wooster's argument contains many holes and at sometimes does not even talk about American military strategy. Due to Weigley's strong argument that has numerous articles in support, the notion that the Civil War greatly affected the military tactics and strategy of the Plains Wars bears fruit. Wooster's argument falls short and sometimes runs off course of his main objective.

In terms of a psychological argument connecting the two events, little documentation or work has been written. Books have shown letters of soldiers suffering from post traumatic stress disorder, and memoirs have been written of some soldiers, but a book on the impact that the Civil War had on soldiers psychology who fought in the Plains Wars does not exist. This

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<sup>6</sup> Wooster 137-140.

research remains relatively new. By looking at memoirs of important officers who served in both wars, journals on the behavior of officers towards others, and letters by soldiers who suffered from PTSD, this essay asserts that the Civil War did in fact impact the Plains Wars soldiers.

The Civil War began in 1861 and lasted until 1865. During this span of time, the Union forces used many officers to try and lead the Army of the Potomac to victory, Those such as Joseph Hooker, George McClellan, and Gordon Meade all tried to hold the command of the Union army and fight against the military might of Robert E. Lee and the Confederates. All of these Union generals learned the old European style of military of Antoine Jomini. They placed value in the maneuvering of troops instead of actually fighting to win victories. However, these men moved to slow and cautiously and could not stomach the loss of lives. Though they were soldiers' generals, they could not win the war. Lincoln wanted someone who could reunify the union quickly and at a cost affordable. General Ulysses S. Grant who headed the western theater of the war, and who had been winning, shined bright and showed promise. Grant morphed his style of Napoleonic warfare to what he saw on the battlefield. He began to use tactics of total warfare to ensure victory over the South. Lincoln saw this and placed him at the head of all Union forces. Grant used this style of warfare and won the Civil war for the North. Most of the generals and officers who had fought under Grant and learned his style of warfare then went to the western frontier in order to deal with the Indian problem.

Prior To the Civil War, the United States policy towards the Indians encompassed removal from eastern territory and resettling the tribes in the West on land deemed unsuitable for white settlers. White soldiers created a boundary in between the Indians and white settlers to basically keep them separated from one another and not allow either to pass the boundary. After

the Civil War, the land deemed unsuitable for white settlers in the past, soon showed profit in mining and for farmland. Whites demanded the land from the Indians and snuck on the land whenever they could. Hostilities arose between the Indians and white settlers due to the encroachment. The Policy of the United States regarding the West and Indians began to change. The Army now began to escort business adventures and white settlers into the West. The Army also began to confine Indians to defined reservations.<sup>7</sup> Indians however did not like this and began to fight back. The generals and officers who fought in the Civil War and had learned total warfare began incorporating it into their fighting style. These hardened soldiers who suffered from stress of the previous war wreaked incredible destruction against the Native Americans and placed them all on reservations by the 1890s.

The Civil War led directly into the Indian Plains Wars. Most of those who fought in the Civil War traveled west and fought against the Native Americans to force them onto reservations. Those that came to the frontier brought with them their style of fighting and their personal issues incurred upon them during the Civil War. Boys turned into men during the Civil War and brought that to the frontier. The Civil War affected the battle tactics and the psychology of the men of the Plains Indian Wars. Total warfare ravaged the country during the Civil War and then the Indians nations during the Plains Wars. Men from the Civil War sustained posttraumatic stress disorder, were battle hardened, and gained an egotistical view of themselves. All of this affected the Plains Indian Wars.

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<sup>7</sup> Kimberly S. McCall, "Vindictive Earnestness" in Practice: The Campaigns of Ranald S. Mackenzie as a Model of Post-Civil War Indian Policy," *Journal of The West* (1995): 67.

## Total Warfare

War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueller it is, the sooner it will be over.

*-William Tecumseh Sherman<sup>8</sup>*

The art of total warfare lied outside the realm of most military officers of the United States code of conduct prior to 1864. The antebellum officers of the Civil War whom had learned the military style of Antoine Jomini while attending West Point Academy mostly stayed within the conservative style of warfare, which encompassed the outmaneuvering of ones enemy to victory. Later, commanders switched to an offensive style of warfare, or a Napoleonic one. The military style of the Civil War evolved even further to a new form of warfare. This all-encompassing destruction of the enemy was named total war. Generals such as Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and Philip Sheridan used total warfare to finally bring an end to the Civil War. These same generals then found themselves stationed after the Civil War on the Western frontier of the United States to deal with the Native Americans. From 1865 until 1890, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan used the same principles that they had learned in the Civil War on the Native Americans in the Indian Plains Wars in order to break their spirit and finally place them on reservations. The generals and their officers used their knowledge of the most devastating type of war in order to achieve what they wanted. The Civil war affected the post war Indian Plains Wars by bringing the total war battle strategy to the frontier. The United States army consigned to a grueling war of non-stop action against the warriors of the Native Americans, assigned troops to destroying the economy and supplies of the Indians, and

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<sup>8</sup> Norman K. Risjord, *Representative America: The Civil War Generation* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2002), 143.

committed atrocities against warriors and civilians in order to instill fear and a sense of demoralization, all of which came from the military policy of the Civil War.

The reasons behind total war became apparent to the generals of the Civil War after the war had dragged on for so long, and when they looked into the eyes of the southerners. The United States military felt little pinpricks of southern civilians attacking the armies' lines, and the guerrilla style warfare that some of the South fought. Generals such as Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan wanted to put an end to the war quickly, and break the civilians spirit so that the South would not rise up again, or at least help their fellows in the army. The same enemy that these generals and other military officers faced during the Civil War seemed to crop up once again during the Indians Plains Wars. The United States wanted to quickly put all Native tribes on reservations and to break their spirits so that the Native wouldn't fight. The Natives fought a similar style of guerilla fighting that Sheridan and Sherman saw in the South. The implementation of total war in the Indians Plains Wars comes from this direct correlation of objectives.

The use of total war through fighting a brutal fighting style of unrelenting pursuit and combat found itself in both the Civil War and the Indians Plains Wars. Grant procured the idea while fighting in the West of the Civil War. He mastered the flow of the long series of events instead of just looking at the outcome of a single battle.<sup>9</sup> Grant took any outcome of an event, be it a win, draw, or a loss, and made it serve his purpose of his long-standing goal: the annihilation or surrender of his enemies forces. On his campaign to conquer Vicksburg, Grant used his up-tempo style of warfare to quell his enemy. Late in the campaign, from May 1- 19, 1863, Grant's army fought five battles, traversed over 180 miles, split the Confederate army in two, started to

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<sup>9</sup> Weigley, 139.

lay siege to Vicksburg, and caused over 7000 casualties to the Southern army while incurring less than 4500 themselves.<sup>10</sup> His continual fighting style made enemy troops tired and kept them off balance, allowing Grant to win the war against his enemies' archaic notion of war.

When Lincoln gave Grant control over the Army of the Potomac in the eastern theater, Grant implemented the same method of total war that he used in the West. Grant wanted to destroy the Confederacy by destroying Lee's army. He figured that this would be the nail in the coffin for the South. The Army of the Potomac made battles "synonymous with the whole campaign." The men "[fought] all the time, every day, keeping the enemy army always within his own army's grip, allowing the enemy no opportunity for deceptive maneuver, but always pounding away until his own superior resources permitted the Federal armies to survive while the enemy army at last disintegrated."<sup>11</sup> Grant wanted to end the war quickly in the most heinous of all pursuits to make war grueling and unbearable upon the enemy.

In Grant's Campaign in the East, followed what he stated to Lincoln. He used his army to pound away at General Lee's. At the battle of Wilderness and Spotsylvania, shows his mentality of total warfare in regards to constant, never ending warfare. In two days of war at Wilderness, Grants army suffered 17,500 casualties while the Confederates only suffered 10,000. Previous Union commanders who did use total warfare would have retreated and battled Lee's army once more in maybe a couple weeks to a month. However, Grant decided to push further south towards Richmond in order to maneuver around Lee. He kept the ultimate goal in his mind of the destruction of the Confederate army. In a letter to Lincoln during the campaign he wrote,

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<sup>10</sup> Weigley 139, 140.

<sup>11</sup> Weigley, 143.

“whatever happens, there is no turning back.” Grant stuck to his offensive strategy, which would eventually pay off.<sup>12</sup>

After maneuvering to Spotsylvania, Grant yet again pounded into the Confederate forces, eking the life force from Lee’s Confederate troops. From May 10-18, 1864, Grant pounded away at the enemy army. Like rain, blood poured in the trenches dug by the armies and soldiers trampled over the wounded and dead. From May 5 through the 12, the Union army suffered 32,000 casualties and the South suffered about 18,000. On the 18, Grant pulled out of the town and yet again maneuvered to go on the offensive at a different angle against Lee’s army. Multiple times the armies clashed on the route to Cold Harbor. The armies were in constant contact with each other, always marching, battling, or digging trenches, day and night. After four long weeks of constant fighting, going back to when Grant first took control of the Eastern Theater, the Union lost 44,000 men and the South lost 25,000.<sup>13</sup>

Grant also administered orders to the officers under him to employ the same total warfare that he exerted. He gave General George Gordon Meade the orders of “Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.” Grant then gave Philip Sheridan instructions “... I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also.” Grant wanted his officers to pursue the enemy until death came upon them.<sup>14</sup> Sheridan faithfully followed the orders of Grant just as all other generals did under him.

The idea of total warfare through continuous fighting and action and the unremitting pursuit of Union forces continued onto the plains in the Midwest and West of America. Grant,

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<sup>12</sup> James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 726.

<sup>13</sup> McPherson, 732 & 733.

<sup>14</sup> Weigley, 143.

Sherman, Sheridan, and other Civil War officers and soldiers shipped out to garrison forts in the plains to look at a new yet old enemy: the Native American. These officers brought with them the knowledge that they had gained in the Civil War. Those aforementioned continued on the policy of total warfare through direct and continuous fighting. The generals believed in the annihilation of tribes if the enemy attacked American settlers. Grant wanted to protect civilians, “even if the extermination of every Indian tribe was necessary to secure such a result.”<sup>15</sup> The American soldiers relentlessly pursued Native Americans until they surrendered or the soldiers had slaughtered them. The Native Americans who surrendered or survived the brutal onslaught then trudged to a reservation where they stayed under the watch of American forces. The many pursuits of the Native Americans by American forces, illustrates the matching style of total warfare through direct warfare from the Civil War to the Indian Plains Wars.

Philip Sheridan’s ideas of total warfare passed on with him from the Civil War to the Indians Plains wars. Sheridan continued his aggressive policies with two key strategy policies. He first wanted his soldiers to seek out and attack Indian villages. Secondly, he called for a strategy of convergence, which entails multiple columns of troops converging on Indian homelands and fighting the foes in a decisive battle.<sup>16</sup> Sheridan took charge in dealing with Native Americans who raided towns and killed American citizens. He sought the annihilation of such groups. The Kickapoo Indians of Mexico fit such a group. The Kickapoo Indians had lived in Mexico and crossed the border into Texas to raid peoples’ livestock. Multiple times when they had gone on such a mission, the Indians ended up killing an American civilian.

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<sup>15</sup> *New York Times*, October 16, 1868, 1, in Lance Janda, “Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total Warfare, 1860-1880,” *The Journal of Military History* 59, no. 1 (1995): 23.

<sup>16</sup> Anthony R. McGinnis, “When Courage Was Not Enough: Plains Indians at War with the United States Army,” *Journal of Military History* 72, no.2 (2012): 462.

Sheridan held a hard line towards these Indians and told the Secretary of War William W. Belknap that the army should “cross the Rio Grande and recover our property and punish the thieves,” and that the murderers should be exterminated. Sheridan then visited Ranald Mackenzie, a commander of the army in the southern plains of the west. Sheridan chose him for the task to deal with the Kickapoo Indians. He told Mackenzie that “I want you to be bold, enterprising, and at full times full of energy...Let it be a campaign of annihilation, obliteration, and complete destruction...I think you understand what I want done, in the way you should employ your force.”<sup>17</sup> When Sherman passed the command of the entire American military to Sheridan, the forces in the West fought over 619 engagements from 1867-1883.<sup>18</sup> Sheridan took his job very seriously and undertook it the only way that he knew how.

History looks at General Nelson A. Miles as one of the best Indian fighters. He fought in the Red River War of 1874-1875, and had an extensive Civil War career as a rising officer in the volunteer Union troops prior to the Indian Plains Wars. He believed that “wherever and whenever Indians could fight, so could soldiers, regardless of terrain or weather.”<sup>19</sup> Miles tried to imbue the idea upon the Native American chiefs that unless the Indians stopped killing and settled on a reservation, that the American forces would show no mercy towards them in battle. He also did not have any trepidation when it came to exterminating Indians in order to end the conflict quickly.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ernest Wallace and Adrian S. Anderson, “R.S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid into Mexico in 1873,” *Arizona and the West* (1965):110, in McCall, 71.

<sup>18</sup> Janda, 20.

<sup>19</sup> Charles M. Robinson III. “Best of the Indian Fighters,” *Wild West* (2008): 45, in Clint Whitfield, “Nelson A. Miles: The Man Who Ended the Plains Indian Wars,” *JOW* 49, no. 1 (2010): 50.

<sup>20</sup> Whitfield, 50.

In Miles's first Campaign in which he lead, he spent his time chasing and battling the Sioux, specifically those under Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, whom had just defeated Custer at Little Big Horn. Anywhere the Indians went, Miles pursued. He pursued the complete destruction or surrender of total warfare that his former officers had taught him in the Civil War. Miles chased the Indians through the Montana winters in order to put them at a disadvantage. He then held meetings with the chiefs in order to discuss the surrender of the Native Americans. Miles wanted unconditional surrender, which the Indians rejected twice. He then gave an ultimatum to surrender or perish. Some chiefs surrendered, but Sitting Bull took his tribe and fled. Miles pursued Sitting Bull and fought him at Cedar Creek and Ash Creek, ending the pursuit. Miles sought annihilation or surrender through constant pursuit and battle in his hunt of the Indians, taking these lessons from the Civil War.<sup>21</sup>

Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie, another ex Civil War officer, went west and continued his role as an officer in the United States army. Mackenzie took the lessons of the Civil War and brought them with him like every other officer. In the Red River War of 1874-1875, Mackenzie followed orders from his superiors to annihilate hostiles. After an attack by the Comanche on buffalo hunters, The United States Army issued a decree that stated that all Native American Tribes had to enroll at the Fort Sill Agency by August 4, 1874. If the tribes did not, then the government deemed them hostile and forcibly disarmed them, moved them onto reservations, and imprisoned their leaders.<sup>22</sup> Mackenzie's forces lead a pincer shape formation against the Staked Plains Indians. October 9, 1874, his forces struck an Indian village and killed only one villager. The Army chased the Indians who fled the village and in pursuit destroyed three abandoned villages and 500 lodges. Eight days later his troops yet again attacked a village and

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<sup>21</sup> Whitfield, 50.

<sup>22</sup> McCall, 72.

destroyed 75 lodges. On October 27 Mackenzie located five Indian camps comprised of Comanche, Kiowa, and Southern Cheyenne and attacked. Following these attacks, the Staked Plains Indians gave up and moved onto reservations. By 1875, all Indians on the Staked Plains had surrendered to Mackenzie due to his brutal total war tactics.<sup>23</sup>

In Mackenzie's later years on the plains, the military promoted him to commander of the District of New Mexico. His style of warfare prospered under his command. He took what he learned in the Civil War and from his old superiors and commanded the officers under him to do what he once did himself. In 1882, he dispatched Lieutenant Colonel George A. Forsyth to Mexico with the orders of "indefatigable pursuit."<sup>24</sup> Mackenzie followed his ideas of total warfare until the end of his reign.

The Civil War generals conducted psychological warfare as another part of total warfare. The officers of the Federal Army wanted to stop the war quickly and they knew that the only way to do so was to defeat the Confederate army, but also to defeat the civilians of the South. "We are not only fighting hostile armies," said William Tecumseh Sherman, "but a hostile people, and we must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hand of war, as well as the organized armies."<sup>25</sup> The Northern Generals believed that the southern people deserved their fate, which helped them deal with the notion of psychological warfare in their own heads. After the war, Sherman stated that he saw everyone in the south as "the rebels who forced us into the war, and who deserved all they got and more."<sup>26</sup> Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan saw first hand the attacks southern civilians made against the northern lines of communication and the guerrilla

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<sup>23</sup> McCall, 73.

<sup>24</sup> McCall, 78.

<sup>25</sup> Sherman to Halleck, 24 December, 1864, in William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (New York: Library of America, 1990), 705, in Janda, 15.

<sup>26</sup> Lewis, *Sherman: Fighting Prophet*, 442, in Janda, 15.

like warfare committed. These generals also saw the embittered hatred the southern eyes had for them and the aid that they gave to the southern troops.

On July 21, 1862, Sherman entered his duties in Memphis as military commander. The Confederate army pulled out of one of its strong points and left it to the Federal Army. Though the army pulled out, those that supported the Confederacy, and even some family members, remained.<sup>27</sup> Sherman noticed when dealing with the military of Nathan Bedford Forrest and Earl Van Dorn that the troops were able to move with ease about the surrounding countryside without having to guard themselves against the civilian population. When Sherman tried to deal with such impedances, Forrest and Dorn moved out of reach before the Federal troops could provide resistance. The two Confederate officers and their troops struck at Sherman with surprise attacks wherever the Union forces were weakest and most vulnerable. These attacks infuriated Sherman, which he soon believed only to be possible with the help of southern citizens. "Our enemies have a terrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, and along our avenues of travel they have active partisans, farmers and businessmen, who seemingly pursue their usual calling but are in fact spies."<sup>28</sup> The Union general accused the southern army of attacking in a guerilla warfare like pattern, which he thought quite unfair at the time. Sherman soon thought that harming the population of the South in a direct way would impact the psychology of not only the civilians, but also the soldiers, so as to prevent and deter future guerrilla warfare.

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<sup>27</sup> John Walters, "General William T. Sherman and Total War," *The Journal of Southern History* 14, no.4 (1948): 458.

<sup>28</sup> John Walters, 457, Sherman to Thomas, November 6, 1861,

The tipping point of Sherman's anger came at the news of attempts to stop steamboats bringing Union supplies down the Mississippi River. He issued an order to Colonel Charles C. Walcutt, of the 46<sup>th</sup> Ohio Volunteers.

The object of the expedition you have been detailed for is to visit the town of Randolph where yesterday the packet Eugene was fired upon by a party of guerrillas. Acts of this kind must be promptly punished, and it is almost impossible to reach such actors, for they come from the interior and depart as soon as the mischief is done. But the interests and well-being of the country demand that all such attacks should be followed by a punishment that will tend to prevent a repetition... I think the attack on Eugene was by a small force of guerrillas from Loosahatchie, who by this time have gone back, and therefore you will find no one at Randolph, in which case you will destroy the place, leaving one house to mark the place.<sup>29</sup>

Sherman turned a page in his book after he incited such an order. He concluded that civilians should receive punishment for the soldiers' actions. Sherman called this correlation collective responsibility. When a troop committed a heinous act of guerrilla warfare by destroying Union supplies or attacking Sherman's troops, the Federal Commander ordered the attack of the nearest town, or another punishment. Three days after the Randolph incident, Sherman issued another set of orders, this time titled Special Order No. 254.

Whereas many families of known rebels and of confederate in arms against us have been permitted to reside in peace and comfort in Memphis, and whereas the Confederate authorities either sanction or permit the firing on an unarmed boat carrying passengers and goods, for the use and benefit of the inhabitants of Memphis, it is ordered that for every boat so fired on ten families must be expelled from Memphis.

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<sup>29</sup> Sherman to Walcutt, September 24, 1862, in *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Part 2, 235-36, in John Walters, 462.

The provost-marshal will extend the list already prepared so as to have on it at least thirty names, and on every occasion when a boat is fired on will draw by the lot ten names, who will be forthwith notified and allowed three days to remove to a distance of 25 miles from Memphis.<sup>30</sup>

After Sherman issued these orders, he wrote to Grant telling his superior of the policies he implemented and as to the reasons. “We cannot change the hearts of those people of the South, but we can make war so terrible that they will realize the fact that, however brave and gallant and devoted to their country, still they are mortal and should exhaust all peaceful remedies before they fly to war.”<sup>31</sup> He also stated, that the South “cannot be made to love us, [they] can be made to fear us, and dread the passage of troops through their country.”<sup>32</sup> His concept of terror against the civilians and armies came in handy when dealing with his campaigns in the South. Everywhere Sherman marched, destruction of people’s lives’ took place. On October 22, 1862, while still near Memphis, Sherman ordered several troops to destroy multiple towns along the Mississippi. His troops understood his orders and destroyed the towns, taking food supplies and burning down every single house. The soldiers learned to vent their anger towards the South onto the population, which lead to decisive destruction of property.<sup>33</sup>

While ordering this, Sherman yet again turned to the 46<sup>th</sup> Ohio volunteers to “destroy all the houses, farms, and cornfields” on a fifteen mile stretch of the Mississippi in Arkansas.<sup>34</sup> In Sherman’s march back from Meridian to Vicksburg in a later campaign, he allowed his troops to

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<sup>30</sup> Sherman to Walcutt, September 24, 1862, in *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Part 2, 240, in John Walters, 462-463.

<sup>31</sup> John Walters, 463.

<sup>32</sup> Walters, 464.

<sup>33</sup> Walters, 465.

<sup>34</sup> Special Order No. 283, October 18, 1862, in *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Part 2, in Walters, 464.

destroy and pillage houses along the way. The psychological warfare of terrorizing civilians went so far that a refugee from Meridian stated, “I do not think you can hear a chicken crow for ten miles around Meridian.”<sup>35</sup> At the town of Lake Station an officer reported, “The Signal Corps went through the town like a dose of salts, and just as we were leaving I noticed a man hunting around to get someone to make an affidavit that there had been a town there.”<sup>36</sup>

Psychological total warfare persisted within all of Sherman’s military decisions. In Sherman’s campaign to take Atlanta and then his “march to the sea” he destroyed the lives of hundreds of thousands. He looked at the citizens while on his campaigns and maintained that he wanted to “make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to [war].”<sup>37</sup> The Union General marched diagonally across Georgia, leaving a devastating wake 60 miles wide. He carried out psychological warfare to its fullest. “You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will... War is cruelty and you cannot refine it.”<sup>38</sup> Sherman burned the capitals of Mississippi and South Carolina to ashes, and depopulated the city of Atlanta. To Atlanta, Sherman issued a letter to the citizens, “Now that the war comes home to you, you feel very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition...to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee.”<sup>39</sup> While on these campaigns he used prisoners to demonstrate lessons. On the Mississippi river, Sherman placed prisoners on exposed boats, which Confederate troops fired upon. In Georgia, Sherman forced

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<sup>35</sup>Mobile *Daily Tribune*, March 5, 1864, in Walters, 471.

<sup>36</sup> Walters, 472.

<sup>37</sup> Sherman to Halleck, September 17, 1863, in Sherman *Memoirs*, 365, in Janda, 16.

<sup>38</sup> Sherman to James M. Calhoun, E. E. Rawson, and S.C. Wells, September 12, 1864, in O.R. Series One, 39 (pt. 2): 418, in Janda 16.

<sup>39</sup>Sherman to Halleck, September 4, 1864, in Sherman, *Memoirs*, 585, in Janda, 16.

prisoners to walk over suspected Confederate minefields. Lastly, in South Carolina, he hanged prisoners if anyone harmed his foragers.<sup>40</sup>

The policy of psychological terror, in accordance with total warfare, on the troops and civilians of the South in order to end the war worked tremendously. The North eventually demoralized the south and broke the peoples' spirits. The decision to destroy homes, businesses, farms, and cities created a crushing effect on the Confederates. One Confederate private even wrote down his sullen outlook.

I hev concluded that the dam fulishness uv tryin to lick shurmin had better be stopped. We hav bin gettin nuthin but hell & lots uv it ever sinse we saw the dam yankys & I am tirde uv it... Thair thicker an lise on a henand a dam site ornraier.<sup>41</sup>

The total psychological warfare persisted into the Plains Indian Wars. The Federal Army used tactics to scare and terrorize the Indians so much so that the latter would surrender and move onto reservations. U.S. commanders such as Grant, Sheridan, and Sherman authorized the extermination of Indians at any cost when deemed hostile. These officers used others such as Ranald Mackenzie and Nelson Miles to actually use the psychological warfare against the Native Americans. Soldiers followed Indians to their village and attacked everyone inside including women and children. Soldiers also attacked villages when no warriors were present and held hostages to secure surrenders from certain chiefs. All of these ploys made up the United States policy of total psychological warfare. The policy worked well against the Indians and induced them into surrendering.

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<sup>40</sup> Walters, 467.

<sup>41</sup> Spencer Glasgow Welch, *A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife* (New York: Neale Publishing Company, 1911), 121, in Janda, 19.--47

Philip Sheridan said it best when he talked about the policy of inducing fear into the Indians. He said:

In taking the offensive, I have to select a season when I can catch the fiends; and, if a village is attacked and women and children killed, the responsibility is not with the soldiers but with the people whose crimes necessitated the attack. During the war did anyone hesitate to attack a village or a town occupied by the enemy because women or children were within its limits? Did we cease to throw shells into Vicksburg or Atlanta because women and children were there?<sup>42</sup>

Sheridan continued to tell people his philosophy of war he held after the Civil War. During the Franco-Prussian War, he traveled to Europe to inspect European armies and how they conducted their wars. He saw the limited amount of attacks each side partook upon and the amount of resources that the two sides did not attack. While talking to Otto van Bismarck, the leader of the Prussian army, during the siege of Paris, Sheridan declared his policy on war stating, “The proper strategy consists in the first place in inflicting as telling blows as possible upon the enemy’s army, and then causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace, and force their government to demand it. The people must be left nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war.”<sup>43</sup>

Sheridan’s earlier superior thought just the same. Sherman strongly advocated the destruction of Indians and thought that the United States army should deal with criminals in a harsh manner. Sherman believed that everything should be done against every single Indian no matter what sex or age. “Fear is the beginning of wisdom,” advocated Sherman, which his

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<sup>42</sup> Sheridan to Sherman, 9 May 1873, Division of the Missouri, Letters Sent, RG 393, in Janda, 21

<sup>43</sup> Moritz Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1898), 1:127-128, in Janda 24.

troops imbibed upon.<sup>44</sup> Sherman thought that the only way to keep Indian warriors in check was by assaulting villages to keep them in constant vigilance and in concern. As long as the Natives felt that the troops could strike at their property and families, the commander seemed happy.<sup>45</sup>

The chiefs of command in the West stayed on the same page the

Other officers also proceeded in the same manner as their superiors. Psychological warfare composed a big part of the United States Army's policy against the Native Americans. In Nelson Miles campaigns, he always occupied the Indian hunting grounds, especially when he dealt with the Sioux. Miles made sure he occupied these grounds and kept the Sioux in a constant state of fear, by having the option to burst into the enemy's village and open fire at anytime that he liked.<sup>46</sup> In dealing with Geronimo and the Apaches, Miles used complete psychological warfare to his advantage in order to bring in the enemies. When Miles had to chase Geronimo for 2000 miles across the West, Miles made sure that Geronimo did not have any allies and that he hurt him where it hurt the most. He removed all the Chiricahau and Warm Springs Apaches from Arizona. After Lieutenant Gatewood, who worked under Miles, told Geronimo the fate of these Indians, which included his family and friends, Geronimo finally surrendered. The thought of the united State army hurting and removing his family away from him proved too much for Geronimo. Psychological warfare won the battle and put an end to the great Geronimo.<sup>47</sup>

The Native Americans began to feel the fear that soldiers would not only locate their villages, but also attack them and kill all the inhabitants. Ranald Mackenzie undertook this line of attack on the Indians. In 1873, Mackenzie fought in the Battle of Remolino. The Kickapoo

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<sup>44</sup> Weigley, 151, in McCall, 67.

<sup>45</sup> McCall, 68.

<sup>46</sup> Whitfield, 51.

<sup>47</sup> Whitfield, 54.

Indians, who lived in Mexico, kept on coming over the boarder and raiding American livestock. Every once in a while they would kill a citizen. Sheridan sent Mackenzie on a mission to cross the border and to deal with the Indians. When Mackenzie finally raided the village, he waited until the warriors had left. He attacked the village filled with only women, children, and the old, killing 19 noncombatants. Mackenzie purposefully sought out psychological warfare in this instance, deciding to attack a village of defenseless Kickapoo Indians to strike at the heart of the community.<sup>48</sup>

The final manner of total warfare that the Union partook in against its Confederate shined in that of total destruction of the South's economy and military supplies. Without military supplies, the Confederate army quickly began to fade away. The Union army lived off the land when they pillaged and destroyed the sustenance of the southern land. Federal troops destroyed all economic surpluses and business from the South to cripple them even further. While committing this type of warfare, the North believed that the South would have to commit some of their troops to stop such warfare, separating the Confederate troops into smaller forces. For generals like Sherman who constantly dealt with guerilla warfare, destroying military supplies and the countryside helped to destroy such forces, since they could not live off the land. This last piece of total war ensured Northern Victory in the American Civil War.

After the battle of Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862 Grant, quickly threw his archaic notion of war out the window, fore he saw that the Civil War would truly entail gruesome pictures of warfare. He saw the South's determination to win the war, and knew that the North could not win it if they did not change their style of warfare.

I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest. Up to that time it had been policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by

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<sup>48</sup> McCall, 72.

me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies.<sup>49</sup>

This strategy allowed for a quicker campaign of Vicksburg. The troops of Grant could cut away from their lines of communication and supplies and lived off the land. Grant's troops took all in their path from the civilians. Soldiers ate and drank milk, honey, poultry, ham, and vegetables. A man who came up to Grant's troops on a mule complained of the soldiers plundering the lands, including his own farm. Grant responded to the man by declaring, "Well, those men did not belong to my division at all, because if they were my men they wouldn't have left you that mule."<sup>50</sup> Grant's plans worked out by living off of the land. He destroyed military supplies and left Mississippi in a hard time. Even newspapers had to print stories on 1x1 pieces of old wallpaper.<sup>51</sup> The other army felt the pangs of having to deal with the Union army destroying supplies. So much so that Pemberton, a commander in the Confederate forces received a letter from his ranks with the pen name "Many Soldiers," stating, "If you can't feed us, you had better surrender, horrible as the idea is, than suffer this noble army to disgrace themselves by desertion... This army is now ripe for mutiny, unless it can be fed."<sup>52</sup> The breaking away from lines of communication and living off the land confused enemy troops who did not know where the Union army resided and who kept trying to cut the lines of

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<sup>49</sup> Janda, 13.--19

<sup>50</sup> Bruce Catton, *Grant Moves South* (Boston, 1960), 438, in McPherson, 629.

<sup>51</sup> McPherson, 634.

<sup>52</sup> McPherson, 636.

communication. Living off the land also affected the enemy troops in a way that the Union troops could cut the others' force into two, creating a smaller army.<sup>53</sup>

Grant applied his total warfare of destroying the South's military supplies and economy to the whole Union army. He ordered William Tecumseh Sherman to "get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can upon their war resources."<sup>54</sup> Prior to Philip Sheridan's conquest of the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, Grant again ordered the destruction of supplies. "If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren wasteland."<sup>55</sup> Destruction of Confederate military supplies became a top priority in order to defeat the South.

William Tecumseh Sherman epitomized the perfect example of total warfare upon enemy supplies and the enemy's economy. In Sherman's campaign of Mississippi he first introduced the style of total warfare on the countryside in order to deny southern armies military supplies and sustenance. He also acknowledged that destroying the South's economy would help quicken the end of the war. Sherman supplied his soldiers with axes to destroy fences and houses along the shoreline where Confederates interfered with Union boats. Sherman also ordered General Frank P. Blair in May of 1863, while still in Mississippi, to strip the Yazoo Valley. The General destroyed immense amounts of bacon, over 500,000 bushels of corn, destroyed all the gristmills, and drove to camp a thousand cattle.<sup>56</sup> After the fall of Vicksburg, Grant ordered Sherman to render Jackson, a city in Mississippi, useless to the Confederacy, as well as the surrounding countryside. Sherman followed the orders through and ruined Jackson. Other troops scoured the

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<sup>53</sup> Janda, 13.

<sup>54</sup> Grant to Sherman, April 4, 1864, in O.R., Series One, 32 (pt.3): 246, Janda, 14.

<sup>55</sup> Grant to Sheridan, August 26, 1864, in Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, General, United States Army*, 2 vols. (New York: Webster, 1888), 1:486, in Janda, 14.

<sup>56</sup> Walters, 467.

countryside pillaging farmhouses and destroying Confederate lines of communication. Civilians fled to Alabama in sheer terror.<sup>57</sup> Those civilians who stayed behind suffered the worst. The Union destroyed all of the supplies. Grant and Sherman felt that the least they could do for these civilians was to supply them with some subsistence.<sup>58</sup>

Sherman's campaign of Atlanta entailed the devastation that the North wreaked upon the South. Jefferson Davis and other Confederates feared the destruction of Atlanta due to its prosperous economy and the supplies leaving the city for the southern armies. Jefferson said that the fall of the city would "open the way for the Federal Army to the Gulf on the one hand, and to Charleston on the other and close up those rich granaries from which Lee's armies are supplied. It would give them control of our network of railways and thus paralyze our efforts."<sup>59</sup> Once at his destination, Sherman ordered the citizens out of the city. He then had his troops set fire to the city. He purposefully sent his troops to warehouses, railroads, factories, and foodstuffs in order to destroy the economy of the city and the military aid.<sup>60</sup>

After the fall of Atlanta, Sherman looked towards Savannah Georgia to continue his destruction of the South. Only 285 miles stood in between his army and the city. The greatest pleasure excursion occurred on the "March to the Sea." Sherman's army foraged and pillaged liberally, and destroyed everything that could help militarily. On this march, Sherman's troops became known as bummers due to all of the foraging for food. Whatever the troops could not eat they burned. The army burned and twisted the railroads, destroyed the southern cotton and the gins, and any other crops that the farmers planted.<sup>61</sup> Leaving a sixty-mile wide gap of

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<sup>57</sup> Walters, 468.

<sup>58</sup> Walters, 469.

<sup>59</sup> A.A. Hoehling, ed., *Last Train from Atlanta* (New York, 1958), 17, in McPherson, 751.

<sup>60</sup> Janda, 15.

<sup>61</sup> McPherson, 809 & 810.

destruction through Georgia, Sherman finally reached Savannah. The Union general took Savannah easily and presented Lincoln with the gift of 25,000 bales of cotton and 150 heavy guns.<sup>62</sup> Sherman took total war to heart in the South. Georgia had been the primary food supply for the Confederate army in Virginia and considered the breadbasket of the Confederacy.<sup>63</sup> Now it lay in ruins. His report to Washington that estimated the amount of damage done to the state of Georgia totaled in “at \$100,000,000; at least \$200,000,000 of which has inured to our advantage, and the rest is simple waste and destruction.”<sup>64</sup> Other Union generals did as well when Grant ordered them to.

Philip Sheridan took the orders, to make the Shenandoah Valley look like a barren wasteland, of Grant to heart. The troops of General Jubal Early lived off the land in the Shenandoah Valley, and had little if any lines of military aid coming to their support. Sheridan destroyed their form of life support.

I have destroyed over 2000 barns filled with wheat, hay, farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4000 heads of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3000 sheep...the Valley, from Winchester up to Staunton, ninety two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast.<sup>65</sup>

Earlier in the year, while working as the cavalry of Grant, Sheridan also played a key role in destroying Lee's lines of communication and supplies. Grant relied on Sheridan at times to try and go around Lee's army in order to destroy the lines. At the same time Sheridan did this, he pulled Lee's cavalry away, allowing Grant more breathing room, and space to maneuver

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<sup>62</sup> McPherson, 811.

<sup>63</sup> D. J. de Laubenfels, "Where Sherman Passed By," *American Geographical Society* 47, no. 3 (1957): 383.

<sup>64</sup> Sherman's Official Report on the Savannah Campaign, January 1, 1865, in *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XLIV, pp. 7-16, especially 13-14, in Walters, 466.

<sup>65</sup> Janda, 17.

without being seen as easily. In May of 1864, while Grant fought at Spotsylvania, he sent Sheridan on such a mission to cut Lee's communication. Sheridan went around Lee's army, all the while chased by Jeb Stuart, and destroyed twenty miles of railroads, three weeks of rations, and all the livestock that they could find.<sup>66</sup>

The Union army during the Civil War completed its total war goal of destroying the South's military supplies and its economy. Grant, Sheridan, and Sherman attacked the Confederate's line of communications while disbanding from their own. The strategy to live off the land also paid dividends in the overall scheme of destroying the South. The war destroyed two-fifths of the South's livestock, demolished one half of all farm equipment, smashed thousands of miles of railroad, burned thousands of plantations and farms, and destroyed the primary economic system that the south relied upon. By the end of the war, nearly two-thirds of southern wealth had vanished.<sup>67</sup>

Total war on military supplies and the subsistence/economy persisted into the campaigns on the plains Indians. This form of total war had a devastating impact on the Native Americans. The United States army saw it as a critical piece in bringing the Indians under control and onto the reservations. Most officers supported the idea of this type of warfare, though some thought that it would make Indians more resilient. Officers such as Sherman knew that an enemy's power to resist not only landed with the army, but also with the supplies the land fed the army and the economy of the enemy.<sup>68</sup> The natives used a guerrilla type of warfare similar to that Sherman faced in the South during the Civil War. He knew that the best way to fight against such an insurgency was by destroying the supplies of the enemy.

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<sup>66</sup> McPherson, 728

<sup>67</sup> McPherson, 818.

<sup>68</sup> David D. Smits, "The Frontier Army and the Destruction of the Buffalo: 1865-1883," *The Western Historically Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (1994): 314.

The war on Indians led the troops attacking the supplies within the camps of their enemies. Officers ordered their troops to pursue such a strategy in order to quickly put a stop the Indians free roaming. In Nelson Miles campaigns of the Indians in the West he said “The only way to make the country tenable for us was to make it untenable for the Indians.”<sup>69</sup> Others followed his slogan. In 1872, Ranald Mackenzie led his troops on the McClellan Creek campaign. On September 29, 1872, Mackenzie surprised a Comanche village and destroyed 262 lodges, took 2000 ponies, and destroyed all of the food and supplies.<sup>70</sup> The officers attacked villages because the Indian warriors lived off their villages and could not survive without it, especially in the winter. During the Powder River Campaign, Miles and Mackenzie both attacked Cheyenne at dawn on November 25, 1876. The two officers and their troops destroyed all of the village’s supplies, meat and ammunition and captured 700 ponies. Upon the victory, Mackenzie said, “We have captured all their winter supplies and they will have to come to some reservation and surrender.”<sup>71</sup>

The sought out destruction of winter supplies of the Indians became a part of every campaign to destroy the Native Americans. In the summer months, troops found that Indians had superior mobility and knowledge of the terrain, but that the Natives became stationary during the winter months and dependent upon their villages. If the army attacked the tribes during the winter months, they had an easier time and could destroy supplies and kill horses much easier. This meant that Native Americans could either surrender or try to escape and live

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<sup>69</sup> Whitfield, 51.

<sup>70</sup> McCall, 71.

<sup>71</sup> McCall, 77.

out the winter. Not many Indians who tried to survive the winter actually did due to starvation and exposure to the elements. The destruction of the Indians' ponies also ruined their mobility.<sup>72</sup>

The United States army led an extermination campaign of the buffalo. Generals and officers thought that this would cripple Native Americans since it was one of the main modes of subsistence for the Indians. Generals Sheridan and Sherman viewed the attack on buffalo as “the critical line of attack” in the fight against the plains Indians.<sup>73</sup> Sherman even believed that “the quickest way to compel the Indians to settle down to civilized life was to send ten regiments of soldiers to the plains, with orders to shoot buffaloes until they became too scarce to support the redskins.”<sup>74</sup> The Army hoped that the killing of buffalo would lead the “warlike tribes to sue for peace and mercy because of starvation.”<sup>75</sup> The United States army attacked the buffalo herds in a variety of ways in order to destroy the Indians food supply. The options included training, hunting missions, and plain old fun for the soldiers.

Military commanders saw it as their duty to kill the buffalo in order to help with the extermination of the “savages.” Such officers as Lieutenant M. Schofield who commanded the Department of Missouri maintained this outlook. He believed that “With my cavalry and carbined artillery encamped in front, I wanted no other occupation in life than to ward off the savages and kill off his food until there should no longer be an Indian frontier in our beautiful country.”<sup>76</sup> Officers allowed their men to go on hunting trips in order to resupply the base with rations. The men that went on these trips would also scout the land for any Indian tribes and to bring back the mapped out areas. The officers also taught their young troops how to shoot from

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<sup>72</sup> Janda, 24.

<sup>73</sup> Smits, 312.

<sup>74</sup> *Army Navy Journal* 6 (1869): 705, in Smits, 317.

<sup>75</sup> Smits, 335.

<sup>76</sup> Smits, 316.

horseback by shooting buffalo. Day after day, the troops exercised and trained by shooting buffalo, in order to keep sharp.<sup>77</sup> Troops even used artillery on herds of buffalo to destroy their numbers. At Fort Cobb, Major General D.S. Stanley remembered his soldiers using cannons on buffalo herds that made their annual migration trip he said that the cannons went on for the longest of times until the entire herd passed.<sup>78</sup>

The commanders that garrisoned forts in the West allowed for hunting expeditions and even encouraged it by supplying ammunition and an escort. The officers who allowed this believed it to help the extermination of the savages' food supply. The army honored William F. Cody as one of their guests. Two companies of the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry escorted Cody on the hunt in which he hunters killed over six hundred buffalo. Others such as the Czar's third son Grand Duke Alexis came to hunt in the plains and were treated similar. Cooks and regiments of cavalry and infantry all took turns with the hunters to tend to their whims and wills.<sup>79</sup> A man named Frank H. Mayer who bought his first sharpshooter from an army base remembered a conversation he had with an officer. The officer stated:

Mayer, there's no two ways about it, either the buffalo or the Indian must go. Only when the Indian becomes absolutely dependent on us for his every need, will we be able to handle him. He's too independent with the buffalo. But if we kill the buffalo we conquer the Indian, so the buffalo must go.<sup>80</sup>

This story permeated the whole campaign of the buffalos. Every troop hunted them and allowed for others to hunt them. The hunters and soldiers never left the plains without stories of hundreds of dead buffaloes that they helped litter the plains with.

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<sup>77</sup> Smits, 318.

<sup>78</sup> Smits, 320.

<sup>79</sup> Smits, 315.

<sup>80</sup> Frank H. Mayer and Charles B. Roth, *The Buffalo Harvest* (Denver, 1958), 29-30, in Smits, 331.

The Federal troops put pressure on the Indians to surrender or to at least stop the hostilities. In April 1867, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock told the Arapaho chiefs, “You know well that the game is getting very scarce and that you must soon have some other means of living; you should therefore cultivate the friendship of the white man, so that when the game is all gone, they may take care of you if necessary.”<sup>81</sup> Though Hancock stated this early on in the Plains Indian Wars, he told the Indians of a future that they did in fact face. The Indians did not heed his warning and the buffalo herds died off, leaving the Indians with little subsistence to live on. The death of the buffalo devastated the Indians greatly. Crow Chief Plenty Coups described the situation. “When the Buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened. There was little singing anywhere.” Sitting Bull went even further, “A cold wind blew across the prairie when the last buffalo fell—a death-wind for my people.”<sup>82</sup>

Through officers and Generals, total warfare passed from the Civil War to the Indian Plains Wars. Officers who participated in both wars saw no other way to win such wars without the implementation of the most devastating type of warfare. By continual pursuit and fighting of the enemy, destroying military supplies and the enemy’s economy, and by inducing fear into the hearts of the enemy, the Union won the Civil War. All three of these parts of total warfare were effective in both wars. The use of total warfare however was not the only way that the Civil War affected the Indian Plains Wars.

### **The Civil War and its Psychological Effects**

The Civil War not only affected the style of warfare in the Indian Plains Wars, but also the people who fought in the wars. Officers and soldiers alike saw the gruesome carnage war

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<sup>81</sup> Smits, 322.

<sup>82</sup> Smits, 338.

brought upon other soldiers and civilians. Images engrained themselves into soldiers' minds for the rest of their lives, haunting them. These images and the tasks that they had to undertake during the war also had an affect of hardening the soldiers. Professional soldiers and officers that dealt with these traveled out west to the frontier to deal with the Indian situation. Bringing with them their psychological issues, the soldiers fought against the Indians and placed them on reservations. However, once out in the terrain of the west the officers that once befriended each other and had respect for their peers, now gained an ego and found others judgment to fall short of their own. Officers fought over rank and tried to become the best at others expenses. The Civil War affected the psychology of officers and soldiers who fought in the Indian Plains wars, making them battle hardened and indifferent to matters, made them egotistical and patronizing to one another, and scarred them, creating a psychologically unstable soldier suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

The Civil War affected the officers and soldiers of the west to confide in each other and trust one another. Most officers and soldiers who went from the Civil War to the Indian Plains Wars brought with them an egotistical view of themselves and the ambition to undermine one another in order for their own reputation to flourish or personal gain. Multiple officers who had once gotten along during the previous war now despised one another. Conflicts over what had happened in the Civil War, or who did what during the war impacted their outlook of each other and often caused conflicts between the officers. Petty quarrels and behind the scenes rivalries often turned into major controversies and created turmoil in the cooperation between higher officials

John Pope's ambitious, egotistical, and argumentative personality developed due to the Civil War and affected his relationships with other officers whom he had previously served with.

Pope developed into a problematic senior officer due to all the feuds he had with other officers in the Indian Plains Wars. Pope begrudgingly let go of events in the past and let people know that. He had a feud with John-Fitz Porter over the man's alleged failure to follow command during the battle of the Second Bull Run during the Civil War. Pope would also not serve under Henry Halleck, whom he worked with during the Civil War. Pope and Halleck had disputes in the past over battles they fought, which continued into the Indian Plains Wars. While serving on the frontier, Pope often argued with Philip Sheridan over battle strategy. He believed that his ideas of only attacking during winter campaigns instead of also during the summer was superior to Sheridan's ideas. Pope's ego of himself and ambition coming from his service in the Civil War also caused tension with other officers. Pope wanted to outshine other officers and so sometimes tried to undermine them. Nelson Miles, an officer with his own ambitious egotistical problems, attested to Pope's problem. After the Red River War of 1874-75, which Pope served under Miles, Miles blatantly states that due to Pope's ambition to outshine people, he failed to supply his army (Mile's army) in the campaign in order to try and place failure upon his superiors. Pope's contentious ideas and personality however, did not find itself alone, for many officers had the same personality owing it to the Civil War.<sup>83</sup>

Philip Sheridan found himself butting heads with other officers because he could not excuse subordinates for disagreeing with him. His arrogance and ego made him think that he was superior to others, and therefore did not have to listen to advice. Sheridan blamed Colonel William B. Hazen during the Indian Plains Wars for not catching the Indians that the U.S. government wanted on a reservation near Fort Cobb. Cobb chased the Indians, only to stop when the Indians produced a paper signed by Hazen on their innocence. Sheridan blamed Hazen

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<sup>83</sup> Wooster, 62&63.

for this failure, stating that the Native Americans tricked him, and put extra pressure on him due to a Civil War feud. Sheridan and Hazen both contended that their troops in the Civil War reached Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga in 1863. The two never got over the dispute and Sheridan never got along with Hazen after that.<sup>84</sup> Sheridan had problems with everyone, even his own comrade and close personal friend from the Civil War George Crook. Crook, as many other officers did, thought that Sheridan took too much credit for the Civil War victories at Fisher's Hill and Cedar Creek in the Shenandoah Valley. Crook began to break ties with Sheridan because he thought this and also because he held sympathy for the Native Americans. The two had very independent minds and very high opinions of themselves since the Civil War. Crook never reported his actions during the Indian Plains Wars because he thought he did not have to, while Sherman liked to know everything that went on as a superior. The two continuously butted heads due to their personalities and past experiences in the Civil War. Sheridan's arrogance and confrontational personality led to many arguments with others, even though he had strong leadership in the West.<sup>85</sup>

Nelson Miles, a young and rising star in the Indian Plains Wars, exhibited the personality traits of insatiable ambition, egotism, and arrogance due to the Civil War. Miles participated in every battle on the eastern front of the Civil war, besides Gettysburg, survived, and had a successful record. Due to this, Miles thought himself perfect, and brought this demeanor with him to the Indian Plains Wars.<sup>86</sup> Nelson Miles never missed the opportunity for self-promotion over others, demean his rivals, or capitalize on others' achievements for his own benefit. Miles boasted the best record for fighting against Indians in the West and never let anyone forget that.

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<sup>84</sup> Wooster, 63.

<sup>85</sup> Wooster, 63, 64.

<sup>86</sup> Wooster, 65.

Miles created rivalries with the likes of Ranald Mackenzie and John Pope in his quest to become the top ranked officer. His arrogance also made Sherman, think of him as the most insufferably ambitious person when compared to all the other officers.<sup>87</sup> Miles married the niece of William Tecumseh Sherman and constantly sent letters to Sherman, unabashedly, about his quest to become the Secretary of War and his arrogant high opinion of himself.<sup>88</sup> Miles consistently made enemies due to his personality, which the Civil War directly affected.

Ranald Mackenzie embodied the type of officer that transferred from one war to the next. Many men and historians state that Mackenzie was arrogant, egotistical, and had a stubborn determination.<sup>89</sup> Mackenzie willingly tried to undermine those that he did not like. In the summer of 1871, Mackenzie tried to remove Colonel Joseph Reynolds from his command. The two men openly detested each other, but Mackenzie hoped to get the best of him. That summer he hoped to use the campaign against the Indians against the commander, but it failed. Reynolds remained in control for the time.<sup>90</sup> Nelson A. Miles also composed a formidable opponent for Mackenzie. Miles encroached on Mackenzie's jurisdiction whenever possible, and soon a rivalry formed between the two. Mackenzie resented Miles and tried to better him a every instance he could.<sup>91</sup>

The officers and soldiers in the Indians Plains Wars who had previously fought in the Civil War brought with them a hardened and brutal mentality. Depictions of soldiers during the Civil War show what the future soldiers of the plains wars looked like, since many of them came directly from the Civil War. Officers such as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Mackenzie offer

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<sup>87</sup> Whitfield, 49.

<sup>88</sup> Wooster, 65.

<sup>89</sup> Charles Robinson, *Bad Hand: A Biography of General Ranald S. Mackenzie* (Austin: State House Press, 1993), 42.

<sup>90</sup> Robinson, 89.

<sup>91</sup> Robinson, 165.

the best evidence of this hardened mentality through the pain that they endured and their instructions. The orders that the men gave changed during the Civil War, hardening and evolving into devastating orders. These words, flowing from the officers' mouths, continued into the Plains Wars where they gave distinct orders of horrible and gruesome tasks. Officers and soldiers knew what it took to silence their enemies since they had served in the Civil War. The Indian Plains Wars did not differ.

Soldiers during the Civil War gained a sense of invincibility and madness once engaged in battle. This tenacity and feeling followed to the plains of the frontier. The Indians had to face demented, battle-hardened soldiers who drank in the madness once the battle began. In the Civil War, officers noted, "the soldier who is shooting is furious in his energy...The men are loading and firing with demoniacal fury and shouting and laughing hysterically."<sup>92</sup> Battles during the Civil War engulfed men in a fit of rage and senselessness that did not end until the battle finished. Soldiers who saw stragglers of the enemy running away pursued them and shot them down from behind. The soldiers sometimes kept on shooting until they reached the body, or even stabbed it a few times when they came upon it. The Civil War soldiers saw atrocities everyday, which numbed their senses, at least in some cases.<sup>93</sup>

In the Plains Indian The soldiers knew what had to be done in order to win, even if it meant destroying every possession and killing every person. The soldiers of the Indian Plains Wars raided villages all the time, killing women and children. Everything remained in the limits of the army if they wanted to destroy it. Ranald Mackenzie traveled across the Mexican border and attacked a defenseless Kickapoo Indian village, when he knew that the warriors of the tribe had left prior. Mackenzie killed 19 noncombatants, burned the village, and killed or captured the

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<sup>92</sup> Eric Dean, Jr., *Shook over Hell* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 53.

<sup>93</sup> Dean, 53.

ponies.<sup>94</sup> Nelson Miles and the U.S. 4<sup>th</sup> Cavalry traveled over 2000 miles for four months just to capture Geronimo.<sup>95</sup> Soldiers attacked anything that their officers ordered them to do. Soldiers also did anything that the officers asked of them.

Grant, Sherman and Sheridan all showed the battle-hardening mentality that evolved during the Civil War and led them to their decisions in the Indian Plains wars. In the western theater of the Civil War, during the campaign of Vicksburg, Grant's vision of soft-sided war, in which war should only be against an army faltered. His vision of what war entailed changed and evolved into his notion of total war. As stated previously in this essay, Grant's perception of war changed after the Battle of Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862. He stated that, "I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest."<sup>96</sup> Grant then campaigned on a total warfare scale, destroying the Confederate Army, the South's military aid, and the civilian morale. He gave the orders to Sherman later in the war "get to the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can upon their war resources."<sup>97</sup> Grant then told Sheridan when he sent him into the Shenandoah Valley, "If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren wasteland."<sup>98</sup>

Grant's idea that the enemy deserved total destruction carried with him from the Civil War to his position in the Indian Plains Wars, and even when he became President of the United States (though he did pursue peace with the Native Americans for a short duration). Grant wanted protection of the settlers out west at all costs. As earlier noted Grant promised to protect

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<sup>94</sup> McCall, 72.

<sup>95</sup> Whitfield, 54.

<sup>96</sup> Janda, 13.

<sup>97</sup> Grant to Sherman, April 4, 1864, in O.R., Series One, 32 (pt.3): 246, Janda, 14.

<sup>98</sup> Grant to Sheridan, August 26, 1864, in Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, General, United States Army*, 2 vols. (New York: Webster, 1888), 1:486, in Janda, 14.

the settlers, “even if the extermination of every Indian tribe was necessary to secure such a result.”<sup>99</sup> After a few attacks by the Sioux nation on soldiers, Grant also announced, “We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children.”<sup>100</sup> Grant stayed true to his hard-line course in war. He was battle hardened by his Experience in the Civil War and showed that during the Indian Plains Wars, through the proclamations and positions against Native Americans.

William Tecumseh Sherman also transformed into a battle-hardened soldier. Through his orders and his marches, Sherman’s idea of war changed to one of no mercy. Originally, Sherman did not believe warfare on civilians or anything construed as immoral, but his views soon changed.

I would not let our men burn fence rails for fire or gather fruit or vegetables though hungry... We at that time were restrained, tied by a deep-seated reverence for law and property. The rebels first introduced terror as part of their system... Buell had to move at a snail’s pace with his vast wagon trains... Bragg moved rapidly, living on the country. No military mind could endure this long, and we forced in self-defense to imitate their example.<sup>101</sup>

Sherman also stated:

I know that in the beginning, I, too, had the old West Point notion that pillage was a capital crime, and punished it by shooting... This was a one sided game of war and many of us... ceased to quarrel with our own men about such minor things, and went in to subdue the enemy, leaving minor depredations to be

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<sup>99</sup> *New York Times*, October 16, 1868, 1, in Janda, 23.

<sup>100</sup> Robert G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 99, in Janda, 23.

<sup>101</sup> W.T. Sherman to James Guthrie, August 14, 1864, cited in Lewis, *Sherman: Fighting Prophet*, 398, in Janda, 14.

charged up to the account of rebels who had forced us into the war, and who deserved all they got and more.<sup>102</sup>

Sherman then went on to raze Georgia and South Carolina to the ground. He grew callous in mind when conducting war and did not care who he hurt or what he destroyed. Sherman's battle-hardened nature continued into the Indian Plains Wars where he wanted the annihilation of the Indians. Sherman believed that any Indian who made trouble should be punished. He wanted all Indians on a reservation by any mean possible and that the Native Americans should knuckle down, or be killed. Sherman's battle-hardened policy backed all of his own orders as well as Sheridan's orders.<sup>103</sup>

Philip Sheridan and his command represent the officers who took on a hard-lined persona from the Civil War to the frontier. Though Sheridan did not talk much about when his tactics changed in the Civil War, or why he changed them, his campaigns under Sherman and in the Shenandoah Valley show his evolution to total warfare and the callous mindset that one needed. Sheridan destroyed the once flourishing Shenandoah Valley and all of its supplies it offered to the Confederate troops. Sheridan continued his style of warfare against the Native Americans and kept his strong attitude of callousness towards the enemy. Under his order, Sheridan ordered officers to attack villages, to campaign in the winter when the Native Americans were most vulnerable, and to kill the Indians food supply. Sheridan even went as far as allowing the extermination of Indian tribes. When the U.S. army had to deal with the Kickapoo Indians who raided from Mexico into the United States, Sheridan told Ranald Mackenzie, "Let it be a campaign of

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<sup>102</sup> Sherman to Halleck, December 24, 1864, in William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (New York: Library of America, 1990), 705, in Janda, 15.

<sup>103</sup> McCall, 70&73.

annihilation, obliteration, and complete destruction.”<sup>104</sup> Sheridan ordered time after time that Army must force the Native Americans onto reservations, or the tribes must die. Sheridan lost no sleep over ordering men to kill women and children of the Indians. He did not care that the army destroyed enemy villages or anything else, as long as the army subdued the Native Americans. Sheridan ascertained this personality while serving under Grant in the Civil War as well as his own campaigns.

Ranald Mackenzie exemplifies how battle-hardened soldiers from the Civil War to the Indian Plains Wars. His story shows how the Civil War molded tough soldiers and officers for the frontier. Mackenzie sustained numerous injuries during the Civil War that he coped with throughout his life. No matter what happened to the man, he returned to the field and led his men into battle. During the siege of Petersburg, Grant had Mackenzie attack a bluff. During this charge, Mackenzie had a shell fragment tear off the first two fingers of his right hand. This injury led to later nicknames during the Indian Plains Wars of “Three Finger Jack,” and “Bad Hand.”<sup>105</sup> In the Shenandoah campaign where he served under Sheridan, Mackenzie yet again suffered wounds. At Cedar Creek, Mackenzie had his leg grazed by a bullet and later hit by a bullet. Even later that day Confederates hit Mackenzie with a piece of shrapnel in the chest, stunning him and temporarily paralyzing his arms. The officer only ordered his men to place him on a horse, where he stayed ordering his troops around for the rest of the day.<sup>106</sup>

Mackenzie also suffered such wounds later during the Indian Plains Wars. While engaging the Comanche in 1871, he received an arrow to the leg. His soldiers immediately

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<sup>104</sup> Ernest Wallace and Adrian S. Andrews, “R.S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid Into Mexico in 1873,” *Arizona and the West*, 7 (1965): 110, in McCall, 71.

<sup>105</sup> Robinson, 20.

<sup>106</sup> Robinson, 24.

pulled him the rear where the surgeon cut it out.<sup>107</sup> Mackenzie yet again suffered an injury in the mid 1870s when he was thrown from a wagon onto his head. The commander laid in a half stupor for a few days from his near fatal injury. Many people believed that he was not the same person after that injury.<sup>108</sup> Ranald Mackenzie also had an insatiable desire to fight at all costs. In the Plains Indian Wars, an officer who worked under him stated that he was, “one of the officers of that period who was always ready and willing to assume the gravest responsibilities, and he would never hesitate to take the initiative while waiting for orders.”<sup>109</sup> His hard hitting style and never-give-up mentality even if injured, shows Mackenzie as a true soldier serving in Both the Civil War and Indian Plains Wars.

The Civil War not only created battle hardened soldiers, but also led to soldiers suffering from “shell-shock” and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Many of these men served on the frontier against the Indians, where they continued to kill and massacre hundreds of people. During the Civil War, men who suffered from mental deterioration due to seeing horrific actions and from being physically exhausted did not know what exactly that they suffered from. Doctor’s gave capricious diagnoses because posttraumatic stress disorder was not studied and not even thought of or understood until the Vietnam War.

Men in the Civil War showed great anxiety. Even before engaging in battle, soldiers trembled and fear. Stress built up in soldiers and stayed with them for their life. Fear engulfed men’s minds, tensions grew, and nerve-wracking anxiety pulsed through men’s veins. Soldiers could hear the bullets and cannons, hear explosions, and the screaming of wounded and dying men before even setting foot on the battlefield. One Union soldier recalled, “I was faint...A

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<sup>107</sup> Robinson, 106.

<sup>108</sup> Robinson, 190.

<sup>109</sup> Robinson, 20.

glance along the line satisfied me that I was not alone in my terror; many faces had a pale, livid expression of fear.”<sup>110</sup> Men standing in their combat lines dropped to the ground, paralyzed with fear and refused to get up. Soldiers noticed others trembling so bad that they could not stand strait or hold their gun. Beads of sweat rolled off of others and some men even lost control of their bowels. The fear of battle was real and added to the stress of life rendering some people with posttraumatic stress disorder.<sup>111</sup>

The Civil War produced grotesque horrors that soldiers saw everyday. Men saw full frontal assault on lines blasted away by enemy fire, friends perished next to one another, and grueling hand-to-hand combat all produced sickening images. “Brains, fractured skulls, broken arms and legs, and the human form mangled in every conceivable and inconceivable manner...At every step they take they see the piles of wounded and slain and their feet are slipping in the blood and brains of their comrades.”<sup>112</sup> Soldiers all witnessed the gruesome terrors of the Civil War. Elbridge Copp recalled a man standing near him was struck by a piece of shell: “The sickening thud as it entered his body, sent a chill of horror through me, such as those only who have heard can know.”<sup>113</sup> Another soldier remembered a man in front of him getting shot: “I heard the bullets chug into his body; it seemed a half a dozen struck him. I shall never forget the look on his face as he turned over and died.”<sup>114</sup>

Very few soldiers went through the entire war without having some type of horrific incident happen before their eyes. Albert Frank, who sat in a trench in Richmond Virginia and offered a comrade a sip of water, witnessed the same man get decapitated from inches away

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<sup>110</sup> Dean, 54.

<sup>111</sup> Dean, 53&54.

<sup>112</sup> Dean, 58.

<sup>113</sup> Dean, 58.

<sup>114</sup> Dean, 58.

when handing the man the canteen. Later that night, his fellow soldiers noticed him acting strangely. Frank ran out of the trenches screaming and running towards the enemy. His friends went looking for him and found him lying in the grass curled up with fear.<sup>115</sup> Soldiers saw the worst of war, something no other person could possibly fathom. Men also saw blood pour from fellow soldiers, which traumatized them forever.

A wounded man begged piteously for us to take him to the rear; he was wounded in the neck, or head, and the blood flowed freely; everytime he tried to speak the blood would fill his mouth and he would blow it out in all directions; he was all blood, and at the time I thought he was the most dreadful sight I ever saw. We could not help him, for it was of no use, for he could not live long by the way he was bleeding.<sup>116</sup>

Men saw bloodshed almost everyday. The images seen wore on soldiers from that day onwards giving them anxiety problems and irritability. Those who served in the Civil War broke down after the war or had mental deterioration. These problems continued into the Indians Plains Wars, and those who fought in the Civil War brought these problems with them.

After the Civil War, some men talked about how it affected them and some men's actions spoke for them. Those that went home and committed to these acts of talking and doing can represent those that voyaged on to the frontier. Both men suffered the same events and affected the same amount of men. Civil war diaries and letters reveal the mental anguish that soldiers faced. Soldiers in their personal writings wrote that those outside of fighting the war just don't understand them anymore, or that they don't understand what they have been through. Soldiers that went home after the war felt a sense of distance from where they were. Even though these men lived at home, they often felt back on the battlefield and constantly had a foggy head.

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<sup>115</sup> Dean, 65.

<sup>116</sup> Dean, 58.

Soldiers also felt that they could not relate to anyone anymore.<sup>117</sup> These factors led to soldiers distancing themselves from everyone and turning to alcohol as well as falling into fits of depression.

Veterans returning home also showed symptoms anxiety and irritability. Many veterans feared being killed. A man named Elijah Boswell, who served in the Civil War, was committed to an insane asylum in 1872. His brother testified to the doctors that since Boswell's return from the war he never acted normal. While at the asylum, a clerk stated that Boswell "Sobbed and cried and imagined that some one was going to kill him." Boswell became violent and always screamed that the rebels were after him. Demarcus L. Hedges, another veteran believed that his enemies always pursued him and that his family members tried to keep killing him. He envisioned that he was in battle all the time and suffered from paranoia greatly. Lastly, a man named Henry Carr also suffered this similar fear. Convinced that someone was trying to kill him and that intruders would try to break into his house, Carr often barricaded himself in his own house and stayed up all night long. He planned defenses of his home and often walked around shooting imaginary objects. All three of these men showed symptoms of PTSD and mental deterioration due to the Civil War.<sup>118</sup>

Ranald S. Mackenzie suffered from the psychological scars of the Civil War. His engagement in the Civil War and then the Indian Plains wars offers the perfect representation of what many soldiers faced when they fought in both wars. Those that knew Mackenzie stated that he was "a man of very deep and intense feeling, of a high-strung and nervous temperament."<sup>119</sup> Multiple times on the frontier Mackenzie's anxiety and depression surfaced. After Mackenzie's

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<sup>117</sup> Dean, 93.

<sup>118</sup> Dean, 105.

<sup>119</sup> Robinson, XVIII.

raid into Mexico for the Kickapoo Indians, he had to hold a meeting with Sheridan and Belknap. Mackenzie was found pacing and nervous as well as uneasy.<sup>120</sup> The officer often suffered emotional letdowns after successful campaigns. After defeating the Indians in the Palo Duro Canyon fights, Mackenzie yet again went into his ever-increasing fits of nervousness and irritability. No officer knew how to deal with Mackenzie, and often when they tried, they received the brunt of criticism and penalties.<sup>121</sup> The commander suffered another loss hardest in his life when his friend Lieutenant McKinney, who Mackenzie deemed “one of the most gallant officers and honorable men that I have ever known” died in a battle against the Cheyenne. One of his soldiers noticed that Mackenzie did not get any rest that night as he paced into the morning. The funeral procession for his friend deepened the depression. Colonel Dodge, a fellow officer noticed that Mackenzie acted “more than a crazy man than that of a sane commander of a splendid body of cavalry... [and] very downcast—bitterly reproaching himself for what he called his failure...He said to an officer that if he had the courage enough he would blow his brains out.”<sup>122</sup> Mackenzie took the loss of life surrounding him very harshly.

By late February 1883, Ranald Mackenzie’s mental health came into question. Lieutenant Dorst, who became an aid to Mackenzie noticed the mental deterioration after he left Mackenzie’s side and returned months later. Mackenzie began to drink heavily—a man who never drank alcohol. His behavior became erratic.<sup>123</sup> Civilians found Mackenzie in a town, away from his post, drunk, trying to break into a house and fight the inhabitants.<sup>124</sup> Mackenzie’s officers became worried for him as well as his sister. His Friends and family had him

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<sup>120</sup> Robinson, 133.

<sup>121</sup> Robinson, 179.

<sup>122</sup> Robinson, 223.

<sup>123</sup> Robinson, 309&313.

<sup>124</sup> Robinson, 316.

transported to Bloomingdale Asylum for the Insane. Once there, the doctors deemed Mackenzie unable for command in the military and that he should stay at the institution.<sup>125</sup> In November 1886, Mackenzie moved out of the Asylum, but passed away just a few years after in January of 1889.<sup>126</sup>

Mackenzie's irascible behavior and nervousness led to the deterioration in his health. He suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, which was an unknown condition at the time. When diagnosing Mackenzie, Charlton looked at Mackenzie and stated in a journal that "His scars were plainly visible and by looking, when he wasn't looking, I learned much of what he had suffered and would suffer until his dying day."<sup>127</sup> These wounds, physical and mental, caused the stress in Mackenzie's life. Linking PTSD to Mackenzie it was noticed that the symptoms of his first trauma came after the slaughter he observed in the Civil War. After this episode came more frequent. His continual exposure to battles and the gore caused more irritability. His own mutilations, of his right hand and wounds of his leg, have also caused Mackenzie PTSD. All of these factors led to the early death of Ranald S. Mackenzie.<sup>128</sup>

Most United States military soldiers who fought in the West had psychological problems or trials. Those soldiers and officers that fought in the Civil War and went to the frontier to continue to serve their country went and fought as changed men. The Civil War created arrogant and egotistical officers and soldiers who could not work with others in the army. The Civil War took men and made them into battle-hardened soldiers who could give atrocious and barbaric orders, as well as undertake those orders without flinching. Lastly, the Civil War affected the mental deterioration of those who also served against the Native Americans. Soldiers who

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<sup>125</sup> Robinson, 322.

<sup>126</sup> Robinson, 328.

<sup>127</sup> Robinson, 334.

<sup>128</sup> Robinson, 335&336.

fought in the Civil war suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder and other psychological issues due to the grotesque scenes they saw during the war. The Civil War created a few psychological identities that served in the Indian Plains Wars. People who fought in the Civil War never were the same.

### **Conclusion**

The Civil War in many ways affected the Indian Plains Wars from 1865 up until 1890, when the last of the Indians traversed to an Indian reservation. The Civil War first introduced the battle strategy of total warfare. This strategy consisted of continual battle until the enemy wore out or surrendered, psychological warfare by attacking the civilian population as well as using enemy prisoners for certain jobs, like minesweeping, and attacking the enemy's economy and destroying military aid. Total warfare had never previously been used in a consistent manner until the Union troops instituted it against the South. Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and Philip Sheridan all undertook the responsibility of implementing total warfare upon the Confederate Army. These same generals instituted total warfare as the strategy in the Indian Plains Wars. Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan used others to destroy Indian villages and buffalo, to kill Indian warriors, and to demoralize the Indian tribes. The implementation of total warfare succeeded and the roving tribes of the Native Americans in the West existed no more.

The Civil War also affected the psychology of soldiers who fought in the Civil War and then traveled West to fight in the Indian Plain Wars. Men who fought and survived the Civil War gained an egotistical view of themselves and believed that they could lead troops better than anyone else. Men used others to gain personal fame and attention. The Civil War created battle-hardened soldiers and officers who fought through any pain and gave any orders they deemed

necessary. Soldiers and officers who served in the Civil War and shipped out West brought this personality with them. Soldiers felt no remorse in attacking villages and killing women and children. Officers also experienced no emotional difference when they ordered an attack on Native Americans that they knew would destroy villages and lives. Lastly, the Civil War caused posttraumatic stress disorder. The veterans of the Civil War ended up having mental deterioration due to their duty in the Civil War and what they saw on the battlefield. Some soldiers killed themselves and others turned insane and paranoid. A lot of these men made their way out to the Indian Plains Wars and had these psychological issues while fighting Indians, which increased the mental anxiety. Soldiers suffered from different psychological issues after serving their military term.

The Civil War affected the battle tactics and psychology of men who fought on in the Indian Plains Wars. Those that fought in the Civil War brought with them the battle strategy of total warfare and implemented it with continual battles against the enemy, terrorizing and demoralizing the enemy, and destroying the enemies supplies as well as economy. The Civil War affected the psychology by creating battle-hardened veterans, psychologically unstable soldiers, and insubordinate officers who were egotistical and who ruined old friendships. The Civil War began a new era of war. One that would never change back to the style of Antoine Jomini. The next wars of the world showed this. World War I took the American style of warfare and applied it to Europe, which World War II then followed. The Civil War had an everlasting impact on the world and one that can be traced.

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