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Weak State caused long duration of insurgency between 1995 to 2016

Abstract

Saddam Hussein's government and the Taliban regime were both toppled in the early months of U.S. invasion. Nevertheless, the U.S. and coalitions' supported government in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been battling insurgencies since the U.S. invasion. To be exact, the U.S. has been conducting counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan since 2002, and in Iraq since 2003. Why would such operations last so long despite U.S. military might? Many scholars have argued differently on the causes of long duration insurgencies but none has given an argument that can explain all cases of prolonged insurgencies. In this paper, I used the theory of political opportunity structure which posits that "repertoires for protest have traditionally been seen as influenced by political opportunity structure, consisting of both a formal, institutional aspect and an informal, cultural one (Porta 2008, 223)" to argue that weak states caused long duration insurgency between the years of 1995 to 2016. My argument gives another alternative argument that can explain the causes of long duration insurgencies. Using 66 cases of insurgency, from the Global Terrorism dataset, I showed that state weakness caused long duration insurgency between the periods of 1995 to 2016, but the only indicators of state weakness that are statistically significant to the duration of insurgency are security effectiveness score and security legitimacy score. Therefore, my policy recommendation is that for states to

carry on successful Counterinsurgency campaigns they need to focus on improving the capability of their security forces, and seek public approval of their security apparatus .

Key words: Political Science, state weakness, state fragility index and matrix dataset, political opportunity structure, global terrorism dataset, strategic interaction, barbarism, state effectiveness score, state fragility index, state legitimacy score, security effectiveness score, security legitimacy score, political effectiveness score, political legitimacy score, economic legitimacy score, economic effectiveness score, social effectiveness score, social legitimacy score, population and GDP.

I. Introduction

Lydia Walker in the article “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock: Counterinsurgency Theory in Iraq 2006-2008,” defined insurgency as the organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” (Walker 2009, 910). The problem of insurgency has existed from time immemorial and as a result, scholars have conducted numerous study to explain why some insurgencies last longer than others, with the hope of helping governments deal with insurgency problem. Unfortunately, despite all the research done, none has argued that state weakness caused long duration insurgency between the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1995 to 2016. Due to the lack of such research, my research will try to answer the question, "why there was long duration insurgency between the years of 1995 to 2016?” Using State Fragility Index and Matrix dataset, I will show that state weakness caused long duration insurgency between the years of 1995 to 2016.

My research is informed by the theory of political opportunity structure, discussed by Donatella Della Porta. In the article, "Research on Social Movements and Political Violence," Della Porta said that repertoires for protest have traditionally been seen as influenced by political opportunity structure, consisting of both a formal, institutional aspect and an informal, cultural one (Porta 2008, 223). The research will show that state weakness indicators of political effectiveness, security effectiveness, social effectiveness, political legitimacy, security legitimacy, and economic legitimacy, which are my independent variables, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population, which will be my control variables, each has a positive and direct relationship with long duration of insurgency, which is my dependent variable. In other words, my research will prove political opportunity structure theory by showing that the presence of a weak state indicator will cause long duration insurgency. I will use quantitative research method and Crosstabulations as my statistical analysis method to show the correlation and statistical significance between each of my independent variables and my dependent variable; long duration of insurgency.

The research will proceed as follows: Section II: Literature review; I will discuss previous research on duration of insurgency, the weaknesses of previous research and why is my research necessary. Section III: Theoretical framework; I will explain how the political opportunity structure theory informs my research, why other theories are weak and how my theory helps show the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Section IV: Research design; I will provide step by step methodology of how my research is conducted, assumptions made, evidence and my expectations. Section V: Findings; I will explain my findings, which will be Crosstabulations outputs, to illustrate the relationship and significance of my independent and dependent variables, and then use previous scholarly research to explain the

outcome of my research. Section VI: Conclusion; I will summarize my research, explain how my claim has either been proven or disapproved, give policy implication of my research and give recommendations for further research.

II. Literature review

Insurgency is a problem that has existed for generations and has attracted numerous scholarly research. In fact, there are a lot of previous research that explain the duration of insurgency, but none attributes state weakness as the cause of long duration insurgency, which is the interest of my research. According to Havard Hegre in the article, "The Duration and Termination of Civil War," global incidence of civil war, which mostly result to insurgency, has changed over a half-century. Hegre uses both theoretical and empirical methods to analyze the determinants (independent variables) of civil war onset, duration, and termination, with emphasis on duration and termination. Hegre show that the lack of state capacity to achieve military victory or to produce credible negotiated outcome, or low opportunity costs for rebels are the independent variable that causes onset of civil wars, sources of finance causes long durations of civil war because rebels could acquire weapons and materials that they needed to continue fighting, and curbing rebel group's finances (independent variable) causes the end of war because rebels can't buy weapons and war material. (Hegre 2004, 252:243). Also, Hegre's research revealed that there was a dramatic increase of civil wars up to 1990s. Hegre asserts that though in the 1990s, the incidence was four times higher than 1950s, the frequencies declined after that and stabilized at 12% from 1995, but there was increase in duration of war after the 1990s caused by available rebel finances. (Hegre 2004, 243:244).

The changes in duration of civil wars after the 1990s that Hegre asserts agrees to the research conducted by Patrick B. Johnson and Brian R. Urlacher. According to Johnson and

Urlacher, in the article “Explaining the duration of Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” post – 1945 Counterinsurgency campaigns have increased to a mean of 11.4 years compared to a pre – 1945 mean of 5.2 years (Johnson and Urlacher 2012, 2). Johnson and Urlacher's assertion agrees with Gordon M. Hahn's claim in the article "The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus” that historically, insurgencies last on average approximately 9-12 years, which he arrived at by the use of several datasets. Hahn’s used the average to explain the Russian Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus since 2005 (Hahn 2008, 2). In another similar argument, “Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, in the article, “Predicting the duration of Syrian insurgency,” used a three-stage technique to predict that Syrian insurgency would last 5.12 years. Pilster and Bohmelt used 69 explanatory (independent) variables that fell under the clusters of physical terrain and geography, cultural terrain, insurgency power and state power, gotten from Lyall and Wilson (2009) dataset, which looked at 286 of insurgency between 1800 to 2005, or insurgency duration and created models with the highest predictive power, using sample approaches; they predicted that development of conventional insurgency (independent variable) in Syria and economic support for Syrian government (independent variable) would cause the Syrian insurgency to last 5.12 years (Pilster and Bohmelt 2014, 1). Also, through the same modeling approach, Pilster and Bohmelt showed that average insurgency duration during the period of 1800 to 2005, caused by the development of conventional insurgencies and economic support for governments was 9-12 years.

As mentioned before, there is no research that argues that State weakness is the cause of long duration insurgency, hence my motivation to research on the duration of insurgency between the years of 1995 to 2016. Nevertheless, there are previous research that give different arguments on the causes of variations in the duration of insurgencies. Both Nicholas T. Calluzzo

in the article "The Urbanization of Insurgency: Shifts in Geography of Conflict" and Halvard Buhaug in the article "Geography, Rebel Capability, and Duration of Civil Conflict" (Buhaug 2009, 1) agree that Geography has a positive effect on duration of civil war. Calluzo, using quantitative analysis studied insurgency outcomes during the 1945-2005 period and found that urbanized insurgencies are hard to defeat because urbanized insurgency favors insurgents because it facilitates concealment and cover, provide soft targets useful for undermining counterinsurgency operations. Additional, Calluzo argues that rural insurgencies are difficult to defeat because insurgents benefit from rough terrain (Calluzo 2010, 3). Similarly, Buhaug contends that the duration of armed civil conflicts (duration of the insurgency) is affected by the geographical factors (such as location, terrain, and natural resources) which interact with rebel fighting capacity. Drawing on a contest success model, Buhaug concludes that conflicts (Insurgency) in remote locations with international borders, and with mineral resources, last long (Buhaug 2009, 544). Though my research supports Buhaug's argument by showing how security effectiveness has a positive correlation with insurgency duration and is analogous to military fighting capacity in Buhaug's research, My research offers an alternative explanation of duration of insurgencies to Calluzo's argument by using state weakness indicators (independent variables) of state's; political, security and social effectiveness and corresponding state's; political and security legitimacy, with addition of economic legitimacy, as shown in the State fragility dataset (State fragility dataset), instead of Geography.

III. Theoretical framework

As mentioned earlier, my research is based on the theory of political opportunity structure, which states that repertoires for protest have traditionally been seen as influenced by political opportunity structure, consisting of both a formal, institutional aspect and an informal,

cultural one (Porta 2008, 223). Della porta argues that the development and success of social movements (that can develop into insurgency) is not because they arise to address new grievances but rather because political opportunities that allows the existing grievances to be heard exist. Such political opportunities could be regime shifts, periods of political instability (in politically weak or unstable states), or changes in the composition of elites (Porta 2008, 223). Those political opportunities may provide an opening to social movement that can lead to insurgency, for example, the assumption that exclusive political systems and unstable democracies provide opportunity for radical opposition and violent escalation that can lead to long duration of insurgency was witnessed in Northern Ireland in the 1960s (Porta 2008, 224). In the 1960s, because of the closing political opportunity in Northern Ireland, the Irish civil rights movement seized the opportunity to mobilize the people, through messages, against the lack of open political opportunities and advocate for inclusiveness and reforms (Porta 2008, 224). Also, research in the new social movements perspective showed that political and social opportunities (conditions) lead to social actors resulting to violence and can cause long duration of insurgency, for example, in Italy, in the 1970s, the government was so much concerned with policing protest related to communist-led riots that it made the police to be more prepared for "communist-led riots" and less prepared to handle well-organized small group violence hence causing well-organized small group to seize the opportunity of police weakness and form insurgencies that prolonged (Porta 2008, 224).

Porta's argument concurs with the arguments made by his predecessors. According to Gary Marks and Doug MacAdam, in the article "Social movements and the changing structure of political opportunity in the European Community," social movements and revolutions, which result to insurgency, emerge and develop in response to changes that render institutionalized

political systems increasingly vulnerable or receptive to change (Marks and McAdam 1995, 2). Marks and MacAdam used Peter Eisinger 1973 argument that protests signifies changes in the political system by claiming that shifts in the structure and geographic locus of institutionalized power can be expected to be accompanied by simultaneous changes in the structure and locus of mass politics (Marks and McAdam 1995, 2). The formal and informal institutions that influence political opportunity structure as Porta argued are clearly explained by Marc Hooghe in the article "Ethnic Organisations and Social Movement Theory: The Political Opportunity Structure for Ethnic Mobilization in Flanders." Hooghe explains that the distinction between formal and informal characteristics of political structure are that the formal elements of opportunity structure, which are the formal rules and institutions while informal political opportunity structure are the informal interaction patterns between elites and outsiders that are developed as a result of the power struggle in a country's history (Hooghe 2005, 982: 978). David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg posit a similar argument to Hooghe's informal interaction argument when they claim in the article "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity" that informal interactions increase when states enable but do not satisfy challengers for, example insurgency group, hence prolonging the insurgency because when challengers are not satisfied they will continue to fight. Enabling challengers opens the political system which creates an opportunity for challengers like insurgencies while not enabling challengers will keep the political system closed hence no opportunity for social movements or even long duration insurgency to occur (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 1628).

Also, Hooghe argues that political opportunity structure explains how weak states experience social movement, for example, long duration of insurgency, because of the assumption that strong, centralized states allow fewer options for outside challengers than weak

states (Hooghe 2005, 982). As per Hooghe, a strong state will have strong institutions like strong military that will crash insurgencies, and strong economy that will ensure that there is enough resources to counter social movements or insurgency. Hooghe uses Consensus Democracy in Belgium as an example of informal institution that influenced the political opportunity structure in Belgium, before the 2006 general elections. Hooghe said that the Belgium political system has established a tradition of consultation with interest groups, lobbying and established mechanisms for joint decision-making hence consensus democracy provides a good opportunity structure for the development of a social movement, for example, insurgency, which might be prolonged if the same conditions for consensus democracy continue to exist (Hooghe 2005, 985). Another example of informal form of political opportunity structure is seen in Jeff Goodwin's, James M. Jasper's and Jaswinder Khattra's article "Caught in a winding, Snarling Vine: The structural Bias of political Process Theory." Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra argued that strategy and agency, which have to do with active choices and efforts of movement actors and other players in the conflict, are the other informal Political opportunity structures that create open or closed opportunities for actors, for example if mobilizing structures, and how the challengers frame the issue are effective, the pressure on the state is likely to open the political system, creating an opportunity for a social movement or even long duration of insurgency. But if mobilization structure and framing of the issue is not effective, the political system will be closed hence there will be no opportunity for a social movement or prolonged insurgency (Goodwin, Jeff, et al. 1999, 29). Hooghe also asserts that power configuration within the elites is an important element for political opportunity structure because of the assumption that if a challenger has allies within the power elites because of division within power elites, access will be granted for the challenger than if there is no division within power elites (Hooghe 2005, 985). Therefore, political systems

with division within elites is more open and will provide an opportunity for long duration insurgency but if a state has a political system with no divisions within power elites the political system will be closed for long duration of insurgency or even a social movement.

It is worth noting that no single argument of political opportunity structure that argues that certain elements of political opportunity structure explain the onset and survival of each social movement or every long duration insurgency. Thus, scholars of political opportunity structure have posited different arguments. In the article "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity," Davis S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff adopt McAdam's (1982) argument that demography, repression, migration, and political economy contributed to the climate that presented an opportunity for African Americans to organize collective action because racial justice was more readily received by government institutions, like when the Supreme Court held in the "Brown v. Board of education of Topeka" that segregation of blacks was unconstitutional in public schools (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 3). This example illustrates that as some government institutions agree with challengers, it opens the political system, creating an opportunity for social movements or even insurgencies but when all government institutions disagree with the challengers the political system closes for not just social movements but also insurgencies hence there will be no opportunity of either of them. Meyer uses similar but opposite argument in the article "Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political opportunity and End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement," in which he argues that the Nuclear Freeze Movement ended because the U.S. provided political opportunity structure that gave the Nuclear Freeze Movement members easy institutional access and venues for participation , which serves to fragment, coopt and dissipate dissident movements hence ending the Nuclear Freeze movement of the 1970s (Meyer 1993, 157). The argument is based on

assumption that more institutional and venues access for challengers gives challengers the alternative venues to present their grievances (closing opportunities for violent action) because challengers will not result to social movements or violent acts like prolonged insurgencies since they won't have the need for them. On the other hand, no access to institutions and no venues provided, will open opportunities for violent actions like insurgencies because challengers won't have access to present their grievances. In other words, as the political system closes (denial of access) the opportunity for challengers to organize and rebel against the govern presents itself.

Another argument that shows that each case is influenced by different elements of political opportunity structure is an argument made by Susan Welch and Donley T. Studlar in the article "The Opportunity Structure for Women's Candidacies and Electability in Britain and the United State." Welch and Studlar argue that political opportunity structures, such as, the type of electoral system, district magnitude, incumbency, party, and level of political office are significant for electability of a woman candidate in the U.S. They argue that open political systems with such structures will provide an opportunity for a woman candidate to be elected into office while states with closed political opportunity structure mentioned, will not elect a female candidate (Welch and Studlar 1996, 862). This argument is analogous to my argument that for a prolonged insurgency to occur the political opportunity structure of the state should be vulnerable, making the state weak, hence the state will be unable to crash an insurgency hence causing long duration insurgency.

Political opportunity structure theory is a popular theory that scholars have used to explain different cases of insurgency, for example, in a theoretical research, conducted by Seth G. Jones titled "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," political opportunity structure theory is used to explain the rise and duration of insurgency in Afghanistan (Jones 2008, 8). Through the

use of intellectual and logical arguments, and visits to Afghanistan during his study period, between 2002 to 2007, Seth's finding showed that the preconditions for the onset of Afghanistan insurgency and the conditions for the Insurgency continuation were structural, for example, the overthrow of the Taliban regime (regime change) led to the collapse of Afghanistan government, and because the new government supported by the U.S. and international community was unable to provide basic services to population like security because its security forces were weak. The weakness of the government security forces provided an opportunity for the Taliban, al-Qaida and other insurgency groups to carry on long duration of insurgency (Jones 2008, 8). Seth's conclusion informs my choice of political opportunity structure theory that I use to explain why in the period between 1995 to 2016, long duration insurgency existed, and helps to support my argument that weak States caused long duration insurgency during that period.

Even though I have chosen political opportunity structure as the theory in my research, numerous theories explain the duration of insurgency as witnessed from previous scholarly research. D. Scott Bennett, in the article, "Recruiting Your Way to Victory: Varying Strategies in Insurgent/Counterinsurgency Warfare," uses the theory of strategic interaction between insurgents and the government to explain the duration of insurgency through recruitment (Bennet 2008, 1). Bennett used agent-based simulation of insurgency government to model the interaction of civilians, insurgents, and soldiers. Bennet's experiment assumed that when government forces inflict collateral damage, it risks creating new insurgents, hence increasing the duration of an insurgency.

In resonance with Bennett's argument, Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter and Jacob N. Shapiro in the article, "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq" argued that the Counterinsurgency strategy of barbarism, where the

government indiscriminately attacked civilians, increased the duration of insurgency in Iraq because the population revolted against the government and joined the insurgency groups, while the strategy of winning hearts and minds, in which the U.S and Iraq government provided the Iraqi population with essential services, won the population to the government side hence depriving the insurgency groups recruits that they need for insurgency to survive (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011, 771). Bennett's experimental assumption and Berman, Eli, et al.'s argument support political opportunity structure theory because of a general research assumption that weak states will provide an opportunity for long duration insurgency because weak states are prone to indiscriminate violence because selective violence against individuals requires more robust institutions that can gather intelligence and target specific individuals. States with weak institutions will be unable to do this, and thus likely to take actions that will prolong insurgency. Also, Bennett found that recruitment by both insurgents and soldiers dominates military actions, and the strategic interactions theory is true only if the government soldiers are inefficient and inaccurate. In fact, Bennet's assumption that collateral damage risks creating new insurgency supports Urlacher's argument that barbarism (independent variable) causes an increase in duration of insurgency barbarism provides an opportunity for insurgencies to recruit rebelling civilians against the state (Johnson and Urlacher 2012, 3). The inefficient and inaccuracy of government soldiers that promote recruitment of insurgents support the political opportunity structure theory, that I am using to argue that weak States, which I use Security effectiveness as the indicator, provides the opportunity for the long duration of insurgency because of state security (soldiers) not being able to defeat insurgencies (Bennett 2008, 1).

Contrary to Bennett's strategic interaction assumption (hypothesis), which imply that the successful recruitment of insurgents is due to government forces inflicting collateral damage, Eli

Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter and Jacob N. Shapiro in the article, "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines" argue that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence (insurgency) (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011, 2). The argument is based on opportunity – cost theory where they take a logical argument to show a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against the government (insurgency attacks) by using case studies of Iraq, Philippines, and Afghanistan. Using Linear regression Berman, Eli, et al. showed that there was a positive correlation between unemployment and insurgency attacks against the government between the years study of 2008 to 2009 (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011, 2). The governments of Iraq, Philippines, and Afghanistan's inability to create employment opportunities created a political opportunity structure that provided the opportunity for long duration insurgency because the civilian population joined insurgents in exchange for pay for essential services hence increasing insurgent fighters causing long duration insurgency (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011, 771). Both Bennet's strategic interaction theory and Berman, Eli, et al.'s opportunity - cost theory are encompassed in the political opportunity structure and State theory (making political opportunity structure theory a superior theory), hence why I based my research on it.

As I have alluded earlier, when explaining the political opportunity theory, state weakness is related to the theory of political opportunity structure in that political systems in strong states will be generally closed and hence provide less opportunities for social movements like insurgency while weak states' political systems will be generally open hence providing an opportunity for onset and survival of social movements like prolonged insurgencies. The relationship between political opportunity structure can best understood by revisiting some of the scholarly arguments that I discussed earlier in my theory, for example, Hooghe argues that

political opportunity structure relates to weak states because strong states are centralized hence have less political opportunities or options for outside challengers than weak ones because in centralized states countermovement operations, for instance, Counterinsurgency campaigns, can be effectively coordinated (Hooghe 2005, 982). In fact, both Della porta and Hooghe agree that a division in power elites which mostly occurs during regime transitions periods, for example, competition for power in the former U.S.S.R satellite states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is an element of a weak states. And both Della Porta and Hooghe argue that elite division will open the political system, creating an opportunity for social movement or an insurgency while in a strong state there will be no elite divisions hence have closed political system with less or no opportunities for social movement or even prolonged insurgencies because the elites will work together to counter the movements or insurgencies (Porta 2008, 223, Hooghe 2005, 982:972). A more general argument that sums up the relationship between political opportunity structure and weak states is the arguments that I explained earlier by Gary Marks and Doug MacAdam, in which they said that social movements and revolutions, which result to insurgency, emerge and develop in response to changes that render institutionalized political systems increasingly vulnerable or receptive to change, and Peter Eisinger 1973 argument that protests signifies changes in the political system by claiming that shifts in the structure and geographic locus of institutionalized power can be expected to be accompanied by simultaneous changes in the structure and locus of mass politics (Marks and McAdam 1995, 2). A state with a change in institutionalized political system (for instance, regime change) and a shift in the power of the political structure are signs of unstable political systems, which according to Della Porta are signs of weak states (Porta 2008, 224). With these examples, and other examples discussed earlier, it is clear that there is a relationship between weak states and political opportunity theory.

As you already know, my claim is that state weakness caused long duration insurgency between the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1995 to 2016, but why do states cause long duration of insurgency? The answer to the question is based on political opportunity structure argument made by Meyer and Staggenborg when they said that interactions increase when states enable but do not satisfy challengers for, example insurgency group, hence prolonging the insurgency because when challengers are not satisfied they will continue to fight until their demands are met (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 1628). In other words, as I explained in examples discussed earlier, weak states will present an open political system that will create opportunities for long insurgencies because of the weakness in their political structure, for example a weak military will cause a weak state not able to crash insurgencies, and if the grievances of the insurgencies are not met, the insurgency will prolong provided the state military remains weak. As you will see when I explain my variables, there are numerous arguments based on political opportunity structure that explain why weak states cause long duration of insurgency. Another example of such argument is Hooghe's division of power elites, in a weak state, argument. Hooghe's argue that in weak states power elites are divided, which creates open political opportunity for long duration insurgency because elites will be divided to conduct Counterinsurgency campaigns hence prolonging insurgencies (Hooghe 2005, 982: 972). Hooghe's argument makes sense because when elites, for instance in state security, are divided there could be leakage of plans of Counterinsurgency operations, making insurgencies prepare for such operations hence prolonging the insurgency duration.

Last but not least, the article "More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields" by Jack A. Goldstone give reasons based on political opportunity structure to why a weak state might experience long duration of

insurgencies. The reasons that Goldstone claims to cause prolonged insurgencies in weak states are shifting political alignments which might make leaders support insurgencies hence giving insurgencies human resource that they need to survive, ineffective and illegitimate state repression forcing the population to rebel, which could lead to members of the public becoming insurgent fighters hence prolonging the duration of insurgency, among other reason (Goldstone 2004, 347). From the examples, I discussed and the ones that I will discuss when discussing weak states indicators that cause long duration of insurgency, it is obvious that weak states cause long duration of insurgency.

To show that political opportunities for long duration insurgency provided by weak states caused long duration insurgencies between the years of 1995 to 2016, I will use the insurgency data for that period that I get from State Fragility Index and Matrix dataset. According to "Global Report 2017 on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility" by Monti G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall, state fragility is an indicator for state weakness, hence I derive the following hypothesis:

1. State weakness caused long duration insurgency, all else being equal. High values of state weakness (high values of state fragility index) are coded to represent high level of state weakness and low values of state weakness (low values of state fragility index) are coded to represent strong or stable states. Therefore, state weakness has a direct and positive relationship to the duration of insurgency. State weakness is the independent variable and duration of insurgency is the dependent variable.

The control variables that I will be using are the mean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the mean population, for each country studied for the period, 1995 to 2016.

IV. Research Design

The code book, Global Report 2017 on Conflict, Governance, and state Fragility" by Monti G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall used to code State Fragility and Matrix dataset, defines state fragility, an indicator of state weakness, as the sum of state effectiveness score and state legitimacy score (Monti G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 51). The indicator, state effectiveness score is a sum of state political effectiveness score, state security effectiveness score, state social effectiveness score and state economic effectiveness score, while state legitimacy score is a sum of state political legitimacy score, state security legitimacy score, state social legitimacy score and state economic legitimacy score (Monti G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall, 2017, 51). If other indicators of state effectiveness score and state legitimacy score are constant, whose sum is the state fragility index (a measure of state weakness), any indicator of state effectiveness score or any indicator of state legitimacy score will directly affect state weakness and is a viable measure for state weakness, or else being equal, and will affect the duration of insurgency.

I determined that there is a multicollinearity between social effectiveness and economic effectiveness, therefore, either indicator can be predicted by the other. As a result, economic effectiveness was not included in my research. Also, the indicator for social legitimacy score, which in the State Fragility Index and Matrix dataset, infant mortality was used as its indicator was about individual motivations rather than the structure of political opportunities so social legitimacy score was precluded from my research leaving me with the following independent variable that can indicate state weakness: state political effectiveness score, state security effectiveness score, state social effectiveness score, state political legitimacy score, state security legitimacy score, and state economic legitimacy score.

Case selection

The changes in civil war incidences, as argued by Hegre, informed me to choose the start period of my research, to be the year 1995. There are other reasons that I factored, like the available data, but Hegre's civil war changes argument was the principal factor because as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, as argued by Gelman in the article, "From the Frying Pan into the Fire?", there were changes in political instability (civil wars), which resulted in changes in the duration of insurgency (Gelman 2008, 7). In addition to the start year of my research being within the period when the Soviet Union collapsed (1995 being close to 1991, when the Soviet Union is said to have collapsed), the data that I get from State Fragility Index and Matrix dataset, which I use to compile my dataset only goes back to the year 19995. I choose the year 2016 as the end of my study period because that was the most recent year with available data that I needed to compile my dataset.

Because the focus of my research is to show that weak states caused long duration of insurgency between the years of 1995 to 2016, I chose to use global terrorism dataset (GTD Dataset) to find the cases that I will use in my research, which are insurgency/guerilla attacks that happened between 1995 to 2016, in respective countries which are included in my study. There are 66 cases that are included in my study. For the sake of this research, I will use country, used in the GTD dataset, to be synonymous to state, which is the unit of measurement in the study because I am interested in showing how state weakness caused long duration of insurgency. Back to the choice of my cases, In the research, I only included cases with either an insurgency attack in a single year or the attacks had to happen in consecutive years. Cases happening in nonconsecutive years were omitted from my research because it was difficult to ascertain if the new attack is due to an insurgency onset or continuous insurgency. The omission of nonconsecutive attacks help avoid the mistake of coding the onset of a new insurgency as a

continuous insurgency, hence ensuring the accuracy of the research. Unfortunately, the omission of nonconsecutive insurgency attacks, because they did not occur in consecutive years has a risk of a surviving (continuous) insurgency not being included in the cases studied. Nevertheless, the problem is remedied by introduction of a dummy variable when coding the dependent variable because all insurgencies falling below 11.4 years, are coded as short duration insurgency. More explanation will be provided when discussing the coding of independent variable (Insurgency Duration). Also, cases like Colombia that had long duration insurgency that were continuing by the research start period of 1995 were omitted to avoid classifying them as short duration insurgencies if the insurgencies ended before reaching 11.4, counting from 1995, my start period, to 2016, my end period.

As mentioned earlier, I used State Fragility Index and matrix, time series data, 1995-2016 dataset, for indicators (independent variables) to show state weakness because according to the "Global Report 2017 on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility" by Monti G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall, state fragility, which measures state weakness is a result of the sum of state effectiveness score and state legitimacy score (Monti G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 51), but all else being equal, the individual indicators of state effectiveness score and state legitimacy score will be able to indicate state weakness. In other words, all else being equal, each of the individual independent variables of security effectiveness, security legitimacy, political effectiveness, political legitimacy, social effectiveness and economic legitimacy is an indicator of state weakness. All else being equal assumption is only true if there is no multicollinearity between variables, which I remedied by checking for multicollinearity and not including economic effectiveness as a variable because it was multicollinear with social

effectiveness. Because for multicollinear variables, one variable can be an indicator of the other, I included social effectiveness in my research and excluded economic effectiveness.

Measures

Dependent variable

Insurgency duration: When coding for insurgency duration, I added the total number of years of continuous (surviving) insurgency attacks in each state (country) between the period of 1995 to 2016. Since Patrick B. Johnson and Brian R. Urlacher in the article, "Explaining the duration of Counterinsurgency Campaigns" asserted that post – 1945 Counterinsurgency campaigns have increased to a mean of 11.4 years compared to a pre – 1945 mean of 5.2 years (Johnson and Urlacher, 2012, 2), using a dummy variable, I coded cases lasting 11.4 or more as Long Duration Insurgency and cases lasting less than 11.4 years as Short Duration Insurgency. This coding technique is important because it remedies the problem mentioned earlier of nonconsecutive insurgency cases being omitted from our study because even if included nonconsecutive insurgencies will be coded as Short Duration Insurgency hence no effect on the focus of the research, which is to show that weak States cause long duration of insurgency. The weakness of this coding method is that cases with a mean close to 11.4 years, say 10 years are still classified as Short Duration Insurgency even though such cases are closer to 11.4 years mean, which would have made them classified as long Duration Insurgency. Also, the technique still can suffer from omission of surviving insurgency cases where the insurgency did not carry out attacks in consecutive years. Nevertheless, this is the best coding technique available for this type of research.

Independent Variables

Security effectiveness score (seceff): In the research, I adopt the definition of security effectiveness as defined in the State Fragility Index and Matrix code book, which defines Security effectiveness as a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). Security effectiveness serves as a measure for state strength because it measures the capabilities of the state's security apparatus, for example, the capability of the state's military to crash insurgencies. States with high security effectiveness will have strong state security capabilities (for example, strong military) hence are classified as strong states, and states with low security effectiveness will have weak security capabilities (for example, weak military) hence are classified as weak states (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). High security effectiveness will deny (or close) the opportunity for long insurgency operations because of strong military will crash insurgencies while low security effectiveness in weak states will open opportunity for long duration insurgencies because the state's military is weak to crash insurgencies. Therefore, weak states will cause long insurgency duration.

When compiling my dataset, I used the mean security effectiveness for the years when a state had insurgency in a single year or continuous insurgency for the period of between 1995 to 2016 because it gives the average state security effectiveness for that period. As you can see from the excerpt of State Fragility index and Matrix code book in appendix 2, security effectiveness is coded into four categories; 0 is coded for a state with no security fragility (stable state), 1 for low security fragility, 2, for moderate security fragility and 3 for high security fragility (states with highest security weakness and are likely to have prolonged insurgency because state security weakness will provide an opportunity for the insurgency to prolong because security forces are weak conduct a successful Counterinsurgency campaign (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). No security fragility (0) means that state security is effective

and can crash insurgency, and as the security effectiveness index increases towards high fragility (3) (a high security weakness), a state becomes vulnerable to insurgency because weak state security forces are unable to crash insurgency hence insurgency duration is prolonged. The argument supports political opportunity structure which claims that an opportunity has to exist for political violence to occur, and security weakness is that opportunity in this case. Because as security effectiveness score increases from 0 to 3 or as state weakness increases, the expected outcome is a direct and positive relationship between security effectiveness score and duration of insurgency, in other words, a change of security effectiveness score from 0 (a state with stable security) to 3 (a state with weak security) increases the duration of insurgency (Appendix 2). For more coding and measurement information of Security effectiveness as utilized in the State Fragility and Matrix dataset see appendix 2.

Security Legitimacy score (secleg): In the State Fragility and Matrix code book, Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall define security legitimacy as a measure of state repression (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). Repression is an indicator of security legitimacy because to legitimize state security apparatus the governed have to consent to security forces' tactics and actions. If security forces repress the public it creates an opportunity for long duration insurgency because the public will withdraw their consent (and even join insurgency groups to fight security forces, and it prolongs insurgency) hence delegitimizing security forces, and if the public approve security forces' tactics and methods, mostly in ways that the governed are not repressed, the publics' approval is legitimization of security apparatus and the public can even join security forces to fight insurgencies which result to short insurgencies. Therefore, repression creates an opportunity for insurgents to get support of the public who might even recruit hence proving political opportunity structure that creates an opportunity for insurgency to survive and

in this case, the political opportunity is the security forces' repressions that causes the public to support insurgencies.

In other words, Security legitimacy serves as a measure for state strength because it measures the approval of state security apparatus by the public, which is important for sake of military recruitment, and stopping the public from joining the insurgencies. States with high security legitimacy will have strong public approval hence are classified as strong states, and states with low security legitimacy will have low public approval and are classified as weak states (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). High security legitimacy will deny (or close) the opportunity for long insurgency because the public will see state's security forces as legitimate and will join the state to fight rebels while low security legitimacy in weak states will open opportunity for long duration insurgencies because the public will not be agreeing with the state security forces actions and might decide to join insurgencies to fight state security forces. Therefore, weak states will cause long insurgency duration.

To code security legitimacy, I used the mean security legitimacy for the years when a State had insurgency in a single year or continuous insurgency, for the period of between 1995 to 2016. The mean security legitimacy gives the average security legitimacy for the period of insurgency coded. Just like, security effectiveness, the values 0 to 3 are used to code different categories of security legitimacy; 0 is coded as no repression, 1 is coded as low repression, 2 is coded as moderate repression and 3 is coded as high repression. The expected result is "no repression will cause short duration insurgency (if there is an onset) while high repression will cause long duration of insurgency." The expected outcome is a direct and positive relationship between security legitimacy score and duration of insurgency, in other words, a change of security legitimacy from 0 (no repression) to 3 (high repression) increases the duration of

insurgency. The expectation that repression (high values of security legitimacy) will prolong insurgency is based on previous research, for example, in the article by Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III titled " Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Counterinsurgency Wars," Lyall and Wilson III argue that during Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq (after the 2003 Iraq U.S. invasion), the U.S. and Iraq forces armored patrols sent a loud nonverbal messages of repression to Iraqis hence causing Iraqi people to resent (deny consent to) the U.S. and Iraq forces. As a result, the Iraqi people refused to give valuable information about insurgency groups to the U.S. and Iraq forces hence the resentment, due repression, created an opportunity for long duration of Counterinsurgency operation (insurgency) (Lyall and Wilson III 2009, 100). Refer to appendix 2 to see in detail how security legitimacy is calculated.

Political effectiveness score (Poleff): is used as defined in State Fragility and Matrix code book; which is a measure of regime or government stability (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). Political effectiveness serves as a measure for state's strength because it measures regime or government stability, for example, regime durability (the more durable the regime, the more stable is the government). States with high political effectiveness will have stable governments hence will be classified as strong states, and states with low political effectiveness will have unstable governments hence will be classified weak state (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). High political effectiveness will deny (or close) the opportunity for long insurgency because the institutions like the military and courts will be strong to withstand pressures from insurgencies while low political effectiveness in weak states will open opportunity for long duration insurgencies because institutions like military will be weak to withstand insurgencies' pressures hence unable to crash insurgencies. Therefore, weak states will cause long insurgency duration.

To calculate regime stability Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall used three indicators of leadership duration, Coup d'état and regime durability. A sum of these indicators is what Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall equate to government / regime stability or political effectiveness (Appendix 2). See appendix 2 for detailed explanation. In my data set, I utilize a mean of political effectiveness for my cases which are then coded in four categories of 0,1,2 and 3, corresponding to the coding in the State Fragility and Matrix dataset, where 0 political effectiveness represents highly stable governments/regime, 1 moderate stable government / regime, 2 less stable government / regime and 3 represents unstable government/regime. The expected outcome is a direct and positive relationship between government effectiveness and duration of insurgency, in other words, a change of political effectiveness from 0 (stable regime) to 3 (unstable regime) increases the duration of insurgency. My expectation that a politically unstable state will cause long duration of insurgency because unstable regime results weak state institutions like the military and courts that needed for political stability hence creating opportunity for long duration insurgencies because competing elites will want to use insurgencies for their gains. Political opportunity structure theory explanation of how unstable regimes provide opportunity for long duration insurgencies is illustrated by Gelman's research. In the article, "From the Frying Pan into the Fire?", Gelman argued that political instability due to competing elites, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, caused long duration of insurgency in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. (Gelman 2008, 7).

Political legitimacy score (Poleg): In the code book for State fragility index and matrix dataset, political legitimacy is defined as government/regime inclusion (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). Political legitimacy serves as a measure for state's strength because it measures government inclusion, for example, ability for everyone to run for office. States with

high political legitimacy will have inclusive governments hence will be classified as strong states, and states with low political legitimacy will have less government inclusion hence will be classified as weak state (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). High political legitimacy will deny (close) the opportunity for long insurgency because the public will feel represented in the government hence their views can influence government policies while low political effectiveness in weak states will open opportunity for long duration insurgencies because part of the public excluded will opt to insurgency to take power and tackle their issues because the current government is excluding them in policy making. Therefore, weak states will cause long insurgency duration.

In my research, I use the mean political legitimacy score, from State Fragility and Matrix dataset, for the years of a single or continuous insurgency within the 1995 to 2016 study period as my political legitimacy score for that period. Political legitimacy score is coded into four categories, high government/regime inclusion is as 0, moderate government inclusion is coded as 1, low government inclusion is coded as 2 and no government/regime inclusion is coded as 3. The relationship between political legitimacy and duration of insurgency is expected to be direct and positive relationship, where high government inclusion (0 coded political legitimacy) is expected to cause short duration of insurgency, while no government inclusion (coded as 3 political legitimacy) is expected to cause long duration of insurgency. The assumption that political exclusion motivates insurgency groups to continue fighting hence causing long duration of insurgency is based on the idea that political exclusion will deny the state the consent of the government, which could lead to radical violent resentment of the government because there are no opportunities for peaceful politics like mobilization, and may cause people to join insurgency groups to express their grievances, for example, an exclusive political systems provided

opportunity for radical opposition and violent escalation that led to long duration of insurgency in North Ireland in the 1960s (Porta 2008, 224). For detailed explanation of how political legitimacy is coded in the State fragility dataset see Appendix 2.

Social effectiveness score (Soceff): Is used as a measure of human capital development, which is defined as the component of education that contributes to an individual's labor productivity and earnings while being an important component of firm production (Son 2). Social effectiveness serves as a measure for state's strength because it measures ability of a state to create high paying employment, by educating the population, by using United Nations Human Development index. States with high social effectiveness have high paying jobs employment rates hence will be classified as strong states, and states with low social effectiveness will have low high paying jobs employment rates, due to low levels of education, hence will be classified as weak states (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). High social effectiveness will deny (or close) the opportunity for long insurgency because the public will have money to meet their needs while low social effectiveness in weak states will open opportunity for long duration insurgencies because part of the public might recruit in insurgency networks to earn enough wages to meet their need. Therefore, weak states will cause long insurgency duration.

The State fragility dataset uses human development index from UNDP as a measure of social effectiveness. Social effectiveness is coded into four categories as follows: high human capital development is coded as 0, 1 as moderate human development, 2 as low human development and 3 as very low human development. In my dataset, I used the mean social effectiveness of the periods of insurgency covered in the study. The choice of the variable social effectiveness score is informed by the article, "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines" in which Eli Berman, Michael Callen,

Joseph H. Felter and Jacob N. Shapiro argue that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence (insurgency) (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011, 2), I expect a direct and positive relationship between social effectiveness and duration of insurgency because when government is not able to create employment opportunities, because the government doesn't have enough education facilities necessary for good education needed for high paying jobs , it provides an opportunity for long duration insurgency because the civilian population will not get high paying jobs and to survive, civilians are likely to join insurgents, in return, they get pay for essential services. This increase of insurgent fighters causes long duration of insurgency (Berman, Eli, et al. 2011, 771). In other words, lack of education due to government failure to provide education institutions creates an opportunity for insurgencies to get recruits who can't meet their basic needs and is an illustration of political opportunity structure theory because government's failure to educate its citizens creates an opportunity for insurgencies to recruit. It is assumed that an increase in education will increase an individual's chance of getting a higher paying job hence an individual will have no motivation to join insurgency, since an individual will be able to cater for his or her essential needs. In other words, a high human development index will mean high human capital development (education increases as opportunity for one to get employed and get higher earnings than uneducated), coded as 0, and as human capital development decreases, or in other words, social effectiveness increases to 3, there will be a corresponding increase in the duration of insurgency. Hence my conclusion that there will be a direct and positive relationship between social effectiveness and duration of insurgency. For detailed explanation of how social effectiveness is coded in the State fragility dataset see Appendix 2.

Economic legitimacy score (Ecoleg): is share of Export Trade in Manufactured Goods, which is manufacturing as a percentage of merchandise exports. Merchandise exports include two classes of products: manufactured goods and primary commodities; low percentage of manufactured goods indicates a high reliance on primary commodities for foreign exchange (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 58). Economic legitimacy serves as a measure for state's strength because it measures the state's high export trade in manufactured goods compared to primary commodities. States with high economic legitimacy will depended more on export trade in manufactured goods, and won't suffer from looting that is common in economies depending on primary commodity hence will be classified as strong states and states with low economic legitimacy will depend on primary commodity for export hence will be classified as weak states (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017, 52). High economic legitimacy will deny (or close) the opportunity for long insurgency because the insurgence will not be able to loot resources that they need for a prolonged insurgency while states with low economic legitimacy will open opportunity for long duration insurgencies because insurgents will be able to loot hence acquiring the resources that they need to fight long duration insurgencies. Therefore, weak states will cause long insurgency duration.

States with a high export trade in manufactured goods compared to primary commodities are coded as 0 fragility, moderate manufactured goods compared to primary commodities is coded 1, low manufactured goods compared to primary commodities is coded as 2 and countries with less manufactured goods compared to primary commodities is coded as 3. See appendix 2 for more coding details. I use the mean of economic legitimacy from State Fragility and Matrix dataset for my cases. A 0-economic legitimacy indicates that a state's export trade depends more on manufactured goods than primary commodities while a 3 indicates that the State's export

trade depends more on primary commodities than manufactured goods. My expectation is a direct and positive relationship between economic legitimacy and duration of insurgency because insurgency groups in states that depend on primary commodities will survive longer than insurgencies in States that have a higher share of export trade in manufactured goods because economies with primary commodity export offer more opportunities to amass the resources necessary for rebellion (long duration insurgency), and this illustrates political opportunity structure theory which posits that an opportunity has to exist for a social movement or long duration insurgency. My expectation is informed by a research conducted by Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. In the article, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars." Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas showed that there was statistical significance (relationship) between States exporting oil, as a primary commodity, and high duration of political violence (insurgency) (Balcells, Laia et al. 2014, 14).

Control Variables

Gross domestic product (GDP): is a measure of the country 's economy. I am using GDP as one of my control variables because previous research as shown that there is a relationship between GDP and duration of insurgency. According to James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, in the article, "Ethinicity, Insurgency, and War", Collier and Hoeffler argued that up to appoint a high GDP, as a result of export of primary commodities, will motivate and provide rebels (insurgency) with an opportunity to support themselves through looting hence supporting political opportunity theory. They also asserted that beyond that point a high GDP will cause a short period of insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 87). Based on the States that had insurgency attacks during my period of my study, I will say that the majority of the States that experienced long duration of insurgency between 1995 to 2016 depended mostly on primary commodities,

and their GDP did not grow high, as shown by GDP (in billions), in my compiled dataset, which is the mean GDP, gotten from World Economic Outlook dataset on the IMF database (WEA dataset). Because the majority of the States depended on primary commodities, and their GDP was not so high during the period of study, I expect a direct and positive relationship between GDP and duration of insurgency. An increase in GDP will increase the duration of insurgency because insurgency groups will have the resources that they need to buy weapons, that they need to continue fighting.

Population: is the second control variable in my research. I chose population because previous research as shown that that an increase in population increases the available recruits for the insurgency groups, which they need to survive hence supporting my choice of political opportunity and structure theory because the opportunity accorded by increase of the state's population creates opportunity for insurgencies to get recruits. In the article "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars," Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas claimed that rebel groups in irregular wars prioritize practices of recruitment that avoid alienating the civilian population (Balcells et al. 2014, 4). Because recruits are an important resource that insurgencies need to survive, an increase in population gives insurgencies more available civilians for recruitment hence population has a direct and positive relationship with the duration of insurgency. The population in millions used in my dataset is the mean population for the period of insurgency, as gotten from the World population dataset contained in the World Bank database (WPP Dataset).

Methodology

I will be using Quantitative method of analysis because I will be analyzing 66 Countries (cases in my dataset) that had insurgency attacks. I intend to show the correlation between the 6

independent variables, 2 control variables and the dependent variable, discussed earlier. I will use Crosstabulations for my statistical analysis because I will be able to see the relationship and the statistical significance between independent variables and control variables, and dependent variable. I will begin my analysis by running SPSS and generating outputs of each of my independent variable and control variables against my dependent variable. Each independent variable and control variable will be run separately against my dependent variable. After each output is generated I will provide a twostep interpretation of the output, interpreting the actual values, and then the statistical significance (p), where $p < .05$ will be statistically significant while $.1 > p > .05$ will denote marginally significant. Values of $p > .1$ will mean that no significance between the respective independent and dependent variable. In other words, no relationship between independent variable tested and dependent variable (long duration of insurgency). After explaining the p value, I will use the + or – value of somers'd to interpret the direction and relationship of independent and dependent variable for cases that are significant. Finally, in my analysis, I will use previous research to explain the outputs of my research

V. Findings

i. Crosstabulationulation output of security effectiveness (seceff) (independent variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (a)

Insurgency Duration * seceff Crosstabulationulation

			seceff				
			0	1	2	3	Total
Insurgency Duration	Short duration insurgency	Count	27	8	20	4	59
		% within Insurgency Duration	45.8%	13.6%	33.9%	6.8%	100.0%
	Long duration insurgency	Count	0	0	3	4	7
		% within Insurgency Duration	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	27	8	23	8	66
		% within Insurgency Duration	40.9%	12.1%	34.8%	12.1%	100.0%

Figure (b)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	.330	.064	2.969	.003
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	.211	.069	2.969	.003
		seceff Dependent	.758	.091	2.969	.003

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Using the observed frequencies table Figure (a), during the period between 1995 to 2016, at 0 seceff there were 27 short duration insurgencies, while at 3 seceff long duration insurgencies increased to 4. This supports an assumption that states with strong security effectiveness, coded

as 0, will be able to crash insurgencies hence will not experience long duration of insurgency while states with weak security coded as 3, will experience long duration of insurgency. Also, Figure (b) shows that the relationship between security effectiveness score and duration of insurgency is statistically significant because the value of p is .003 which is less than 0.05, for statistical significance in social sciences, $p = .000, \leq .05$. Somers'd from Figure (b) is .211, which means there is statistically significant, moderate, positive relationship between duration of insurgency and security effectiveness score and since security effectiveness score is an indicator of state weakness, the relationship proves the hypothesis that state weakness caused long duration insurgency, all else being equal.

In fact, the results shown by Fifure (a) and Figure (b) that proves that a weak state, due to weak state security, will prolong insurgency is supported by an argument made by Seth Jones. In the article, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," Seth argued that insurgency in Afghanistan survived after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 because state and coalition security forces were weak and the weakness of the security forces provided an opportunity for the Taliban, al-Qaida and other insurgency groups to carry on long duration of insurgency (Jones 2008, 8).

ii. Crosstabulation output of security legitimacy (seceleg) (independent variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (c)

Insurgency Duration * secleg Crosstabulationulation

			secleg				
			0	1	2	3	Total
Insurgency Duration	Short duration insurgency	Count	6	18	24	11	59
		% within Insurgency Duration	10.2%	30.5%	40.7%	18.6%	100.0%
	Long duration insurgency	Count	0	0	5	2	7
		% within Insurgency Duration	0.0%	0.0%	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	6	18	29	13	66
		% within Insurgency Duration	9.1%	27.3%	43.9%	19.7%	100.0%

Figure (d)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	.169	.062	2.185	.029
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	.108	.049	2.185	.029
		secleg Dependent	.390	.129	2.185	.029

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

From the observed frequencies table Figure (c), for the period between 1995 to 2016, at 0 secleg there were 6 (10.2%) short duration insurgencies and 0 (0%) long duration insurgency, while at 3 secleg long duration insurgencies increased to 2 (28.6%). This supports an assumption that states with strong security legitimacy, coded as 0, will win the support of the civilian population hence denying insurgencies recruits that they need to survive, as a result such states will not experience long duration of insurgency while states with no/weak security legitimacy coded as 3, will experience long duration of insurgency because the civilian population resents the State security forces and might join insurgents or refuse to give valuable information needed for a successful

Counterinsurgency operation. Also, Figure (d) shows that the relationship between security legitimacy score (secleg) and duration of insurgency is statistically significant because the value of p is .029 which is less than 0.05, for statistical significance in social sciences, $p = .000, \leq .05$. Somers'd from Figure (d) is .108 which means that there is statistically significant, moderate, positive relationship between duration of insurgency and security legitimacy score and since security legitimacy score is an indicator of state weakness, the relationship proves the hypothesis that state weakness caused long duration insurgency, all else being equal.

Previous research also supports my finding that state weakness, due to weak / no security legitimacy causes long duration insurgency, for example, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III in the article " Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Counterinsurgency Wars", argued that during Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq (after the 2003 Iraq U.S. invasion), repression of Iraqis created an opportunity for prolonged insurgency because repression caused Iraqis to delegitimize (resent or deny consent to) the U.S. and Iraq forces and as a result, the Iraqi people refused to give valuable information about insurgency groups to the U.S. and Iraq forces (and some Iraqis joined insurgents in rebellion which provided insurgents with human resources that they needed to survive) hence, prolonging the duration of insurgency (Lyall and Wilson III 2009, 100).

iii. Crosstabulation output of political effectiveness (poleff) (independent variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (e)

Insurgency Duration * poleff Crosstabulationulation

			poleff				
			0	1	2	3	Total
Insurgency Duration	Short duration insurgency	Count	8	19	16	16	59
		% within Insurgency Duration	13.6%	32.2%	27.1%	27.1%	100.0%
	Long duration insurgency	Count	1	1	4	1	7
		% within Insurgency Duration	14.3%	14.3%	57.1%	14.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	20	20	17	66
		% within Insurgency Duration	13.6%	30.3%	30.3%	25.8%	100.0%

Figure (f)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	.012	.081	.147	.883
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	.008	.051	.147	.883
		poleff Dependent	.029	.198	.147	.883

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

From the observed frequencies table Figure (e), for the period between 1995 to 2016, at 0 political effectiveness score (poleff) there were 8 (13.6%) short duration insurgencies and 1 (14.3%) long duration insurgency. The presence of long duration insurgency at poleff equals to 0 (coded as a high political effectiveness, for instance, a stable regime with an opportunity for anyone to run for office), which is supposed not to experience long duration of insurgency shows that there is no relationship between political effectiveness score and duration of insurgency. Also, the finding shown at Figure (f) of p is .888 which is greater than 0.05 (for statistical significance in social sciences, $p = .000, \leq .05$), shows that there is no relationship between political effectiveness score and duration of insurgency.

iv. Crosstabulation output of political legitimacy (polleg) (independent variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (g)

Insurgency Duration * polleg Crosstabulationulation

			polleg				
			0	1	2	3	Total
Insurgency Duration	Short duration insurgency	Count	11	14	22	12	59
		% within Insurgency Duration	18.6%	23.7%	37.3%	20.3%	100.0%
	Long duration insurgency	Count	1	3	1	2	7
		% within Insurgency Duration	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%	28.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	17	23	14	66
		% within Insurgency Duration	19.0%	22.8%	35.4%	22.8%	100.0%

Figure (h)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	-.010	.096	-.104	.917
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	-.006	.060	-.104	.917
		polleg Dependent	-.024	.234	-.104	.917

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

From the observed frequencies table Figure (g), for the period between 1995 to 2016, at 0 political legitimacy score (polleg) there were 11 (18.6%) short duration insurgencies and 1 (14.3%) long duration insurgency. The presence of long duration insurgency at polleg equals to 0 (coded as high political legitimacy), for instance, a state with highest inclusion), which is supposed not to experience long duration of insurgency shows that there is no relationship between political legitimacy score and duration of insurgency. Also, the finding shown at Figure (h) of p is .917 is not statistically significant because p is greater than 0.05 (for statistical

significance, p = .000, ≤ .05), hence there is no relationship between political effectiveness score and duration of insurgency.

v. Crosstabulation output of social effectiveness (soceff) (independent variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (i)

Insurgency Duration * soceff Crosstabulationulation

			soceff				
			0	1	2	3	Total
Insurgency Duration	Short duration insurgency	Count	7	16	17	19	59
		% within Insurgency Duration	11.9%	27.1%	28.8%	32.2%	100.0%
	Long duration insurgency	Count	1	2	2	2	7
		% within Insurgency Duration	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%	28.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	8	18	19	21	66
		% within Insurgency Duration	12.1%	27.3%	28.8%	31.8%	100.0%

Figure (j)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	-.022	.092	-.239	.811
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	-.014	.058	-.239	.811
		soceff Dependent	-.053	.222	-.239	.811

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

From the observed frequencies table Figure (i), for the period between 1995 to 2016, at 0 social effectiveness score (soceff) there were 7 (11.9%) short duration insurgencies and 1 (14.3%) long duration insurgency. The presence of a long duration insurgency at soceff equals to 0 (coded as a state with high social effectiveness, for instance, a state with highest capital capital development), which is supposed not to experience long duration of insurgency shows that there

is no relationship between social effectiveness score and duration of insurgency. Also, the finding shown at Figure (j) of p is .811 is not statistically significant because p is greater than 0.05 (for statistical significance, p = .000, ≤ .05), hence there is no relationship between social effectiveness score and duration of insurgency.

vi. Crosstabulation output of economic legitimacy (ecoleg) (independent variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (k)

Insurgency Duration * ecoleg Crosstabulationulation

			ecoleg				
			0	1	2	3	Total
Insurgency Duration	Short duration insurgency	Count	20	4	13	22	59
		% within Insurgency Duration	33.9%	6.8%	22.0%	37.3%	100.0%
	Long duration insurgency	Count	2	0	1	4	7
		% within Insurgency Duration	28.6%	0.0%	14.3%	57.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	4	14	26	66
		% within Insurgency Duration	33.3%	6.1%	21.2%	39.4%	100.0%

Figure (l)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	.076	.097	.759	.448
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	.048	.064	.759	.448
		ecoleg Dependent	.174	.223	.759	.448

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

From the observed frequencies table Figure (k), for the period between 1995 to 2016, at 0 economic legitimacy score (ecoleg), there were 20 (33.9%) short duration insurgencies and 2 (28.6%) long duration insurgency. The presence of a long duration insurgency at ecoleg equals to

0 (coded as a state with high economic legitimacy, for instance, a state with no dependency on primary commodities), which is supposed not to experience long duration of insurgency, because rebels can't acquire resources the need to survive like in states depending on primary commodities export, shows that there is no relationship between economic legitimacy score and duration of insurgency. Also, the finding shown at Figure (l) of p is .448 is not statistically significant because p is greater than 0.05 (for statistical significance, p = .000, ≤ .05), hence there is no relationship between economic legitimacy score and duration of insurgency.

vii. Crosstabulation output of GDP in Billions (control variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (m)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	.176	.057	2.355	.019
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	.105	.045	2.355	.019
		GDP in Billions Dependent	.545	.155	2.355	.019

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Figure (m) shows that the relationship between GDP and duration of insurgency is statistically significant because the value of p is .019 which is less than 0.05, for statistical significance in social sciences, p = .000, ≤ .05. Somers'd from Figure (b) is .105 which means that there is statistically significant, moderate, positive relationship between duration of insurgency and GDP and results agree with previous research. In the article, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and War", Collier and Hoeffler argued that up to appoint a high GDP, as a result of export of primary commodities, will motivate and provide rebels (insurgency) with an opportunity to support themselves through

looting hence increasing the duration of insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 87). This proves political opportunity structure theory that requires an opportunity to exist for long insurgency.

viii. Crosstabulation output of population in Thousands (control variable) and Insurgency duration (dependent variable).

Figure (n)

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymptotic Standard Error[a]	Approximate T[b]	Approximate Significance
Ordinal by Ordinal	Somers' d	Symmetric	.181	.058	2.374	.018
		Insurgency Duration Dependent	.108	.045	2.374	.018
		Population in Thousands Dependent	.559	.157	2.374	.018

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Figure (n) shows that the relationship between Population and duration of insurgency is statistically significant because the value of p is .018 which is less than 0.05, for statistical significance in social sciences, p = .000, ≤ .05. Somers'd from Figure (b) is .108 which means that there is statistically significant, moderate, positive relationship between duration of insurgency and population and this result agrees with previous research. In the article "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars," Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas argued that recruits are an important resource that insurgencies need to survive, an increase in civilian population creates an opportunity for more recruitment (Balcells et al. 2014, 4) hence population has a direct and positive relationship with the duration of insurgency hence supports political opportunity structure which claims for a long insurgency to exist there has to be an opportunity allowing it to exist and in this case, is the increase in population which provides recruits for insurgencies.

VI. Conclusion

In an attempt to understand why we have prolonged insurgencies, in my research, I answered the question "why there was long duration insurgency between the years of 1995 to 2016? (years after the collapse of the Soviet Union). In order to answer the question, I claimed that weak states caused long duration insurgency during that period because I based my claim on political opportunity structure which posits that an opportunity that allows social movements (i.e. insurgency) hast to exist for it to occur. By using the indicators of state weakness, from state fragility dataset, as my independent variables, and applying quantitative method and crosstabulation, I proved my claim that state weakness caused long duration insurgency between the years 1995 to 2016 but the only state weakness indicators proven to cause prolonged insurgencies are security effectiveness score and security legitimacy score. As a result of this research my policy proposal is for states to focus resources into strengthening their security (security effectiveness) and states to seek their security approval (legitimacy) from the public. The control variable of GDP and population which both are statistically significant to duration of insurgency both have a positive and direct relation to duration of insurgency hence showing that my research is correct.

Finally, I recommend further research to find a way to code for surviving insurgencies that do not occur in consecutive years, which I omitted in my research for not knowing if they were surviving insurgencies or a new onset. Also, my research is based on state weakness indicators from state fragility dataset which disregards external support in Counterinsurgency operations. In further research, I recommend that a way of coding, in which both host state's strength and the external support are taken into account when coding for state weakness.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Compiled Dataset for analysis of State weakness causing long duration insurgency

#	Country	Start year of continous insurgency	End year of continous Insurgency	Continuous Insurgency	Insurgency Duration	seceff	poleff	polleg	ecoleg	soceff	socleg	GDP in Billions	Population in Thousands
1	Tajikistan	1995	1998	4	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	0.064	5893
2	Senegal	2011	2012	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	5187.510	13502
3	Russia	1995	2016	22	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	48134.750	144808
4	Georgia	1997	1999	3	0	1	2	2	0	1	0	5.732	4827
5	South Africa	1995	1996	2	0	2	2	2	0	1	2	1740.350	42493
6	India	1995	2016	22	1	3	0	1	0	2	2	64198.410	1149087
7	Algeria	1995	2016	22	1	2	2	3	3	1	1	5226.470	34065
8	Venezuela	1995	1997	3	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	40.294	22650
9	Iraq	2003	2016	14	1	3	3	3	3	2	1	136822.860	27814
10	Myanmar	2012	2012	1	0	3	2	3	3	2	2	45080.660	50987
11	Pakistan	2004	2008	5	0	2	2	2	0	2	2	7678.290	157152
12	El Salvador	1995	1995	1	0	2	0	1	1	2	1	6.479	5611
13	Angola	1998	2002	5	0	3	2	3	3	3	3	472.749	16490
14	Sierra Leone	2000	2000	1	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	2,944.34	4 564
15	Uganda	1995	1997	3	0	2	3	1	2	3	3	16095.210	21206
16	Jamaica	1995	1995	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	686.261	2537
17	Philippines	1999	2016	18	1	3	2	1	0	1	1	4907.430	86724
18	Bahrain	1995	1995	1	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	4.565	564
19	Indonesia	1995	2000	6	0	3	1	2	0	2	2	2025185.570	204216
20	Chad	2006	2006	1	0	2	3	2	3	3	3	0.648	10422
21	Papua New Guinea	1995	1996	1	0	1	1	2	3	2	2	12.134	4958
22	Iran	2008	2008	1	0	2	2	2	3	1	1	1,919,488.35	72846
23	Bangladesh	1995	1996	2	0	2	3	3	0	3	3	2757.720	19988
24	Saudi Arabia	1995	1996	2	0	0	1	3	3	1	1	1327.540	18934
25	Panama	1995	1995	1	0	0	3	1	2	1	1	10.651	2740
26	Jordan	2004	2004	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	6.824	5536
27	France	1995	1996	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1545.740	58371
28	Zaire	1995	1995	1	0	1	3	3	3	3	3	6,126.79	41596
29	Italy	1996	1997	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1440.280	57207
30	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996	1997	2	0	2	1	2	2	1	0	11.943	3766
31	Cambodia	1996	1996	1	0	3	3	1	0	2	2	10,431.46	10980
32	Nigeria	1996	1998	3	0	2	2	2	3	3	3	21766.630	113547
33	Sudan	2007	2008	2	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	93.942	32619
34	Germany	2011	2011	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,664.89	80934
35	Nicaragua	1996	1996	1	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	81.582	4701

36	Mexico	1996	1998	3	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	9034.420	95672
37	Greece	1996	1997	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	166.984	10835
38	Afghanistan	2002	2016	15	1	3	2	1	3	3	3	331.637	28276
39	Paraguay	1997	1997	1	0	0	2	1	2	1	1	16,267.28	4980
40	Yemen	1997	1998	2	0	0	2	2	3	3	3	214.310	16653
41	Albania	1997	1997	1	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	297.833	3093
42	Djibouti	1997	1997	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	3	65.209	661
43	Niger	2010	2011	2	0	0	3	1	3	3	3	2023.240	16745
44	Rwanda	1995	2016	22	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3247.730	9111
45	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2004	2005	1	0	2	3	2	3	3	3	5506.190	53893
46	Nepal	2001	2006	6	0	2	2	3	0	2	1	472.714	25095
47	Republic of the Congo	1999	1999	1	0	1	2	2	2	3	3	5,120.25	3136
48	Macedonia	2002	2003	2	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	278.322	2051
49	Namibia	1999	1999	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	3	26.21	1858
50	Uzbekistan	1999	1999	1	0	0	1	3	3	1	1	454.508	24490
51	Tunisia	2000	2001	2	0	0	3	2	0	1	1	33.382	9742
52	Kyrgyzstan	2000	2000	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	0	83.793	4921
53	Fiji	2000	2000	1	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	4.892	811
54	Kuwait	2002	2002	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	21.824	2144
55	Thailand	2004	2009	6	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	7259.630	65979
56	Mali	2007	2008	2	0	0	1	1	3	3	3	3296.540	13907
57	Ivory Coast	2014	2015	2	0	1	3	1	2	2	3	15324.050	22820
58	Ethiopia	2007	2008	2	0	2	1	2	3	3	3	333.316	82093
59	Eritrea	2007	2007	1	0	2	1	0	2	3	1	16.955	4153
60	Cameroon	2007	2007	1	0	0	2	3	3	2	2	8,454.89	18395
61	Japan	2015	2015	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	516,635.60	127975
62	Mauritania	2011	2011	1	0	0	3	2	3	2	2	710.047	3718
63	Central African Republic	2011	2014	4	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	718.851	4495
64	Kenya	2011	2012	2	0	1	1	0	1	2	2	3369.050	43067
65	Turkmenistan	2014	2014	1	0	0	1	1	3	1	1	88.758	5466
66	Haiti	1995	1995	1	0	0	3	1	0	3	3	11.603	7820

Condign key:

1. Country: Represents U.N. Recognized State

2. Start year of continuous insurgency: Represents when there was an insurgency/guerrilla attach each consecutive year. No year between without attack.

3. End year of continuous Insurgency: Represents when continuous insurgency, explained earlier, ended or if it didn't end, the year 2016 when data set was complied.

4. Continuous insurgency: Is the total number years of continuous insurgency, excluding cases without attack, in between, as discussed earlier.

5. Insurgency duration: is a dummy variable coded, in which 0 is coded to represent number of years of continuous insurgency less than 11.4 while 1 represents number of continuous insurgency that equal to 11.4 years or more.

6. seceff is the mean security effectiveness score for the years of continuous insurgency as gotten from State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016 dataset compiled by Center for Systemic Peace.

7. poleff: is the mean political effectiveness score for the years of continuous insergency as gotten from State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016 dataset compiled by Center for Systemic Peace.

8. polleg: is the mean political legitimacy score for the years of continuous insergency as gotten from State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016 dataset compiled by Center for Systemic Peace.

9. ecoleg: is the mean economic legitimacy score for the years of continuous insergency as gotten from State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016 dataset compiled by Center for Systemic Peace.

10. Soceff: is the mean social effectiveness score for the years of continuous insergency as gotten from State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016 dataset compiled by Center for Systemic Peace.

11. Socleg: Is the mean social legitimacy score for the years of continuous insurgency as gotten from State Fragility Index and Matrix, Time-Series Data, 1995-2016 dataset compiled by Center for Systemic Peace.

12. GDP Variable is taken from World Bank dataset and is the mean GDP between 1995 to 2016 for each country.

13. Population varible is the mean population for that country between 1995 to 2016 taken from IMF dataset.

Case selection:

1.The period of insurgency between 1995 and 2016 was selected because of the fall of the Soviet Union, said to be in the year 1991, and available data. No State fragility data and GDP data was available before 1995.

2. Cases like Colombia that had long duration insurgency that were continuing by the start period of 1995 were omitted to avoid classifying them as short duration insurgencies if the insurgencies ended before reaching 11.4, counting from 1995, my start period.

Appendix 2: Explanation of variables used in State Fragility Index and Matrix Dataset

TECHNICAL NOTES TO THE STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2015:
The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2016 lists all independent countries in the world in which the total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2016 (167 countries). The Fragility Matrix scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2016. Each of the Matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 "no fragility," 1 "low fragility," 2 "medium fragility," and 3 "high fragility" with the exception of the Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale (including 4 "extreme fragility"). The State Fragility Index, then, combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 "no fragility" to 25 "extreme fragility."

A country's fragility is closely associated with its *state capacity* to manage conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver essential services, and its *systemic resilience* in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life, responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development.

Fragility Indices

State Fragility Index = Effectiveness Score + Legitimacy Score (25 points possible)
Effectiveness Score = Security Effectiveness + Political Effectiveness + Economic Effectiveness + Social Effectiveness (13 points possible)
Legitimacy Score = Security Legitimacy + Political Legitimacy + Economic Legitimacy + Social Legitimacy (12 points possible)

General Notes: The State Fragility Index and Matrix was originally introduced in "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007." In order to standardize procedures for scoring each of the eight component indicators to make the indicators and indices comparable across time, we set threshold values for the categorical fragility scores based on cut-points derived from values in a baseline year (2004). This methodology effects continuous measures used for Economic Effectiveness (GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars); Economic Legitimacy (manufacturing exports as a percent of merchandise exports); Social Effectiveness (human development indicator; HDI); and Social Legitimacy (infant mortality rate); baseline specifications are provided in the relevant indicator explanations that follow. Social Effectiveness scores were revised slightly due to a change in the formulation of the Human Development Index by the UNDP *Human Development Report* in 2010. The Economic Effectiveness indicator was rescaled in 2010 and a fifth value was added to denote "extreme fragility" in countries that have a GDP per capita of $500 or less (constant 2005 US$). As the World Bank regularly revises historical, country-level GDP and periodically adjusts "constant" GDP figures to a new base year, we recode the entire time series of the Economic Effectiveness indicator annually using the most recent GDP figures provided by the World Bank; this may result in some changes to historical indicators and indices in the time-series data set. In addition, a fourth indicator was added in 2008 to the calculation of the Political Legitimacy Score (scores for all previous years have been recalculated; state fragility scores have been calculated for all countries annually beginning with 1995). As several of the Matrix indicators

use "most recent year available" data, the Matrix scores are carried forward and adjusted when new data becomes available; see details below.

Security Indicators

Security Effectiveness ("seceff") Score: Total Residual War, a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence, 1992-2016 (25 years). Source: Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2016, (www.systemicpeace.org), variable name "actotal." The formula to calculate this score is based on two assumptions: (1) the residual effects of low level and/or short wars diminish relatively quickly; and (2) the residual effects of serious or protracted wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period. Three indicators are used to calculate each country's "residual war" score (*reswartot)*: *warsum1-4* (sum of annual scores for all wars in which the country is directly involved for each continuous period of armed conflict); *yrnowar1-3* (interim years of "no war" between periods of armed conflict); and *yrpeace* (years of peace, or no war, since the end of most recent war period). For states with one war episode: *reswartot* = *warsum* – [*yrpeace* + (0.04*yrpeace* x *warsum*)]. For countries with multiple periods of war, a *reswar* value is calculated for each, in chronological order. Thus, for a state with two episodes of war, to calculate the first episode: *reswar1* = *warsum1* – [*yrnowar1* + (0.04*yrnowar1* x *warsum1*)]; and for the second episode: *reswartot* = *(reswar1* + *warsum2)* – {*yrpeace* + [.04*yrpeace* x (*reswar1* + *warsum1*)]}; and so on. Any negative residual war (*reswar*) scores are converted to zero before calculating additional residual war scores. The final *reswartot* value is then converted to a four-point fragility scale, where: 0 = 0; 1 = 0.1-15; 2 = 15.1-100; and 3 = greater than 100.

Security Legitimacy ("secleg") Score: State Repression, a measure of state repression, 2002-2015. Source: Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale (PTS; www.politicalterrorscale.org). The PTS provides separate annual indicators drawn from U.S. State Department and Amnesty International reports; each indicator is coded on a five-point scale, from 1: "no repression" to 5: "systemic, collective repression." To determine the state repression score, we calculate the following: (1) nine-year average, 2002-2010; (2) four-year average, 2011-2014; and (3) most recent value, 2015; the three, mean indicators are then compared according to a fragility categorization: 0 = 1.0-2.0; 1 = 2.1-3.0; 2 = 3.1-4.0; and 3 = greater than 4.0. If the most recent year value agrees with the previous four-year average, then these two means are used to identify the repression category. When the most recent year score is not in agreement with the previous period, then the earlier nine-year mean is used to help determine a more general pattern in state repression. Historical treatments, that is, calculations of Security Legitimacy Scores for previous years, are further aided by reference to patterns in "future" PTS values. The exact year of change in the general practice of state repression and, so, the Security Legitimacy Score can be more confidently identified in the historical treatment.

Referent Indicator: The *Armed Conflict Indicator* provides a general indicator of the country's most recent experience with major armed conflict, including wars of independence, communal wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and inter-state wars. Referent indicators are not used in the calculation of state fragility scores. Source: Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2016, Center for Systemic Peace. A dark shaded "**War**" entry indicates a country is actively involved in a major armed conflict(s) in mid-2017; a medium shaded "**X**" indicates that the country has emerged from major armed conflict(s) in the past five years (since early 2012); and a light shaded "*****" indicates that the country has been directly involved in one or more major

armed conflicts sometime during the previous twenty year period (1992-2011) but has not experienced a major armed conflict since, that is, for at least the past five years.

Political Indicators

Political Effectiveness ("poleff") Score: Regime/Governance Stability, 2001-2016. Sources: Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity V Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016; Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Leadership Duration (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, Coups d'Etat, 1946-2016, datasets (www.systemicpeace.org). Three indicators are used to calculate the Regime/Governance Stability score: Regime Durability (Polity V, 2016); Current Leader's Year's in Office (Leadership Duration, 2016); and Total Number of Coup Events 2001-2016, including successful, attempted, plotted, alleged coups and forced resignations or assassinations of chief executives, but not including coup events associated with Polity adverse regime changes (these major regime changes cause the "durability" score to be reset to "0" and, so, would be double-counted, see above). These indicators are scored such that: Durability < 10 years = 1; Leader Years in Office > 12 years = 1; and Total Coup Events: 1-2 = 1 and >2 = 2. These indicators are then added to produce the Regime/Governance Stability score (scores of 4 are recoded as 3). Note: Countries coded in the Polity V dataset as an "interregnum" (i.e., total or near total collapse of central authority, −77) for the current year are scored 3 on the Political Effectiveness indicator.

Political Legitimacy ("polleg") Score: Regime/Governance Inclusion, 2016. Sources: Polity V, 2016; Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Victor Asal, Minorities at Risk Discrimination 2016 (updated by Monty G. Marshall); and Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Elite Leadership Characteristics 2016 (updated by Monty G.

Marshall). In the 2007 report, four indicators were used to determine the Regime/Governance Inclusion score: Factionalism (Polity V, *parcomp* value 3 = 1); Ethnic Group Political Discrimination against 5% or more of the population (Discrimination: *POLDIS* values 2, 3, 4 = 1); Political Salience of Elite Ethnicity (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELETH* values 1 or 2 = 1); and Polity Fragmentation (Polity V, *fragment* value greater than 0 = 1). To these indicators, we have added Exclusionary Ideology of Ruling Elite (Elite Leadership Characteristics: *ELITI* value 1 = 1). Political Legitimacy Score is calculated by adding these five indicators; scores of 4 or 5 (rare) are recoded as 3. Note: Countries coded in the Polity V dataset as an "interregnum" (i.e., total or near total collapse of central authority, −77) for the current year are scored 3 on the Political Effectiveness indicator.

Referent Indicator: The *Regime Type* column provides a general indicator of the country's regime type on 31 December 2016 based on the "polity" score recorded in the Polity V data series. An upper case "**AUT**" indicates the country is governed by an institutionalized autocratic regime (POLITY -6 to -10); a lower case "**aut**" indicates that the country is governed by an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," autocratic regime (POLITY -5 to 0). An upper case "**DEM**" indicates an institutionalized democracy (POLITY 6 to 10) and a lower case "**dem**" indicates an uninstitutionalized, or "weak," democratic regime (POLITY 1 to 5). Countries listed with a "**SF**" (state failure) are experiencing a "collapse of central authority" such that the regime has lost control of more than half of its territory through some combination of human and natural factors, usually due to serious armed challenges, poor performance, and diminished administrative capacity (Haiti, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen); those denoted with dash "**—**" indicates that the central government is propped up by the presence of foreign forces and authorities that provide crucial security support for the local regime and, without which, central authority would be susceptible to collapse (Bosnia). Countries with transitional governments at the end of 2016 (Myanmar) are classified as either weak democracies (dem) or weak autocracies (aut) according to the transitional regime's authority characteristics. As the Polity V indicator of "polar factionalism" has proven to be a very potent indicator of political instability, regimes that are denoted as factional (i.e., PARCOMP=3) are shaded; in addition, transitional (POLITY score -88), failed (POLITY score -77), and occupied (POLITY score -66) are also considered unstable and, so, are shaded for emphasis on this referent indicator.

Economic Indicators

Economic Effectiveness ("ecoeff") Score: Gross Domestic Product per Capita (constant 2005 US$), 2010-2016. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2016 (www.worldbank.org/data). The annual values for the past seven years are reviewed to verify that the value in the most recent year is consistent with values in previous years and that a threshold/category change in a country's GDP per capita indicator score is part of a consistent trend and not simply a short-term aberration from that trend. The value for the most recent year (2016) is coded into a five-point fragility scale, based on cut-points derived from the threshold values for the fit of the State Fragility Index and GDP per capita in a baseline year (2005). The standardized categories are as follows: 4 = less than $500.00; 3 = $500.00 to $1199.99; 2 = $1200.00 to $2999.99; 1 = $3000.00 to $7499.99; and 0 = greater than or equal to $7500. When a country's 2016 value exceeds the borderline value separating categories, the fifteen-year income growth indicator is used to assign the final score: selecting the higher fragility category if long-term growth is negative or the lower fragility category if long-term growth is positive. **Note:** These cutpoint values and the baseline year are consistent with the 2014 SFI, but differ from earlier versions of the Global Report due to revisions made by the World Bank in contemporary and historical data with the 2014 version of the data series. 2016 data has been published by the World Bank using 2010 as a baseline year; the real GDP data has been adjusted to 2005 US$ for comparability with earlier iterations of the SFI. An update to 2010 US$ is forthcoming.

Economic Legitimacy ("ecoleg") Score: Share of Export Trade in Manufactured Goods, 2002-2016. Source: UN Development Programme, Structure of Trade, 2016, and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI),

2016, (manufacturing as a percentage of merchandise exports). Merchandise exports include two classes of products: manufactured goods and primary commodities; low percentage of manufactured goods indicates a high reliance on primary commodities for foreign exchange. The annual values of this variable are examined to ensure that the most recent annual value is a representative value within the established range for that country. The manufacturing percentage of merchandise exports is then converted to a four-point fragility score, where: 3 = less than or equal to 10; 2 = greater than 10 and less than or equal to 25; 1 = greater than 25 and less than or equal to 40; and 0 = greater than 40. The world's main illicit drug producing/supplying countries: Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), and Colombia are given the highest value (3) on this indicator.
Referent Indicator: The *Net Oil Production or Consumption* indicator provides information on a country's 2016 petroleum energy profile expressed in net "barrels per capita" as reported by the US Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov). The indicator value is calculated by subtracting the country's reported total daily consumption figure from its total daily production figure (in thousands of barrels), multiplying the result by 365 (to get an annual figure), and dividing by the country's total population (in thousands). A dark-shaded numerical value (e.g., Qatar's **261**) indicates a net petroleum producer expressed in barrels per capita. A single plus sign "**+**" indicates a minor net petroleum consuming country (1-5); a double plus sign "**++**"

indicates a moderate net petroleum consuming country (5-10 barrels per capita) and an "**X**" indicates a major net consuming country (greater than 10 barrels per capita). Blank cells indicate country's with low petroleum profiles (less than one barrel per capita producer or consumer). Disaggregated data for North and South Sudan were not available (na). Taken together, these countries are a minor net producer (1.2 barrels per capita).
Social Indicators
Social Effectiveness ("soceff") Score: Human Capital Development, 2016. Source: UNDP *Human Development Report 2016*, Human Development Index (HDI), 2016 (www.undp.org). Reported HDI values are converted according to a four-point fragility scale based on the cut-points of the lower three HDI quintiles in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Effectiveness Score is assigned as follows: 3 = less than or equal to .400; 2 = greater than .400 and less than or equal to .600; 1 = greater than .600 and less than or equal to .700; and 0 = greater than .700. **Note:** These cutpoints differ from those reported in the 2007 - 2009 editions of *Global Report*. This is due to a change in the formulation of the Human Development Index reported in the UNDP *Human Development Report* beginning in 2010. The new UNDP report provides scores for earlier years and orders countries similarly across the two (old and new) formulations of the HDI; thus the two indices could be combined to provide consistent coverage annually for the entire period, 1995-2015.
Social Legitimacy ("socleg") Score: Human Capital Care, 2016. Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2015, (IDB; www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb), Infant Mortality Rate, 2016. This indicator is based on the infant mortality rate (number of deaths of infants under one year of age from a cohort of 1,000 live births), with values converted to a four-point fragility scale based on the upper cut-points of the lower three quintiles of the infant mortality rates in the baseline year, 2004. The Social Legitimacy Score is assigned as follows: 3 = greater than 75.00; 2 = less than or equal to 75.00 and greater than 45.00; 1 = less than or equal to 45.00 and greater than 20.00; and 0 = less than or equal to 20.00. These scores are then adjusted according to ranking comparisons between the country's income level (GDP per capita) and human capital development (HDI). If the country's HDI ranking among the 167 countries listed is more than twenty-five places above its GDP per capita ranking (meaning it provides better human capital care than expected by its level of income) the Social Legitimacy Score (fragility) is lowered by one point. If HDI ranking is more than twenty-five places below GDP per capita ranking, the fragility score is increased by one point.
Referent Indicator: The *Regional Effects* indicator provides information to identify two important "neighborhood" clusters of countries: dark-shaded "**Mus**" indicates a country that is characterized by a Muslim majority (countries mainly located in northern Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia) and unshaded "**Afr**" indicates a country located in non-Muslim (sub-Saharan) Africa.