

Heterotopiamania:
Spaces of Crisis Heterotopia, Non-Normativity, and Counter-Surveillance

by

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Abstract

In Michel Foucault's essay *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias*, Foucault makes a distinction between "crisis heterotopias"¹— those "privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis,"² and "heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed"³. Subjects of both heterotopias belong 'elsewhere,' with the subjects within 'heterotopias of deviation' being a space of non-normativity to be kept at bay, confined, from the so called 'normative' society. It is deviant heterotopias that Foucault says constitute modern life, with those of crisis becoming less prevalent within a surveillance state that actively works to confine, rather than appraise and privilege, non-normativity. Where are these spaces of deviant Heterotopia in our modern society? And what role do they play for non-normative subjects: are they places of confinement, or solace? Furthermore, where have 'crisis heterotopias' gone, and by what instruments of power have they disappeared? In this piece, I will first offer a genealogy of how 'crisis heterotopias' have disappeared: for what reasons, by what instruments of power, and through what material institutions? This analysis will provide insight into what space 'deviant heterotopias' take in our modern society, and how they are places of both confinement and oppression. I will do this through an engagement with the work of Max Weber— particulate his

¹ Michel Foucault, *Of Other Spaces: Utopia's and Hetertopia's* (NYC, Routledge, 2003), 6-7

² Foucault, *Of Other Spaces*, 6-7

³ *Ibid.*, 6-7

diagnosis of both the Protestant work ethic, its relation to the formation of capitalism, and the iron cage of modernity.

In the second third of my project, I will contextualize Foucault's account of deviant and crisis heterotopias within a broader range of critical theory. I will draw comparisons between Foucault's appraisal of a 'crisis heteotopia' and Nancy Frasier's account of a "Subaltern counter-public"⁴— both comparing and expanding upon Foucault's notion of heterotopia. In comparing the two, I will gage the strengths and weaknesses of each account. Doing this will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the spaces non-normative subjects inhabit.

Lastly, I will gage why 'crisis heterotopias' and counter-publics are particularly suited to subverting, and escaping from, normativity.

1.0. Introduction

Michel Foucault, in the recently published *The History of Madness*, gives us a genealogy of reason that goes back to antiquity. It is the Greek notion of reason that considered unreason as constitutive of reason— the very notion that was carried forth until a major break in our understanding of reason. It is Descartes *cogito* that gives us an appraisal of certainty, and a critique of unreason— with unreason as the image of the evil demon, fooling our senses, giving us imperative to deduce to certainty. The Age of Enlightenment carried forth this notion of unreason as distinct from reason, and used madness as the weapon that showed reason as antithetical to unreason. Simply, the unreasonable became the mad, and certainly madness must be confined in order to preserve the sanctity of reason and its virtues.

⁴ Nancy Frasier, *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy* (Social Text, 56)

Critiques have been made *ad nauseam* about Foucault's projects as lacking normative grounds. These claims simply miss the point of the genealogical method. If there is an imperative for why we should use the genealogical method, it is to give certain normatively constructed groups— here, the mad— a space to speak for themselves distinct from the normative notions that they've been constructed in terms of. As Foucault notes, the confinement of the mad is akin to a swift “gesture,”⁵ one that is for the sake of perpetuating “economic usefulness, bourgeoisie normativity, and [sociality]”⁶. It is this “gesture”⁷ of confinement, informed by Descartes move from unreason as constitutive of reason, to unreason as antithetical to reason, that hides the mad's capacity to speak. But, if it is only through genealogy that we can give the mad a space to speak for themselves, does this not seem to exclude those very not philosophers, non-genealogists, who certainly would otherwise want to give the mad a place, a capacity, to speak for themselves? Where in our modern society can the mad speak for themselves? And by what means?

The same year (1967) the abridged version of *The History of Madness* was published, Foucault published an essay entitled *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias*. Here, we get a sense of by what means, in what spaces distinct from the surveillance of normativity, the mad can speak for themselves. Foucault describes two sorts of heterotopias, the first being a ‘crisis heterotopia,’ and the second being a ‘deviant heterotopia’. Crisis heterotopias are “privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the

⁵ Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 44

⁶ Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 46

⁷ Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 44

human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis”⁸. These heterotopia’s are “persistently disappearing”⁹ in our modern society. A “sacred”¹⁰ place where one can go to engage in non-normative behavior— sex, queerness, unreason— has become an empty space. Though Foucault notes that these crisis heterotopia’s existed in primarily “primitive societies,”¹¹ we still see examples of crisis heterotopias moving into the mid twentieth century: “a tradition called the ‘honeymoon trip’ ... [where] the young woman’s deflowering could take place ‘nowhere’ ... [but] this heterotopia without geographical markers”¹².

The disappearance of crisis heterotopias seems to coincide with the rise of “heterotopias of deviation: those [spaces] in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed”¹³. Deviant heterotopias are not those “sacred”¹⁴ spaces where one can engage in non-normativity as long as they come back to the normative, moved certainly, but unchanged and still normative nonetheless. They are, merely, a place of confinement. A place where the non-normative is looked at as deviant, and as needing to be separated from the “mean or norm,”¹⁵ or normativity, of modern society. Here, we see the location of the mad: the

⁸ Ibid., 6-7

⁹ Ibid., 6-7

¹⁰ Ibid., 6-7

¹¹ Here, he seems to be borrowing from Claude Levi-Strauss’s notion of the ‘primitive’. While I think Foucault is exempt from criticism directed at Strauss for his fetishizing of the primitive, I do think that Foucault has more than enough historical means and wherewithal to, perhaps, subvert the very normative notions of ‘primitive’ as referring to Other’s— a normative notion that persists as problematic today.

¹² Ibid., 10

¹³ Ibid., 6-7

¹⁴ Ibid., 6-7

¹⁵ Ibid., 6

“great confinement”¹⁶ via the confinement houses of the 18th century in France. The confinement houses described in *The History of Madness* are an example of a deviant heterotopia: a place to keep the non-normative, those seemingly antithetical to reason, at-bay, hidden from normative society. How have these deviant heterotopias— now not the confinement houses, but something else— change as it carried forth into modern society? How have deviant heterotopias become a place of solace for the non-normative? A place of comfort and expression distinct from the constant surveillance of normativity? *How* are these deviant heterotopias a place of solace from the constant surveillance of normativity?

In this essay, I will work to address all of the previously raised questions. First, the question still remains, *where did crisis heterotopias go? And by what instruments of power?* By showing how these crisis heterotopias have gone, and for what reasons, I will consequently show the role deviant heterotopias have taken in replacing crisis heterotopias. Simply, showing the how and why crisis heterotopias have disappeared, and been replaced by deviant ones, will show *why* power would prefer deviant heterotopias, rather than crisis ones, in our modern society.

Second, I will further explore the role of deviant heterotopias in our society today. I will show deviant heterotopias as spaces within the otherwise normative systems of institutions that are the carceral institution, and the psychiatric institution. Through this exploration, I will show these ‘deviant’ spaces within these institutions as formed for the sake for confinement, still in some ways servicing the role of confining today, but which have become nevertheless have necessitated the formation of ‘counter-spaces’ where non-normative subjects may exist distinct from the normative.

¹⁶Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 44

2.0. Where Have Crisis Heterotopias Gone? And why?

*These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private space and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred*¹⁷

In our modern society, there still exists the “private space and public space...family space and social space... cultural space and useful space... space of leisure and that of work,”¹⁸ all supposedly “nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred”¹⁹. But, the sacred as visible, as a *crisis heterotopia*, has gone in our society. Where has it gone, certainly is an important question; why and how it has gone even more so. In order to address those questions, we must understand how the role of the sacred has changed. It has not become sublimated with the disappearance of crisis heterotopias because, as Foucault notes, it was always a “hidden presence”²⁰. We must ask, if we cannot bear to see as visible sacred spaces of non-normativity, what is our directness towards the “hidden presence of the sacred”²¹ look like? In a society that has turned non-normativity from a space to be inhabited outside of the normative, yet still as a place of inhabitation nonetheless, to a space of deviancy, we have further hidden an already “hidden prescience of the sacred”²². Why have we done this? What has the sacred been replaced with?

¹⁷ Ibid., 6-7

¹⁸ Ibid., 6-7

¹⁹ Ibid., 6-7

²⁰ Ibid., 6-7

²¹ Ibid., 6-7

²² Ibid., 6-7

Max Weber's *Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* is a momentous account of the birth of modern capitalism, as well as the sorts of temperaments birthed under capitalism that, consequently, further perpetuate capitalism. Weber describes the spirit of capitalism as the "man... dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life". For Weber, it is the Protestant work ethic that is the very sort of temperament held by subjects under capitalism that leads to a notion that "acquisition [is] the ultimate purpose of life"²³. Weber gives an analysis of the "calling,"²⁴ a Protestant notion that holds "the highest form of moral obligation of the individual is to fulfill his duty in worldly affairs"²⁵. It is the universal normative demands of the "calling" that lead to the formation and perpetuation of capitalism—the subject who embodies Protestant work ethic, and whose ultimate purpose is economic gain.

Certainly, it is the Reformation for Weber that led to the rise of the Protestant work ethic, and consequently capitalism. The decline of the Church led to a "relaxation of traditional moralities,"²⁶ which led to a consequent decline of substantial values, and a subsequent rise of instrumental ones. It is the image of the church that represents something once sacred—a universal code of morality and meaning to abide by—that has not become lost and filled with ambivalence. Around this same time of Weber's analysis of the formation of capitalism, and the full decline of the role of the Church as moral arbitrator, we see the last of the sort of 'crisis heterotopias': "the boarding school...military service for young men...the tradition of the

²³ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

²⁴ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

²⁵ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

²⁶ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

honeymoon, or ‘voyage de nocces’ as it is called in French”²⁷. Foucault locates the last of these crisis heterotopias in the mid-to-late 19th century, the ‘vestiges [which have]...bound to survive”²⁸.

Interestingly enough, Weber seems to give an account of one of the very boarding schools Foucault is referencing when he talks of the decline of “the boarding school”²⁹ in the late 19th century. Weber’s analysis of the 1895 enrollment of schools in Baden, primarily Protestant-Catholic higher education schools in Hungary— used to show the difference between how Catholic and Protestant parents educate their children— would be exactly the sort of boarding school Foucault would be referring to as the last “vestiges”³⁰ of crisis heterotopias. Weber’s point is that these “scientifically oriented”³¹ schools enrolled more Protestants than Catholics, training Protestants for the very fields— science and business— that led to the formation and perpetuation of capitalism. What makes these Baden schools ‘crisis heterotopias’ is implicit when Weber notes the “higher education...Catholic parents, as opposed to Protestant, give their children”³². *Give* here denotes the parents providing a space for their children, distinct from parental control, through higher education. Boarding schools today serve a similar function— providing children a “sacred,”³³ established, institutional, space to carry out non-normative behavior whilst still working under the guise of normativity.

²⁷ Ibid., 6-7

²⁸ Ibid., 6-7

²⁹ Ibid., 6-7

³⁰ Ibid., 6-7

³¹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

³² Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

³³ Ibid., 6-7

What makes Baden boarding schools ‘crisis heterotopias’ rather than ‘deviant ones’, contra to boarding schools now, is found in the very structure of Baden boarding schools educational standards for students. Baden boarding schools were informed by a “democratic spirit”³⁴ cultivated under new notions of education theorized after the 1848 Hungarian Revolution— giving a space for the student to explore not only non-normativity, but the things they are learning in the classrooms in a non-routinized, interactive way. We also see this in Hungarian changing educational policies towards the study of Greek. Prior to 1880, Greek was part of the traditional Hungarian curriculum. In 1883, we see the teaching of Greek challenged by “the conservative curriculum lobby,”³⁵ comprised mostly of churches, looking to replace the teaching of Greek, but compromising with being giving a more substantial position in education policy. The churches looking to replace Greek are certainly Protestant ones: looking to replace Greek with teachings of science and business, or with things of more practicality. What we see here is a replacing of Greek— a teaching tradition long associated with a teaching of Greek philosophy which, consequently, instills agency in students to both think for themselves and challenge authority— with a teaching of science and business both routinizes the student and which, in itself, makes the student subservient to the normative standards demanded of by the sciences and business.

The boarding schools of Baden don’t seem to punish non-normativity in the way we see with boarding schools now. Hungary’s “democratic spirit”³⁶ seems to leave room for non-

³⁴Péter Tibor Nagy, *The Social and Political History of Hungarian Education*. University of Pecs, Accessed May 01, 2020, <https://mek.oszk.hu/03700/03797/03797.htm>

³⁵ Péter Tibor Nagy, *The Social and Political History of Hungarian Education*. University of Pecs, Accessed May 01, 2020, <https://mek.oszk.hu/03700/03797/03797.htm>

³⁶Péter Tibor Nagy, *The Social and Political History of Hungarian Education*. University of Pecs, Accessed May 01, 2020, <https://mek.oszk.hu/03700/03797/03797.htm>

normativity; and if not that, it at least doesn't seem to crack down on it in the ways boarding schools do now, and in the ways conservative Hungarian politicians cracked down on a teaching of Greek that was for its own sake, and not for the sake of economic usefulness and normativity. Baden boarding schools leave room for non-normativity like they leave room for the teaching of Greek and Greek philosophy. Like the Greeks themselves, it might be a fair presumption to assume these schools left room for sexual non-normativity as well.

More importantly, these Baden schools post-Hungarian Revolution don't seem to educate their students in the very things that Weber notes as preparation for careers in capitalism. As Weber notes in his analysis of Baden, Protestant students were primarily educated in business and science—preparing for careers in capitalism— while Catholic students continued to read traditional Greek and Latin. The year, 1895, of the very analysis, is what Weber says developed the workforce that, shortly thereafter, would lead to the formation of, and come to perpetuate, capitalism. The formation of capitalism, the decline of the teaching of Greek and Latin, and the increase of students studying business and science, all parallel what Foucault describes as the decline of 'crisis heterotopias', and the birth of deviant ones.

The question of 'where crisis heterotopias have gone' may be better phrased as 'why have they been replaced'. The answer certainly has to do with the very reasons why the the teaching of Greek and Latin disappeared around the same time: *they weren't conducive to capitalism and preparing subjects to be economically useful*. Like subjects educated in Greek and Latin are antithetical to subjects who merely have an obligation to "persevere and persist throughout the day,"³⁷ and not deliberate, think philosophically, for themselves, subjects who can inhabit a space

³⁷ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (NYC, Scribner, 1958), xi-xii

of deviancy outside the normative are antithetical to a capitalist society that has, even in its earliest reiteration in France, as always been tied up with, and built on, normativity. Simply, normative spaces are necessary for capitalism insofar as non-normativity, or deviancy, is antithetical to subjects who work, persist, but don't question— who do what they're told, perpetuate capitalism, and don't combat, confront, rebel. Like the decline of Greek and Latin, crisis heterotopias have disappeared to perpetuate “bourgeois normativity and economic usefulness”³⁸— for the same reasons Foucault accounts for the disappearance of the mad, the queer, the non-normative.

3.0. The Role of Deviant Heterotopias in our Modern Society

Think of the ship: it is a floating part of space, a placeless place, that lives by itself, closed in on itself and at the same time poised in the infinite ocean, and yet, from port to port, tack by tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies, looking for the most precious things hidden in their gardens. Then you will understand why it has been not only and obviously the main means of economic growth (which I do not intend to go into here), but at the same time the greatest reserve of imagination for our civilization from the sixteenth century down to the present day. The ship is the heterotopia par excellence³⁹

The rest of the first half of this paper will be devoted to exploring the role of deviant heterotopias in modern society, and explicating what is good about crisis heterotopias for Foucault. I shall flesh out their role, often, through Weber's analysis of the iron cage of modernity. Therefore, let me explicate both 1) Foucault's initial notion of the role of deviant heterotopias in modern society, 2) Foucault's initial notion of what is good about crisis heterotopia's, and 3) Weber's notion of the “iron cage of modernity,” and how it can be informative to our study. This will

³⁸ Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 44

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 12

provide grounds to, first, expand upon a conception of deviant heterotopias in modern society, expand upon what is good about them, and, in the second half of the essay, compare them to Frasier's notion of a counter-public.

3.1. Foucault's Account of Deviant Heterotopia's in Modern Society

In *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias*, Foucault focuses on 'crisis heterotopias' rather than deviant ones. He does this by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for 'crisis heterotopias'—appraising them—but doing slightly more than only noticing what has replaced them ('deviant heterotopias'). On what grounds then, can I understand Foucault as saying something important about deviant heterotopia's role in our modern society? Does he leave this under-theorized?

In the subsequent pages, I will draw on Foucault's brief account of deviant heterotopias in *Of Other Spaces*, and his account of madness and the confinement house, the imprison and the prison, both of which comes from the respective *The History of Madness* and *Discipline and Punishment*, in order to explicate what Foucault considers a deviant heterotopia.

This is what Foucault has to say about 'defiant heterotopias' in *Of Other Spaces*:

I believe, by others which could be described as heterotopias of deviance, occupied by individual's whose behavior deviates from the current average or standard. They are the rest homes, psychiatric clinics, and, let us be clear, prisons, in a list which must undoubtedly be extended to cover old-people's homes, in a way on the border between the heterotopia of crisis and that of deviance. This is because in a society like our own, where pleasure is the rule, the inactivity of old age constitutes not only a crisis but a deviation⁴⁰

Deviant heterotopias are defined as a space of non-normativity cast as antithetical to the normative: "*occupied by individuals whose behavior deviates from the current average or*

⁴⁰ Ibid., 5

standard”⁴¹. Simply, non-normativity in these spaces are cast as bad, which can lead us to believe that they are places for oppression. This, perhaps, is the very foundation for his earlier work on prisons and psychiatric institutions detailed in *The History of Madness* and *Discipline and Punishment*. It is here, we will find, perhaps more acutely, the role of deviant heterotopias in our society.

What insight does Foucault’s analysis of the confinement house in *The History of Madness* give us into the role of deviant heterotopias in modern society? First, and more simply, what does Foucault tell us about the nature of the confinement in modern society?

In *The History of Madness*, Foucault tells us a story about how the mad came to be thought of as the ‘crazy’— or the normative notion of ‘madness’ that exists today. The mad, once, existed in society, alongside the non-mad; in the same marketplaces, in the same streets, among the same crowds. They were thought of as providing insight into things beyond the material world. They were privileged— thought of, perhaps, in the ways some in Athens thought of Socrates. They were the philosophers, the insightful, the brilliant and wise. He notes the first “gesture of confinement”⁴² as happening in the 18th century. Here, the mad were cast, moved, to the edge of society—placed in confinement houses— for the sake of perpetuating “bourgeois normativity [and]... economic usefulness”⁴³. The trend caught on in the rest of Europe: the mad

⁴¹Ibid., 5

⁴² Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 44

⁴³Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 46

were cast to the edge of society in these so-called “confinement houses”⁴⁴— similar to psychiatric institutions today.

It is here that the ‘mad’ were grouped with the ill and the sick. The sick were thought of as impious and needed to be treated by Christian orthodoxy. The mad being grouped with the ill made them be thought of in the same way— as impious and needing to be treated by Christian orthodoxy. Here, we see how the mad became the impious and the outcast— respectively, by being grouped with the sick, and being cast away because they weren’t both normal and economically useful.

One of the more general points is that the ‘mad’ only because the ‘crazed-mad’ once they were cast to the confinement houses— with the confinement houses being a place that perpetuated the notion that the mad were crazed. Here, the confinement houses take the role of ‘deviant heterotopias’. The mad in the confinement houses aren’t appraised, privileged for their non-normativity. Rather, they are confined and cast as non-normative— a non-normativity antithetical to the normative.

The notion of the ‘confinement house’ as akin to ‘deviant heterotopias’ provide many insights into the nature of ‘deviant heterotopias’. Like in the beginning sections, we see ‘deviant heterotopias’ as not conducive to ‘economic usefulness’ (again, perhaps this is why they disappeared’). We also see ‘deviant heterotopias’ as not non-normative, but anti-normative— a non-normativity in direct *opposition* to the normative⁴⁵. We see them as being birthed in the 18th

⁴⁴ Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 44-end

⁴⁵ More specifically, non-normative refers to a non-normative subject being, certainly, the binary opposite of normativity. The anti-normative subject, in contrast, is always in *contention with* the normative. In recent queer and trans theory, it refers to a non-normative subject (really anti-normative) always posited as subverting the binary— not allowing to just *be*; always political, never just existing.

century— an earlier formation of deviant heterotopias but, nevertheless, still connected with the decline of the Church and the rise of modernity.

More acutely, the confinement houses show ‘deviant heterotopias’ as both 1) places that change the very subjects that inhabit them; opening up new discursive frameworks, and 2) that lead to the formation of other ‘deviant heterotopia’ spaces.

In *The History of Madness*, we come to see how discursive frameworks— or normative notions: the change from madness as appraised to crazed, privileged to ill— led to the formation of the confinement houses. We see this in his description of “the ship of fools”⁴⁶ from the earlier half of the 16th century, that cast madness as lunacy, madness as sick, madness as belonging away from society— at sea, apart from society. This, with various other examples from literature and art, serve as justification for the casting away of the mad in society. Simply, the mad were cast away because they weren’t economically useful, but the justification for it was these earlier discursive frameworks/normative notions about the mad as crazed, ill, and sick (it’s what made people, also, not question the very disappearance of the mad— that once lived side by side with them, in the streets, among those in the marketplace). Succinctly, discursive frameworks (normative notions of mad as ill) was justification for the birth of the material institutions that was the confinement houses! Furthermore, it describes the way the birth of the confinement houses birthed new normative notions— the conflation between the mad and ill as *both* impious — which necessitated the further building of more material institutions.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (NYC & London, Routledge 2006), 3

⁴⁷ We can simply represent this as: ‘discursive frameworks → material institutions → discursive frameworks’. The influence of discursive frameworks, as I and Foucault in this post-structuralist sense— can never be fully realized and gaged. There are myriad discursive frameworks that lead to the formation of material institutions; here, the mad as ill, sick, and crazed, are only one out of many normative notions that led to the formation of the confinement houses.

What this provides insight too is the historical nature of ‘deviant heterotopias’. They didn’t pop up out of nowhere, but their roots were located in previous years—in previous normative notions. Furthermore, ‘deviant heterotopias’ must, if they are like “psychiatric clinics...and prisons”⁴⁸ open up discursive frameworks/normative notions that lead to the formation of other ‘deviant heterotopias’.

What story does Foucault tell about the ‘prison’ in *Discipline and Punishment*? How are they ‘deviant heterotopias’? And what insight do they provide into the nature of ‘deviant heterotopias’? In a similar way as the confinement houses in *The History of Madness*, we see the ways in which discursive frameworks lead to the formation of material institutions, and how material institutions, subsequently, open up discursive frameworks that are pervasive throughout history which, consequently, open up other material institutions, etc.

We start *Discipline and Punishment* with the execution of [insert]. It is an attack on the body; the image of the executioner. Simply, it is how punishment was carried forth in the 18th century: violent; *sovereign punishment*— the image of someone doing the punishment; something visible, tangible. The change of punishment from violent and an attack on the body, to punishment in the age of “sobriety,” civility and humanness— wearing down the body via *routinization* and *schedule* to “get to the soul”— made the birth of the material institution that was the prison, viable. As in, the prison could only form, a measly 100 years later, because punishment changed from sovereign and violent to non-sovereign and “wearing down the soul”. In a similar way as the confinement houses, we see how ‘deviant heterotopias’ aren’t ahistorical but, rather, formed by virtue of previous normative notions. Furthermore, Foucault notes as the

⁴⁸ Ibid., 6-7

prison as a place of sociological study opened up discursive frameworks, or tactics of, surveillance and policing— leading to the formation of the surveillance state. Here, we see the ‘deviant heterotopia’ that is the prison— a material institution— opening up discursive frameworks that consequently, lead to the formation of other prisons and institutions of the surveillance state.

Furthermore, the prison shows us ‘deviant heterotopias’ as a non-sovereign place of confinement for non-normativity. If ‘deviant heterotopias’ are “*let us be clear, prisons,*”⁴⁹ then ‘deviant heterotopias’ must punish its inhabitants in a non-sovereign way as well. If ‘deviant heterotopias’ are places of confinement, not refuge, then they are places of confinement that don’t confine subjects via the image of a sovereign punisher; there is no principals, authority figure, bosses, in these ‘deviant heterotopias’. Rather, it is the threat of punishment, the threat of surveillance that, like the subject in the surveillance state that self-polices and self-surveil, makes the subject in the ‘deviant heterotopia’ oppress themselves. If ‘deviant heterotopias’ are places of oppression, not refuge, then that oppression, must be, self-afflicted.

More succinctly, what is the role of deviant heterotopias in our modern society? We certainly know that they take the form of prisons and psychiatric institutions, but what necessary and sufficient conditions can we give for ‘deviant heterotopias,’ deploying the insights we garnered from Foucault’s earlier work?

The necessary conditions for Foucault’s conception of a deviant heterotopia are a) a place of non-normativity that is deemed as *antithetical* to normative society, b) (in align with their

⁴⁹ Ibid., 6-7

situatedness in a surveillance state) the ways they both construct subjects in terms of ideology, and punish subjects, are non-sovereign, and c) they are historically contingent— which is merely to suggest that they are the product of other deviant heterotopias, and lead to the formation of other ‘deviant heterotopia’’. Since ‘deviant heterotopias’ go under-theorized in Foucault’s work, we must further explicate why these are necessary conditions, and what, more acutely, they mean.

In terms of *non-normativity antithetical to normative society*, subjects in deviant heterotopias are just that, *deviant*. Simply, they are not different, but still situatedness within normativity; they are not strange or weird, but still acceptable to the normative— co-existing with the normative. Rather, it is a non-normativity that is antithetical— can’t coexist with— normativity. Hence, why non-normativity in ‘deviant heterotopias’ are confined and made distinct from normative society. As suggested before, one may think of the role of the mad as a useful metaphor here. The mad *pre*-confinement houses certainly were non-normative— in a different, opposite of the normative sense— but still existed alongside normative society in the everyday. The mad *Post*-confinement houses were seen as not being conducive with normativity. They needed to exist apart from it— antithetical to it. They were labeled and made to think of themselves as always *anti-normative*— in inextricable opposition to the normative. Simply, ‘deviant heterotopias are places of confinement (like the confinement houses) which, consequently, means that merely non-normative subjects inhabit their spaces but, rather, anti-normative subjects who always have an adversarial relationship to the normative.

In terms of *non-sovereign punishment and ideological-construction*, subjects in ‘deviant heterotopias’ aren’t constructed by power in a sovereign way. There is no executioner, or

punisher, doing the punishing, in ‘deviant heterotopia’’. Rather, it is the threat of punishment that make people self-surveil. Now, certainly if we take the prison as an example of ‘deviant heterotopias,’ one may suggest that, indeed, there is a sovereign punisher: the guards, the law, the *ones with guns*. But, how power actually operates in prisons— what latent force drives prisoners to not rebel and subvert authority and the authorities ideology— is merely the threat of punishment. Guards, mostly, don’t have to lift a finger to make prisoners obey. It is the threat of punishment— power as non-sovereign— that constitute how subjects in ‘deviant heterotopias’ like prisons stay subservient to the ideology of authorities. Therefore, while ‘deviant heterotopias’ do have authorities, these authorities are not what reinforce ideology and subservience to authority. It is both the *threat* of surveillance and punishment, and other prisoners within these ‘deviant heterotopias’ that serve as ‘self-surveillance apparatus’s’— those other prisoners who make sure other prisoners don’t rebel, subvert authority, challenge ideology (simply, when a prisoner sees another prisoner, perhaps, obeying the law, it reinforces the notion that they too much obey the law— not rebel! When one sees a prisoner take the guards as authorities, it makes others do the same; etc.). Like prisons, this is how ‘deviant heterotopias— places where non-normativity is confined— operate.

Lastly, ‘deviant heterotopias must be historically contingent in order to be such. As noted previously, like Foucault’s historical account of the prison and confinement house, ‘deviant heterotopias’ are the product of normative notions— normative notions that arise from ‘deviant heterotopias,’ already formed, as well— that partially lead to, partially enact, partially inform, and partially serve as justification for, the formation of the material institution that is the space of the ‘deviant heterotopia’. Furthermore, these ‘deviant heterotopias must lead to the formation of

other ‘deviant heterotopias. Like the prison, they must open up discursive frameworks/ normative notions, that are again pervasive throughout history, and again, partially enact the formation of other ‘defiant heterotopias’.

3.2. Foucault’s Account of Heterotopias

Foucault attempts to give a systematic account of heterotopias: “how can we describe them? What meaning do they have?”⁵⁰. Foucault doesn’t refer to these heterotopias as specifically ones of ‘crisis,’ but rather, processes to give accounts of various different other forms of heterotopia’s, as well as necessary conditions for all heterotopias. Therefore, in order to subsequently parse out what Foucault’s conception of what a ‘crisis heterotopia’ may be— insofar as he doesn’t define it himself in the text— let me give an exegetical description of Foucault’s systematic account of heterotopias. These insights will be used to provide a subsequent account of what Foucault may think of a ‘crisis heterotopia’.

Foucault’s “first principle”⁵¹ for heterotopias is really a necessary condition for a heterotopia being what it is: 1) “there is probably not a single culture in the world that is not made up of heterotopias”⁵². Principles four also seems to apply to all heterotopias, rather than a particular variation of one: 4) “Heterotopias are linked for the most part to bits and pieces of time, i.e., they open up through what we might define as a pure symmetry of heterochronisms. The heterotopia enters fully into function when men find themselves in a sort of total breach of

⁵⁰ Ibid., 4

⁵¹ Ibid., 6-7

⁵² Ibid., 6-7

their traditional time”⁵³. The remaining four describe different variations and kinds of heterotopia’s: 2) heterotopias where “over the course of its history, a society may take an existing heterotopia, which has never vanished, and make it function in a very different way,”⁵⁴ 3) “the[se] heterotopia[s] ha[ve] the power of juxtaposing in a single real place different spaces and locations that are incompatible with each other,”⁵⁵ 5) “Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that isolates them and makes them penetrable at one and the same time,”⁵⁶ and 6) “in relation to the rest of space, a function that takes place between two opposite pole”⁵⁷.

While certainly esoteric, let me first expand upon what Foucault means by the first two necessary conditions for heterotopias (1, and 4), and then expand upon the different variations of heterotopias he gives (2, 3, 5 and 6). Consequently, in what ways do they provide insight into what a ‘crisis heterotopia’ may be for Foucault?

3.3. Necessary Conditions for Heterotopias

1) Heterotopias “probably... ma[k]e up”⁵⁸ every culture. What does this mean? Sadly, he does not give us much sense. The operative word “probably,”⁵⁹ perhaps, suggests that Foucault is taking some sort of poetic license. Furthermore, he refers to it as a persistent “feature of all

⁵³ Ibid., 8

⁵⁴ Ibid., 5

⁵⁵ Ibid., 6-7

⁵⁶ Ibid., 8

⁵⁷ Ibid., 11

⁵⁸ Ibid., 6-7

⁵⁹ Ibid., 6-7

human groups,”⁶⁰ without providing much subsequent insight. In expanding upon what Foucault is saying, it might be better put to suggest that all cultures have some sort of customs which, consequently, necessitate binary-opposition between normal and non-normal, custom and not-custom— normative and non-normative. Therefore, since all cultures have customs, all cultures have non-normative behavior. Furthermore, there must be some space for these non-normative subjects to inhabit— hence, the heterotopia space!

Foucault also uses the necessary condition as a transition into his distinctions between deviant and crisis heterotopias. While “primitive societies”⁶¹ long had, and *still do*, have ‘crisis heterotopias,’ we, in so-called non-primitive society, have started to see these heterotopias diminished and replaced by ‘deviant ones’. Therefore, this first necessary condition of heterotopia’s apply to both ‘crisis heterotopias’ and ‘deviant ones’.

4a) How are heterotopia’s linked to “bits of pieces of time,”⁶² and why? Later, Foucault describes the deal about “bits of pieces and time”⁶³ and “pure symmetry of heterochromnisms”⁶⁴ more simply. For him, “bits of pieces of time”⁶⁵ refer to “when men find themselves in a sort of total breach of their traditional time”⁶⁶ with examples of this being when the space of the

⁶⁰ Ibid., 6-7

⁶¹ Ibid., 6-7

⁶² Ibid., 8

⁶³ Ibid., 8

⁶⁴ Ibid., 8

⁶⁵ Ibid., 8

⁶⁶ Ibid., 8

cemetery allows people too deliberate about “the loss of life and of that quasi-eternity in which, however, he does not cease to dissolve and be erased”⁶⁷.

“Traditional time”⁶⁸ refers, certainly, to something phenomenological— how time feels for most people in a normative society (perhaps in modernity, neoliberalism, etc.). “Traditional time”⁶⁹ for example, may be feeling the workday go slow because you are bored. Here, it seems to point to the opposite of something that’s deliberative. “Traditional time”⁷⁰ refers to time that feels rushed— when one doesn’t have the means to stop, think, deliberate, like the ways one can at a place like a cemetery. Therefore, we can see heterotopia’s of this kind as allowing, or giving subjects within the space, the space to “breach traditional time”⁷¹ by deliberating— by deliberating about things like “the loss of life”⁷² and “eternity,”⁷³ which are things we don’t get to deliberate about in “traditional,” perhaps normative, time.

Furthermore, he describes libraries and museums as exemplifying heterotopia spaces that allow subjects, or rather give subjects the space, to deliberate in ways they otherwise wouldn’t⁷⁴. He describes these as “*heterotopias of time*”⁷⁵: those where “the concept of making all times into one place, and yet a place that is outside time, inaccessible to the wear and tear of the years”.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 8

⁶⁸ Ibid., 8

⁶⁹ Ibid., 8

⁷⁰ Ibid., 8

⁷¹ Ibid., 8

⁷² Ibid., 8

⁷³ Ibid., 8

⁷⁴ Here, we see a notion similar to John Dewey’s notion of an esthetic experience that a) opens up both further esthetician experiences, and b) provides a space for further deliberation.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 9

Museums and the art that compromise them draw from “all [different] times,” that become gathered in “one place”⁷⁶. Here, it seems we get another phenomenological description: it’s the very idea of a place being comprised of “all [of] time”⁷⁷ that makes a place feel timeless— “inaccessible to the wear and tear of the years”.

4b) In contrast, there are the “very recent, new... *heterotopias... of the holiday village*”⁷⁸. These heterotopia’s have to do with time, certainly, but marked by time as not felt in a long, extended way via deliberation and contemplation, but rather, time that feels short— “three short weeks of primitive and eternal nudity to city dwellers”⁷⁹. Time in the ‘holiday village heterotopia’ is constituted by expression, dance, and joy— the image of Dionysius— which makes time pass unreflected upon and brief.

The two forms of time-based heterotopias are “the whole story of humanity”⁸⁰ when “they come together”⁸¹. Like Nietzsche’s idea that tragedy as exemplified by the relation between Apollo and Dionysius is a metaphor for how we should live, Foucault in a similar way theorizes both of these forms of heterotopia as necessary and essential to life.

3.4. Different Kinds of Heterotopias

2) How do societies make *this* heterotopias (hereafter, heterotopia-2) function in a different way? ‘Different’ merely does not denote something like ‘replace’. When Foucault accounts for heterotopia-2’s being made to function differently, it is to say that they continue to

⁷⁶ Ibid., 8

⁷⁷ Ibid., 8

⁷⁸ Ibid., 8

⁷⁹ Ibid., 9

⁸⁰ Ibid., 9

⁸¹ Ibid., 9

function in one way whilst, simultaneously, starting to function in another. Foucault uses the “curious heterotopia of the cemetery” as an example to explicate this. He describes the cemetery as “an ‘other’ place with respect to ordinary cultural spaces, and yet it is connected with all the locations of the city, the society, the village, and so on, since every family has some relative there”. Heterotopia-2’s are both a space where non-normativity dwells— where freaks, the mad, the ill, go at night to loiter, perhaps— and a place ingratiated into the lives and culture of a normative society.

Foucault proceeds to account for how heterotopia-2 like the cemetery went from a “sacred”⁸² crisis one to a deviant one. The cemetery went from being “located in the very heart of the city, near the church”⁸³ to being pushed “to the outskirts of the city”⁸⁴— as I should note, like the mad, who move from the being among the city-dwellers, like Socrates, to being confined to the edge of cities. The dead became thought of as an illness— “where death transmits sickness to the living,”⁸⁵ where death could spread to people like a common cold. Here, Foucault notes, we see heterotopia-2’s of the cemetery change from ‘crisis heterotopia’ to ‘deviant’: the cemetery as once a “sacred”⁸⁶ place, to, for the sake of perpetuating a sort of bourgeois normativity (as noted earlier in the example of the ‘mad’) and economic usefulness, the cemetery as a place of confinement.

⁸² Ibid., 6-7

⁸³ Ibid., 5

⁸⁴ Ibid., 5

⁸⁵ Ibid., 6

⁸⁶ Ibid., 6-7

The example shows us, however abstractly (though he is quite clear in giving an example of how a 'crisis heterotopia' turns 'deviant' and why), how heterotopia-2's are, like my earlier diagnosis, always historical in the sense that they are either disappearing, or in the example of the prison as 'deviant heterotopia', leading to the formation of other heterotopia's.

Heterotopia-2's can take on two roles in one society. Foucault expands upon this point by saying one of these roles can gain importance, while the other diminishes, or vice versa.

3) How does this heterotopia (hereafter, heterotopia-3) contain two spaces in itself? And how can it contain two spaces that are incompatible? Foucault "deploys contradictory locations is the garden" as the "oldest example of these heterotopias". The traditional garden is:

"...a sacred space that was supposed to unite four separate parts within its rectangle, representing the four parts of the world, as well as one space still more sacred than the others, a space that was like the navel, the center of the world brought into the garden (it was here that the basin and jet of water were located). All the vegetation was concentrated in this zone, as if in a sort of microcosm. As for carpets, they originally set out to reproduce gardens, since the garden was a carpet where the world in its entirety achieved symbolic perfection, and the carpet a sort of movable garden in space. The garden is the smallest fragment of the world and, at the same time, represents its totality, forming right from the remotest times a sort of felicitous and universal heterotopia"⁸⁷.

⁸⁷Ibid., 6-7

Foucault suggests that, at once, the garden represents both the whole of itself and its parts. More clearly, the garden is both a garden, and a place comprised of various different spaces within it. The garden as a whole is representative of a “sacred space”⁸⁸. The center— the area of “vegetation”⁸⁹— represents “part of the world”⁹⁰ while the “carpets”⁹¹ represent another.

What we can surely say is that heterotopia-3’s are spaces that have spaces within them. If we use the example of the prison, perhaps the garden is like the prison, while the sections that comprise the prison like jail cells, the detainment center, the surveillance room, are like the different sections of the garden.

Furthermore, he compares these heterotopias too the “cinema”⁹² where “places... are alien to each other; thus the cinema appears as a very curious rectangular hall, at the back of which a three-dimensional space is projected onto a two-dimensional screen”⁹³. The cinema *represents two spaces in one*: the seating section, which comprises the majority of the cinema, and the screen. Each space is “incompatible”⁹⁴with the other in the sense that they only make sense as a whole— as a whole heterotopia! Simply, the idea of seats in a theater juxtaposed with a moving image on a screen in the back only makes sense when the whole precedes the parts— when our understanding of what a theater is presupposes our walking into the theater. Without this previous knowledge in regards to what a theater is, the two spaces seem distinct; they don’t

⁸⁸ Ibid., 6-7

⁸⁹ Ibid., 6-7

⁹⁰Ibid., 6-7

⁹¹ Ibid., 6-7

⁹² Ibid., 8

⁹³ Ibid., 8

⁹⁴ Ibid., 8

mesh, or rather, they seem randomly thrown together— as if any other combination of spaces could take up the space of the cinema rather than these two. Succinctly, the cinema represents two spaces in one, that only make sense as a whole.

5a) What does it mean to say that some heterotopias “presuppose a system of opening and closing that isolates them and makes them penetrable at one and the same time”⁹⁵. It’s important to also note that subjects who enter these heterotopia’s do “not get into a heterotopia location by one’s own will. Either one is forced, as in the case of the barracks or the prison, or one must submit to rites of purification”⁹⁶. These heterotopia’s operate where subjects are forced into the space through an opening, which then closes once the subject enters. The prison example is apt: the prison opens for the prisoner, who is forced in, and then closes to isolate them.

Subjects are allowed to enter these heterotopias if, and only if, they abide by certain rules: “one can only enter by special permission and after one has completed a certain number of gestures”⁹⁷. One can enter the prison once one is screened, detained, surveilled. If and only if one succumbs to the normative practices— like being screened, detained, surveilled— can one enter the prison. In some cases, it is a matter of “purification”⁹⁸: one can only enter a religious space, say, once they are cleansed by the will of god, or once they submit to a certain doctrine of religious specificities, etc.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 8

⁹⁶ Ibid., 9

⁹⁷ Ibid., 9

⁹⁸ Ibid., 9

5b). Another variation of heterotopias with “a system of opening and closings”⁹⁹ are those with the “*appearance* of pure and simple openings,”¹⁰⁰ where “anyone can enter one of these heterotopian locations, but, in reality, they are nothing more than an illusion: one thinks one has entered and, by the sole fact of entering, one is excluded”¹⁰¹.

He compares these heterotopias too old rooms where “the front door did not give onto the main part of the house, where the family lived, so that any person who happened to pass by, any traveler, had the right to push open that door, enter the room, and spend the night there. Now, the rooms were arranged in such a way that anyone who went in there could never reach to the heart of the family: more than ever a passing visitor, never a true guest”¹⁰². These rooms give the illusion of privacy, where in fact, anyone can enter the ‘private space’ at any moment. These rooms are spaces where one can abide, perhaps engage in non-normative behavior, but are places where one is never really thought to belong— or rather, they are spaces where people only temporarily stay. Foucault equates the last of these sort of heterotopias to the “American ‘motel’ room,”¹⁰³ where one can stay, engage in non-normative behavior, and on one hand be private and concealed, and on the other have that very privacy be an illusion insofar as that space really isn’t your own space, but is, rather, a temporary space you are staying. Succinctly, these heterotopia-4’s are 1) spaces where one has privacy, and 2) where that privacy is not really

⁹⁹ Ibid., 7

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 7

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 7

¹⁰² Ibid., 8

¹⁰³ Ibid., 9

‘private’ insofar as 2a) that space is a borrowed space— where one is not a guest, but where one merely gets to occupy that space.

6) What does it mean that heterotopia-4’s are space that “a takes place between two opposite poles”¹⁰⁴? Foucault accounts for the poles as:

On the one hand they perform the task of creating a space of illusion that reveals how all of real space is more illusory, all the locations within which life is fragmented. On the other, they have the function of forming another space, another real space, as perfect, meticulous, and well-arranged as ours is disordered, ill-conceived, and in a sketchy state...Brothels and colonies, here are two extreme types of heterotopia. Think of the ship: it is a floating part of space, a placeless place, that lives by itself, closed in on itself and at the same time poised in the infinite ocean, and yet, from port to port, tack by tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies, looking for the most precious things hidden in their gardens¹⁰⁵

Heterotopias on one hand are *illusionary heterotopias* that show the “real”¹⁰⁶ as “illusionary”¹⁰⁷. On the other, ones that give us a space to be “disordered, ill-conceived... sketchy”¹⁰⁸. The interdependent-binary given between these two heterotopias again recalls Nietzsche’s notion of Apollo and Dionysius as giving a metaphor for how we should live. Nietzsche claims that Apollo shows us the fallibility of truth— rather the meaninglessness of both truth and the enterprise of truth. We are subsequently left with a meaningless void where we can’t organize life around ‘truth’ in the way we used too. Art, subsequently, allows us to

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 11

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 10-11

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 10-11

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 10-11

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 10-11

move into Dionysian ways of being— expression, dance, drunkenness. For Nietzsche, this is how we should live, like Dionysius— moving away from the fruitless nature of ‘truth’ both as an enterprise (the truth seeker) and as a notion we center our lives around.

These spaces seem to offer subjects the same sort of life-advice: the Apollonian heterotopia shows us the fallibility of the “real”¹⁰⁹— shows us it as an illusion. It shows us, through the ‘illusion’ of space itself, the illusion of things we take to be true. More succinctly, the ‘illusion’ may be something like ‘socially, culturally, and historically’ contingent— meaning that these spaces, like Apollo, shops us things that we don’t think twice about in our everyday, and take as ‘true’, as mere products of the specific social, cultural, and historical context were thrown into. For example, when I walk into a police station, I take its existence as always being true, always existing. These Apollonian spaces make us rethink the unreflected way in which we understand the police station, and show us how the existence of the police station is only ‘real’ because were thrown into the specific social, cultural, and historical context were thrown into.

The Dionysian heterotopia gives us a space to be disorderly, or perhaps *drunken*. It allows us to not fall into an existential crisis, or depression, and, instead, allows us to move past what we now see as illusions— the social, cultural, and historical nature of the institutions; the arbitrariness of power, and who is in charge, and how it is all only true because were thrown into the specific context were thrown into— by moving into modes of expression dance.

Like both Apollo and Dionysius are contingent on each other for Nietzsche, these two variations of heterotopia— the “brothels and colonies”¹¹⁰— are contingent as well.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 10-11

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 11

3.5. What's Foucault's Conception of a Crisis Heterotopia?

Now that I have interpreted some of the esoteric language Foucault deploys in order to give both necessary and sufficient conditions for heterotopias, and account for different variations of heterotopias, let me proceed to provide a more succinct account of what a 'crisis heterotopia' is by using the insights provided in the text. As it turns, Foucault has the most to say about 'crisis heterotopias' in principles 2, 3, 5b, and 6. I will end the section with a more succinct conception of the necessary conditions that comprise 'crisis heterotopia's'.

Principle 2 shows us 'crisis heterotopias' as inhabiting space in the center, or at least within the parameters, of a community. We can think of the cemetery, which was once 'crisis'—a place of refuge for non-normative behavior—that was located in the center of society, which became 'deviant'—confined to the fringes of society. Cemeteries still exist, certainly, but they are no longer places of non-normative refuge. As I will later elaborate on, the disappearance of these 'crisis heterotopias' is certainly a bad thing. Nevertheless, for now it suffices to say that, in their past and present form, 'crisis heterotopias' are located in the center of societies because they are not thought of as dangerous or antithetical to said society but, rather, constitutive of it. *Unreason and non-normativity, in these crisis heterotopia's, are thought of as essential features of reason and normativity.*

Principle 3 shows us 'crisis heterotopias' as a "sacred space"¹¹¹ constituted by its parts. These "sacred space[s]"¹¹² certainly only apply to 'crisis heterotopias'. 'Deviant' ones, by there

¹¹¹ Ibid., 6-7

¹¹² Ibid., 6-7

very definition, we're not places of refuge to be appraised, but places of confinement, seclusion, and oppression. Therefore, we can see 'crisis heterotopia's as both "sacred" and as having parts that make them sacred.

Prisons, a 'deviant heterotopia', also have parts that make them what they are. Thought the parts of a prison— jails cells, surveillance rooms— don't make them sacred, but rather, places of oppression. Wherein the jail cells and surveillance rooms allow a prison to constantly surveillance, confine, and oppress its subject, 'crisis heterotopias' like gardens have parts that make the place "sacred"¹¹³. The "carpets"¹¹⁴ and "jet basins"¹¹⁵— the things that comprise Foucault's own "garden"¹¹⁶— aren't means towards oppression and confinement. Rather, they form a space that allows subjects to move freely within them. Therefore, the space of a 'crisis heterotopia' seems to be constituted by things that promote free movement, spontaneity— perhaps non-normativity!— in a way the things that comprise a 'deviant heterotopia' don't.

Principle 5b shows us 'crisis heterotopias' as a place of refuge from normativity— their mere definition, but nonetheless, a succinct account of the different ways in which heteropic space can be a space where one can go to engage in non-normative behavior (i.e. "the American motel room").

Furthermore, we see 'crisis heterotopias as, though private, having an element of publicness to them. One has the privacy to engage in non-normative behavior, but these spaces still are quite public insofar as one doesn't own the space, consequently meaning that one can be

¹¹³ Ibid., 6-7

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 10-11

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 10-11

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 10-11

walked in on at any moment; the privateness of the space if an illusion, to some extent. We also get a sense that, insofar as these ‘crisis heteropic’ spaces are never fully private, that the people within spaces, must, have some sense of anxiety and apprehension that constitutes the very nature of the non-normative experience. For example, if I were to engage in some queer, non-normative sexual act with a partner in a motel room, that experience would be consisted by the very sense that *at any moment we could be caught*. This sense that at any moment one could be caught— an apprehension about the possibility of rupture— perhaps, may be constitute of the non-normative subjects very life.

Principle 6 so that ‘crisis heterotopias’ give us the space to both learn how to live a meaningful live, and *live* a meaningful life. First, principle 6 certainly describes ‘crisis heterotopia’s’ insofar as these heterotopia-4’s reveal the very sort of thing Foucault often looks to appraise. One of the persistent themes in Foucault’s work is giving a theoretical space for non-normative subjects to exist apart from their attributed normative notions; in doing this he casts normativity as violent to the non-normative, subsequently showing the ways normativity is really imperialistic and oppressive. In this sense, he shows normativity as what it really is— apart from “illusions”. Therefore, these heterotopias are both ‘crisis ones’— ones that show what we take as “real,” or normative, as merely an illusion, or socially culturally, and historically contingent— and ones that he would certainly want to appraise. Furthermore, he would also certainly be critical of both the sort of society that dismisses ‘crisis heterotopias’, and the very power structures that look to get rid of ‘crisis heterotopias’.

What principle 6 shows us about ‘crisis heterotopias’ is that they can teach us lessons. They are informative spaces for subjects who move within them; perhaps by virtue of the

subjects very ability to move and explore within these spaces! The lessons that these ‘crisis heterotopia’s’ show us are certainly those along Nietzschean lines: first showing us the fallibility and meaningless of truth and truth-seeking, and then giving us a space to move beyond the meaningless left when we no longer have truth— expression, drunkenness, dance, Dionysius. But, what might be distinctive about other sorts of ‘crisis heterotopia’s’ is that they could teach us different lessons. Nevertheless, the educational space of ‘crisis heterotopias, that allow subjects to move and learn within them, cannot be said of ‘deviant heterotopias’ insofar as their spaces are places of confinement— where subjects cant move and learn via an interaction with the space but, rather, are restrained and confined.

It might seem necessary for some for me to more succinctly propose some necessary conditions for ‘crisis heterotopias’. Therefore, the necessary conditions for a ‘crisis heterotopia’ include 1) being a space on the fringe of the normative, 2) being comprised of spaces that make the whole of the space “sacred”, 3) them being a place of refuge from normativity, with the refuge itself being private enough to engage in non-normative behavior away from the normative, but not private enough to where there is no possibility of being caught, and 4) them teaching us a lesson. In regards to the last one, one might suggest that, in some cases, ‘crisis heterotopias’ don’t show us some sort of hidden truth; or don’t teach us lessons. In some ways, this perhaps is true. Not all ‘crisis heterotopias teach us such precise lessons in such as Apollonian and Dionysian ones do. Nevertheless, all ‘crisis heterotopias,’ unlike deviant ones, give us the space to explore, act spontaneously, and creatively engage with space— consequently, giving us the space to learn through creative engagement. Like the garden, where

one has the space to move around— the space to deliberate, learn, think, and in some ways, learn from the space itself (one may become fixed on the flower, and find the flower as some sort of source of insight and wisdom; or the carpets, which might inspire a metaphor, or interesting thought, in someone— ‘crisis heterotopias’ at large give subjects the space to move and deliberate which, consequently, give subjects the space to learn. In a high-paced, commodified neoliberal economy, the idea that the sort of spaces that allow for deliberation are disappearing, perhaps, is quite intuitive for most.

3.6. What’s *Good* About Crisis Heterotopias for Foucault?

Certainly, I have given the impression that Foucault likes and wants to appraise ‘crisis heterotopias’. Therefore, what does he particularly like about them? The precise answer is that it gives non-normative subjects a space to freely express their non-normativity, distinct from oppression and power. Though this account is right, Foucault certainly has more to say regarding what’s good about ‘crisis heterotopias’.

Furthermore, the necessary conditions of 3) them being a place of refuge from normativity, with the refuge itself being private enough to engage in non-normative behavior away from the normative, but not private enough to where there is no possibility of being caught, and 4) them teaching us a lesson, are certainly good insofar as they, respectively, allow non-normativity to exist apart from normativity and oppression, and insofar as they teach non-normative subjects how to live a good life (which certainly doesn’t need any further normative grounds for why this is good!). The idea that ‘crisis heterotopias’ open up space for deliberation is also certainly a good one— one that’s should be appraised, and has been, for both Foucault,

and philosophers from Socrates (‘the unexamined life is not worth living’) and John Dewey (notion of esthetic experience). Spaces that allow for deliberation and thinking certainly need not any further normative grounds as well— for Foucault, a space for subjects to think and be spontaneous, creative, is certainly a good thing (and also central to his later ‘ethical turn’). But, what else may have Foucault felt was good about ‘crisis heterotopias’ that we have not yet explored?

In continuing with the example of “ship”¹¹⁷ as ‘crisis heterotopia’ in *Of Other Spaces*, Foucault ends the piece on quite an emphatic note: “in civilizations where it is lacking, dreams dry up, adventure is replaced by espionage, and privateers by the police”¹¹⁸. The operative “where it is lacking” refers to ‘crisis heterotopias,’ like the ship, that have disappeared and been replaced by ‘deviant heterotopias’. Insofar as we can presume that “dreams dry[ing] up, adventure...replaced by espionage, and privateers by the police”¹¹⁹ is a bad thing, then, certainly, we may see the lack of ‘crisis heterotopias’ as a bad thing— something that infringes on, perhaps, the sort of creativity and spontaneity associated with “dreams...[and] adventure”¹²⁰. Furthermore, it is in ‘deviant heterotopias’ where movement, and consequently creativity, is restricted, which leads to “dreams dry[ing] up, adventure...replaced,”¹²¹ replaced by, perhaps, something like a surveillance state. Therefore, for Foucault, ‘crisis heterotopias’ are good insofar as they foster creativity and spontaneity—“dreams...adventure”¹²²— and should be appraised.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 11

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 12

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 12

¹²⁰ Ibid., 12

¹²¹ Ibid., 12

¹²² Ibid., 12

He does not make the move to say that we should reinsert ‘crisis heterotopias’ into society, but nevertheless, he at least longs for a period when ‘crisis heterotopias’ were more prevalent than they are today.

Foucault’s persistent critique of the ways non-normative subjects are cast to the edges of society (oppressed, marginalized) also gives credence to the idea that he would advocate for a space where non-normative subjects could move in creative, free, and spontaneous ways. Furthermore, Foucault’s advocacy and work with the GIP: the *Group D’Information sur les Prisons*, shows a Foucault actively interested in giving space for non-normative subjects to engage freely. The GIP’s “objective was not to advocate particular prison reforms or to diagnose the dysfunction of the prisons in the manner of sociologists, but to give a voice to prisoners themselves. This pamphlet, filled with stories of people considered non-normative and deviant, serves the function of a space where non-normativity can literally speak for itself! In a similar way, ‘crisis heterotopias’ allow non-normative subjects the space to deliberate and think for themselves. Certainly, in the same way that Foucault worked to give non-normative subjects a space to speak for themselves, Foucault would advocate for, or at least appraise and admire, a space in which non-normative subjects could speak for themselves.

4.0. What is a ‘Counter-Public’?

Nancy Fraser describes counter-public’s as “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them to

formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs”¹²³. Simply, it is a non-normative space distinct from the normative, and a space where non-normative subjects can perpetuate non-normative ideologues, ideas, thoughts, and discourses. It is a space where non-normative subjects “formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs”¹²⁴. In other words, it’s a space where non-normative subjects speak for themselves, distinct from normative subjects that speak for the non-normative subject—saying what they want, desire, need, etc. It is a space where non-normative subjects themselves determine what they want, desire, and need. This necessitates a notion of subaltern counterpublics where non-normative subjects both deliberate about what their wants, desires, and needs are, and then express them.

Furthermore, ‘counter-publics’ have been taken up in interesting ways by numerous thinkers, with Michael Warner perhaps being the most notable. In his essay (and later book of the same name) *Publics and Counter-Publics*, Warner describes ‘counter-publics’ as “publics... [that] differ markedly in one way or another from the premises that allow the dominant culture to understand itself as a public”¹²⁵. Yet, as he says, “we cannot understand counter-publics very well if we fail to see that there are contradictions and perversities inherent in the organization of all publics[;]....counter-publics are publics too [that]...*are ideological in that they provide a sense of active belonging that masks or compensates for the real powerlessness of human agents in*

¹²³ Nancy Frasier. “Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy.” In *Social Text* (Duke University Press, 1990), 70

¹²⁴Ibid., 70

¹²⁵ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 52

capitalist society”¹²⁶. Counter-publics are spaces of community that allow us to be-at-ease— give us a “sense of belonging”¹²⁷ —in the face of a capitalism that often ignores, and ceases to recognize, non-normative subjects.

For Warner counterpublics are also defined as a “spaces of circulation in which it is hoped that the poesis of scene making will be transformative, not replicative merely”¹²⁸. The scene (or space) itself is something made anew, as “the poesis of scene making”¹²⁹— meaning “the activity in which a person brings something into being that did not exist before,”¹³⁰ with the thing that didn’t exist before being then new “scene”¹³¹— denotes the non-normative scene being made as originally made (with the scene being made from nothing, from “not existi[ng],”¹³² necessitating a non-normative subject who *creatively*, or rather through creativity, forms the new scene from nothing). This new scene is not merely for the sake of being-at-ease, but is “transformative”¹³³. The scene doesn’t “replicate”¹³⁴ other scenes, but rather works to enact new sort of political change— a “transformative”¹³⁵ one— through the new scene. This political change may be in the form of subverting normative notions, changing them, or working to fight for concrete material policy change often directed as non-normative subjects.

¹²⁶ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 52

¹²⁷Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 54

¹²⁸ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 60

¹²⁹ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 61

¹³⁰ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 62

¹³¹Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 61

¹³² Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 62

¹³³ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 62

¹³⁴ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 63

¹³⁵ Michael Warner. “Publics and Counterpublics”: In *Public Culture* (Duke University Press, 2002), 64

4.1. How are ‘Counter-Public’s’ Like ‘Crisis Heterotopias’? How do They Expand and Differ Upon the Concept?

Using both Frasier and Warner’s conception of ‘counter-publics’, I will proceed to compare and contrast them to Foucault’s notion of a ‘crisis heterotopia’. The comparison will center on four aspects: 1) both as non-normative spaces, 2) both as places where non-normative subjects can deliberate and formulate ideas in distinction from the normative, 3) places where non-normative subjects can learn about themselves, and 4) both can be spaces for being-at-ease and political subversion— or both simultaneously. The differences center on three grounds: 1) counter-publics only can exist with the rise of Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, while ‘crisis heterotopias have existed in every historical community, 2) counter-publics are pervasive throughout our modern society, while ‘crisis heterotopias’ aren’t¹³⁶, and 3) counterpublics are *public*— as in they are heard by the normative, for the sake of subverting or being in opposition to the normative— while crisis heterotopias are private refuges. In both accounts, I will point out what I find to be insufficient about either both accounts, or one.

Subsequently, I will work to show the virtue of such a comparison: what does this comparison make clearer about both? How does it strengthen the flaws of the other, and vice versa? In what ways is one conception more sufficient than the other, and not? The most interesting question, perhaps, centers on the very idea that both ‘crisis heterotopias’ and ‘counter-publics’ are so similar, yet exist in completely different historical contexts— with ‘crisis

¹³⁶ Furthermore, what’s ambiguous, and should be studied in future work, is the location of counter-publics in a society; whereas ‘deviant heterotopia’s’ exist in the outskirts of a community, it is yet to be seen what location counter-publics inhabit.

heterotopia's' being an old phenomena that have mostly disappeared, while 'counter-publics' are a completely new phenomena. What we can make of this will be ever so important for what, later on, I conceive as good and original about both accounts.

4.2. How 'Counter-Publics' and 'Crisis Heterotopias are Alike?

Let me expand upon the previous conditions I gave for how counterpublics and 'crisis heterotopias' are alike.

First, and certainly most obviously, they are both spaces of non-normativity. We shall only need to look to both concepts definitions to see this. As 'crisis heterotopias' are a "privileged or sacred or forbidden place," with forbidden certainly being a place in opposition "to [normative] society,' counterpublics are "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs¹³⁷"— with "subordinated,"¹³⁸ "counter-discourse,"¹³⁹and "oppositional...identities, interests, and needs"¹⁴⁰denoting something non-normative. Furthermore, both spaces are inhabited by non-normative subjects who perpetuate non-normative discourses within them. If we think of the non-normative space of 'the motel room,' we can see the non-normative subjects within them generating ideas that are non-normative by virtue of their own non-normativity. Creating these 'counter-discourses' need not be intentional; the queers at the motel room talking about gay

¹³⁷ Ibid., 70

¹³⁸Ibid., 70

¹³⁹Ibid., 70

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 70

rights is a ‘counter-discourse’ just like a politically oriented meeting of gay allies is— albeit that the nature of these ‘counter-discourses’ are different.

Continuing the example of ‘queers at motel room’ and ‘political meeting,’ both counter-publics and crisis heterotopias are spaces that can be for either political subversion or being-at-ease. The ‘crisis heterotopia’ can be the motel room queers, merely trying to be-at-ease and work through, perhaps, some sort of internal anxiety, or a group of queers planning political protest. Though the nature of these spaces are different when they are ‘counter-publics,’ as will be detailed later on, ‘queers at a motel room’ and ‘political meetings’ both represent kinds of counterpublics that are for being-at-ease and political subversion respectively.

Lastly, and in respect to the necessary condition that is ‘non-normative subjects can learn about themselves’, both crisis heterotopias and counter-publics give non-normative subjects the space to speak and think *freely* apart from normative discourses. Consequently, this allows non-normative subjects to deliberate in ways they otherwise wouldn’t; deliberating in ways that allow them to think things anew, gain knowledge, ask questions they otherwise wouldn’t, etc. Therefore, it is the ways these spaces give subjects the space to deliberate distinct from the normative that allow them to learn and gain knowledge they, otherwise, may not of.

4.3. How ‘Counter-Publics’ and ‘Crisis Heterotopia’s’ Differ?

Frasier’s conception of a counterpublics is an expansion on Habermas account of the rise of the ‘public’, which he locates as forming in the 20th century. In contrast, Foucault refers to ‘crisis heterotopias’ as all but gone with the rise of modernity in the 20th century. In respect to conditions one and two, it seems that the two spaces are located in completely different historical

epochs. Not only that, it seems that as counterpublics rise, crisis heterotopias fall. ‘Crisis heterotopias’ are all but gone in our modern society, with the ‘motel room,’ among a few other examples, still persisting. On Foucault’s account, ‘crisis heterotopias’ have been replaced by ‘deviant heterotopias’: refuge became oppression, counter cultural space became prisons. But, Frasier’s conception of a counterpublics seems to run contrary to that very notion. ‘Crisis heterotopias,’ perhaps, may still exist, though they would have to take the form of a counterpublics.

Furthermore, counterpublics and ‘crisis heterotopias’ differ in that counterpublics are public, while ‘crisis heterotopias’ are not. Counterpublics arise from Habermas’s notion of the public, but one need not know this to see the ways counterpublics are inherently public (‘public’ being in the name aside). The “discursive arenas”¹⁴¹ that constitute counterpublics are social. The social nature of counterpublics are not the image of people gathered in a small hotel room, talking to themselves— *social* in the sense of social gathering. Rather, the “social groups”¹⁴² that perpetuate non-normative discourse proceeded to “circulate”¹⁴³ these discourses in an “oppositional”¹⁴⁴ manner. We may see this ‘circulating’ as showing social counterpublics as public ones— ones that form non-normative discourses, share them, and not keep them *private*.

In contrast, ‘crisis heterotopias’ are a “refuge” from normativity. They don’t work to be in oppositional dialogue with the normative, but to escape from it. Like the motel room, where non-normative subjects can go to not be seen, ‘crisis heterotopias’ are hidden places.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 70

¹⁴²Ibid., 70

¹⁴³Ibid., 70

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 70

5.0. Why we Should Appraise ‘Crisis Heterotopias’ & ‘Counter-Public’s?’

‘Crisis heterotopias’ and counterpublics both give space to non-normative subjects that, consequently, allow them to both live a life distinct from the normative, and to perpetuate and form ideologies to be used to subvert normativity. Consequently, both ‘crisis heterotopias’ and counterpublics necessitate talk of how normativity is violent to the non-normative, and why we should look to appraise spaces that both allow non-normative subjects to be-at-ease, and give them a space to subvert normativity. Instead of accounting for a mere few conceptions of oppression—a few which would certainly leave out many important, interdisciplinary accounts—let me draw on queer theorist Lee Edelman’s account of how normativity infringes on non-normativity. Edelman’s account will serve as grounds for my subsequent claims, which focus on how ‘crisis heterotopias’ and counterpublics are particularly suited to subverting normativity.

5.1. Lee Edelman: What Normativity Does to Non-Normativity

Lee Edelman is often referred to as the ‘Darth Vader’ of queer theory for his nihilistic approach to the discipline. Nevertheless, his insight on how normativity infringes on non-normativity are useful. There are two ways that normativity infringes on, oppresses, marginalizes, etc, non-normativity: 1) it perpetuates a normativity that works to construct non-normative discourses in terms of the normative,¹⁴⁵ and 2) it establishes a co-dependency between normative and non-normative¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴⁵ Lee Edelman, *No Future* (Duke University Press, 2004), 1-200

¹⁴⁶ Lee Edelman, *No Future* (Duke University Press, 2004), 1-200

To say that normativity works to construct non-normativity in terms of the normative is to express that normativity works to both silence non-normative discourse by positive non-normative discourse as normative. In expanding upon the example of a queer activist group, imagine that said group needed financing for a protest. Imagine this group looked to STRAIGHT.PEOPLE.CORPORATION for the financing— a group that, though queer friendly, are only queer friendly when ‘queerness’ isn’t radical, or flamboyant, or dressy, etc. The queer activist group seeks out financial assistance, but on the condition from STRAIGHT.PEOPLE.CORPORATION that they ‘tone down’ the queerness, the flamboyance, etc. The protest group is stuck: either they protest, yet become more ‘normative’ by seeking out the financial assistance, or they cant protest. It is desiring recognition from the normative STRAIGHT.PEOPLE.CORPORATION that makes the non-normative have to become normative; the non-normative will only be accepted if they conform to the normative!

In a slightly different way, when normative discourses (like STRAIGHT.PEOPLE.CORPORATION) have the ability to change non-normative discourses, they often do so. Simply, think of Black Lives Matter— a non-normative group comprised of minorities who work to enact actual political change. Now think of the ways in which BLM tee-shirts sell at Walmart and Target— and the ways the original message of BLM is watered down: the original ‘black lives matter’ becomes ‘black lives matter’ accompanied by a picture of Martin Luther King Jr. on the front. The original ‘black lives matter,’ associated with things like protest, perhaps violence, perhaps confrontation, becomes the image of a peaceful MLK— which is to say that Black Lives Matter is only okay when its associated with a peaceful black person, or one

that makes white people comfortable. Simply, once the normative Walmart has the opportunity to change the original non-normative discourse, they, often, will.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, this process establishes a co-dependency between normative and non-normative. It makes it so the non-normative group or subject has to go the normative to be who non-normative. The queer activist group, now, has to go to the normative STRAIGHT.PEOPLE.CORPORATION to protest. The relationship resembles trauma: the non-normative subject finds themselves having to go to another— having to be recognized by another — in order to be who they want. As Edelman contends, this relationship perpetuates itself until it becomes more fully realized trauma.

5.2. How Counterpublics and Crisis Heterotopias are Particularly Suited to Combatting Normativity

Perhaps, the very question is twofold: how do these spaces allow non-normative groups and subjects to both subvert and/or be-at-ease away from, the normative? The answer to the question has been brushed upon. Therefore, let me provide some more succinct necessary conditions to account for how these spaces allow us to both subvert and escape (or not) normativity.

‘Crisis heterotopias’ are constituted by the notion that they are accepted, in some sense, by the normative— even if only as a refuge. For example, the ‘motel room’ is generally accepted in society as a place of non-normativity. Therefore, the space itself necessarily is constituted by it belonging within— or being accepted by— the normative. Furthermore, the spaces themselves aren't subversive, certainly non-normative discourse may form within these spaces; certainly the

¹⁴⁷ These are only a few examples among many that critical theorists, queer theorists, philosophers, etc. give when gaging how normativity is violent to the non-normative.

queer couple at the motel room might be inspired to protest and revolt! But, it is not the space of the motel room as ‘crisis heterotopia’ itself that does this.

In contrast, counterpublics subvert normativity by both 1) perpetuating and circulating non-normative discourse, and 2) being public. The ways counterpublics are places of subversion is, perhaps, quite obvious. Circulating non-normative discourse means forming discourses that are antithetical to normative discourses—ones that challenge their attention in the public sphere. It gives people an option to, say, not just read normative discourse, but perhaps engage with non-normative discourse. This gives credence to the notion that the public nature of counterpublics make them subversive. They are not done in private (like ‘crisis heterotopias’) but are done in a public sphere where they challenge normative discourse.

Though ‘crisis heterotopias’ aren’t sufficient spaces for subverting the normative, ‘they certainly are “vestiges,” or a refuge for being-at-ease, from the normative. ‘Crisis heterotopias’ as private are what make them a suitable refuge— a place where one can hide, be in refuge and distinction, from normative society.

Interestingly enough, the public nature of counterpublics don’t make them as sufficient a space for refuge. Counterpublics are defined by the ways they “circulate”¹⁴⁸ non-normative discourse. The idea that the discourses formed in counterpublics must, necessarily be definition, be shared, seems to make them antithetical to a space where one can hide, and be-at-ease away, from the normative.

¹⁴⁸ibid., 70

Now, if one feels-at-ease *from having* their discourses circulate and be public— in opposition to the normative— then certainly counterpublics may be places where one can be-at-ease. But, insofar as it seems subverting, protesting, and challenging the normative are all ways non-normative subjects are limited— and made to be always politically oriented towards the world, and always subjects with only the purpose of *subverting and protesting*— and insofar as, therefore, subversion and protest seem antithetical to a subject being-at-ease, it seems that, consequently, counterpublics that “circulate” non-normative discourse are not places of being-at-ease. Simply, counterpublics are always political and public, and insofar as subjects always being political and public is antithetical to being-at-ease, counterpublics aren't great places for being-at-ease.

More succinctly, it seems there is an interesting binary between counterpublics and ‘crisis heterotopias’. It is counterpublics public and political nature that make them sufficient places of subversion, but less sufficient places for being-at-ease. In contrast, the opposite is true of ‘crisis heterotopias’. Insofar as they are private refuges, they are great spaces for ‘being-at-ease’, but not optimal spaces for subverting the normative.

6.0. Conclusion

Hopefully, my account of ‘crisis heterotopias’ and counterpublics has provided useful scholarship on the relation between the two, and the different ways in which both serve as space distinct from the normative. Future scholarship may further the comparison to other conceptions within philosophy, political theory, and critical theory.

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